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Abstract 
In Chapter 1, I hypothesize that there is a differential response by agents to changes in 
sovereign credit risk in both calm (low default risk) and turbulent (high default risk) markets 
conditions or regimes. This creates two time-varying states of the world. I model the two regimes 
using threshold cointegration and Threshold vector error correction model in three pairs from 
sovereign CDS, bond and equity markets for each of seventeen emerging markets. I find 
evidence of nonlinear cointegration in 48/51 cointegrations and momentum in 
41/51cointegrations. In 49/51 combinations, positive and negative cointegration divergences 
adjust to equilibrium relationship at different speeds. Asymmetric short and long-run adjustments 
is found in 66/102 pairs. The informativeness of each asset price is regime dependent. The 
results largely contradict evidence provided by linear modeling. There is evidence of contagion 
among sovereign CDS, bond and equity markets based on asset substitution and news-based 
hypotheses. Therefore, dynamic interaction among assets and their price informativeness is 
generally regime dependent.  The existence of momentum, multiple regimes, thresholds and 
overall evidence have important implications in portfolio rebalancing, hedging and policy 
intervention decisions.  
 
In chapter 2, I hypothesize that financial intermediaries can be categorized into bank-
based institutions (BBIs) and market-based institutions (MBIs). MBIs and BBIs are under 
different regulatory agencies. Traditionally, the Fed use only BBIs to transmit liquidity and 
monetary policy into real economy and financial markets yet MBIs also play important role in 
providing liquidity and stability in financial markets. I use two monetary policy tools under two 
regimes to investigate which monetary policy tool is suitable for each category of financial 
x 
 
intermediary and under which regime. Using Threshold vector auto-regressions and regime 
specific impulse response functions, I find that liquidity of BBIs and MBIs respond differently to 
different monetary policy tools under different regimes. Moreover, monetary policies are 
uncertain and vary over time. The Fed cannot continue to ignore MBIs in formulating and 
implementing monetary policy. Monetary aggregate policy is more effective when used on MBIs 
during contractionary monetary policy intervention (economic downturn) while Federal fund rate 
is more effective when used on BBIs under expansionary monetary policy. 
 
KEY WORDS: Threshold, Nonlinear, Price discovery, cointegration, Liquidity, Monetary Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1:  
Momentum, Nonlinear Price Discovery and Asymmetric Spillover: Sovereign Credit 
Risk and Equity Markets of Emerging Countries 
I. Introduction 
When financial markets are calm, there is little or no intervention by policy makers 
while investors don’t face downside risk associated with wealth loss from decline in asset 
prices. This ‘calm’ market condition can be regarded as a state of the world or regime. An 
alternative state of the world or regime can be characterized by high uncertainty and turmoil 
in financial markets. In this state, policy makers aggressively intervene in the market and 
real economy to level the fluctuations and alleviate investors’ fear and overreaction. Investor 
also takes aggressive actions to rebalance their portfolio and hedge against or minimize 
further wealth loss. According to Lee, Fang and Lin (2007), crises episodes such Asian crisis 
of 1997, internet bubble burst of year 2000 and sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007/2008 
triggered negative impact on both investors’ wealth and domestic, regional or global 
economies. This became the foundation of acute convergence of investors’ sentiments and 
led to the transmission of price variance among CDS, stocks and bonds across domestic and 
international markets. 
While other financial and economic conditions may exist within the realm of the two 
states, it is easier to assess the singular and contrasting actions of policy makers and 
investors under the calm and volatile regimes. According to Mankiw and Miron (1986), the 
mere existence of such regimes is a testament of the uncertain environment under which 
agents make decisions based on the new information they receive and accordingly adjust 
their expectations. The two regimes occur at different times hence modeling using different 
market regimes captures time variation in states of the world. 
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In the context of multiple regimes, we can define momentum from perspective of 
cointegration relationship between two assets. Specifically, momentum occurs when 
divergence or error term in cointegration relationship displays higher intensity in one regime 
or direction relative to alternative regime. This is particularly apposite when the size of 
divergence militate the adjustment in each regime. Enders and Siklos (2001) document that 
momentum modeling entails intervention by policy makers to smooth intensified changes in 
a macro variable in one direction only. For example: Policy makers smooth large increases 
in inflation, government budget deficits, inflation rates, interest rates and unemployment 
rates among others while divergences that minimize these macro variables are unconstrained. 
Investors in corporate and sovereign bonds hold risky investments and need protection 
against potential default. Similar to conventional insurance, the bondholders pay ‘insurance’ 
premium called credit default swap CDS) spread or premium1 to buy protection against 
default by the borrower (reference entity).  The payment of CDS spread transfers the risk of 
default from bondholder to CDS seller (Duffie, 1999 and Hull and White, 2000). Should the 
reference entity defaults, a swap will occur where the CDS buyer is eligible to receive the 
par value of the bond of contract from the seller of the CDS. Other credit events such as 
bankruptcy, credit rating downgrades, debt restructuring, repudiation, technical insolvency, 
violation of loan agreement or indenture can elicit a swap. The borrowers or reference 
entities can be domestic firms, foreign firms, sovereign governments and even quasi-
government entities.  
CDS spread is expressed as a percentage of the par value of the bond and is paid 
either quarterly or semi-annually. For example: If the par value of a bond is $1000,000 and 
                                                            
1 The terms Spread and premium are used fairly interchangeably. In this study, I shall consistently 
use the term CDS spread. 
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the bond holder agrees to pay $8,000 quarterly($32,000 per annum) to CDS seller like  AIG, 
CDS spread is 320 basis points. The higher the credit or default risk of reference entity, the 
higher the CDS spread charged by the seller and vice versa. CDS instruments are traded on 
over-the-counter market and CDS spread on each reference entity changes as investors’ 
perception about credit risk changes. For example: News about government budget deficits 
and deteriorating fiscal policies, political instability and reduced exports will lead to increase 
in sovereign CDS premium. CDS is a derivative of bonds issued by reference entities. CDS 
premium should ideally be equal to bond spreads (bond yield less interest rate of a treasury 
bond of the same maturity). This exposition in substantiated further in the literature by Hull 
and White (2000). 
Can the concept of momentum be applied in sovereign CDS, bonds and equity markets? 
We can infer that increase in sovereign credit default swap (CDS) premium and bond spread, 
both of which evince increase in default or credit risk of the sovereign government borrower 
(as a result of huge budget deficits and poor fiscal policies) lead to policy intervention while 
investors rebalance their portfolios, buy more CDS to hedge against default risk or dump the 
bonds and equity in their portfolios. These intensified and panicky actions of bondholders 
and policy makers will influence equity market, alter the short term and long term dynamic 
relationship among the three assets (CDS, bonds and equity) and the price informativeness of 
each asset. Reduction in divergences in cointegration relationships in pair-wise combinations 
of the three markets (CDS premium and bond spreads, CDS premium and equity and  equity 
and bond spreads) require little or no policy intervention. In this context, momentum is likely 
to exist in dynamic interaction among the three markets. 
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I focus on Seventeen emerging markets which are geographically dispersed across four 
continents. I analyze the three markets of each country instead of panel for various reasons. 
First, according to Bekaert and Harvey (2002), emerging countries have higher default risk 
relative to developed countries. On the basis of Merton (1974) theory, Investors are likely to 
trade more on emerging markets sovereign bonds and CDS. Anecdotal evidence shows that 
emerging markets’ CDS and bonds are more liquid than those of developed countries with 
low credit risk since it is the country’s fundamentals as opposed to credit risk that drive the 
CDS premium and bond yield. Second, different countries have different levels of credit risk. 
I am interested in assessing how this risk is priced by different securities unique to each 
country. Third, the levels of market frictions, which may deter attainment of equilibrium 
relationship between cointegrated securities, vary across time and countries. Fourth, 
sovereign CDS premium, bond yield and equity prices are influenced by the fiscal policies 
and budget deficits of individual country. These policies are generally unique to each 
country which warrants the analysis to be confined to each country. Fifth, different countries 
have different levels of economic and financial development, political stability, financial 
structure, financial architecture and integration with global economy and financial market. 
This will influence the pricing of default risk. Lastly, cultural factors play a role in trading of 
securities. Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) find that the momentum effect in the stock market 
is stronger in countries with stronger degree of individualism, implying that cultural factors 
affect trading behavior. 
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) note that academic literature and study on the relationship 
among credit derivatives, bond, and equity markets is very small. For example: Studies by 
Longstaff, Mital and Neiss (2005), Norden and Weber (2004), Forte and Peña (2008), Pan 
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and Singleton (2008), Norden and Weber (2009) and Meng, Gwilym, and Varas (2009) and 
Longstaff et al (2011) span the three markets. Among these studies, only Chan-Lau and Kim 
(2004) and Pan and Singleton (2008) have focused on sovereign CDS, bonds and equity 
markets albeit Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) justified extending Merton (1974) theory from a 
corporate to a sovereign issuer.2 The study by Pan and Singleton (2008) covered only three 
emerging markets (Turkey, South Korea and Mexico). 
 Previous studies have focused on linear relationship among the three corporate 
markets3.There has been no empirical study focusing on non-linear cointegration and price 
discovery among the sovereign bond market, CDS market and the equity market. Extant 
literature unreservedly surmises that the price discovery mechanisms are both constant and 
continuous under linear modeling. This is only realistic if financial markets are dominated by 
homogeneous agents. However, a large body of finance literature lucidly document that 
financial markets are dominated by heterogeneous agents. Hommes and Wagener (2009), 
using the seminal works of Simon (1991) and Rubinstein (1998), argue that financial 
markets are complex adaptive systems, dominated by incessantly interacting heterogeneous 
agents with “bounded rationality”. The heterogeneous agents thus have limited information, 
cognitive abilities and finite time availability for decision-making. Against this background, 
rationality of agents is limited and the use of rules of thumb is highly prevalent. Therefore, 
financial markets become nonlinear systems 
Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), using linear modeling, did not find any equilibrium price 
relationship between the bond and CDS markets and the equity markets for most of the 
                                                            
2See Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) paper which illustrates how corporate credit risk modeling 
can be extended to sovereign bonds and credit risk. 
3See for example  Norden, Lars and M. Weber 2004, Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Blanco, 
Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2007), Forte and Lovreta (2008), Forte (2008), 
Ammer and Fang (2008), Norden and Weber (2009) 
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sovereigns they covered. One of the possible explanations they give for their findings is 
nonlinearities in time series data due to high volatility of security prices and returns that 
characterize emerging markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 2002). Delatte et al (2010), using 
Smooth Transition threshold auto-regression (STAR) conclude that in a single country, price 
discovery pecking order may be reversed above a definite threshold of spread depending on 
market conditions. In fact, the market in which price discovery occurs may be dependent 
upon financial, economic, liquidity and other factors not captured by the linearity 
relationship.  
 Linden (2010), argue that the existing literature on the interaction of CDS and bond 
markets focus mainly on the pricing of risk and the role of both markets in price discovery. 
Gomez (2003), Cremers (2004) and Zhang (2008) argue that looking only at the relationship 
between credit derivatives and cash bond markets is insufficient, and suggest including 
equity markets as well in the analysis hence connecting CDS, bond and equity markets. 
Motivated by findings of Chan-Lau and Kim (2004), the conclusion of Delatte et al 
(2010) and dearth of studies in non-linear price discovery, cointegration and long-run 
adjustment process in pairs of sovereign CDS, bond spreads and equity prices, I seek to 
address the following questions:  
(i) Are sovereign CDS spreads, bond spreads and equity prices characterized by 
nonlinearities? 
(ii) Does a threshold exist below or above which pair-wise cointegration will 
change? What is this threshold value and how does it affect nonlinear or 
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threshold4cointegration, speed and magnitude of adjustment process to pair-
wise equilibrium relationship and price informativeness of each security? 
(iii) Does momentum exists and if it does, how does it affect cointegration and 
price discovery process in each regime?  
(iv) The changes in CDS premium, bond spreads and equity prices lead to 
changes in returns associated with each security. The three securities are 
usually held in a portfolio by investors. During clam regime, investors 
generate positive returns. In the volatile regime, they generate negative 
returns and attempt to hedge against downside risk. Since investors rebalance 
their portfolios as regime changes, is there asymmetric return spillover among 
the three securities? 
 
I find evidence of nonlinearities in time series data. In 49/51 possible cointegration 
relations, I find evidence specification error in linear regression which supports the case for 
nonlinear modeling. Momentum in cointegration is evident in 41/51 possible contegrations. 
In 51/51 pair-wise combinations, we find that positive and negative divergences adjust to 
equilibrium relationship at dissimilar speeds and magnitudes depending on the regime. 
Moreover, asymmetric short-and long-run adjustment process is found in 66/102 and 55/102 
possible combinations respectively. The informativeness of each asset in a pair is 
asymmetric and regime dependent and generally contradict results of linear modeling. In 
asymmetric return spillover, I find evidence in support of asset substitution hypothesis and 
news-based hypothesis of financial contagions in sovereign CDS, bond and equity markets. 
Therefore, dynamic interaction among assets held in a portfolio shift with regime change.  
                                                            
4  In this study, I use the terms nonlinearity and asymmetrical fairly interchangeably 
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Investors, in making decisions regarding portfolio rebalancing and hedging against downside 
risk need to identify when regimes change to make informed decisions while policy makers 
need to identify the threshold below or above which policy intervention in the market 
becomes necessary. Linear modeling may provide mis-specified and biased results as 
indicated by comparative results of linear and nonlinear modeling. 
 
The findings were achieved through a battery of econometric tests and modeling. We 
first test for nonlinearities in the time series data of sovereign CDS premium, bond spreads 
and equity and then utilize nonlinear threshold cointegration, momentum threshold auto-
regression (MTAR), and threshold vector error correction model (TVECM) to assess 
asymmetric short term and long run adjustment process in price discovery mechanism. 
Nonlinear modeling can be justified on numerous grounds.  First, Marshall (1994) argues 
that linear VECM guarantee permanent attraction effect regardless of the size of deviation 
from equilibrium relationship of variables. This is premised on the assumption that agents 
make decisions under a single state of the world (single regime) which is not realistic.  
Second, investors are usually concerned only with downside risk hence it is expected 
that cointegration and price informativeness of different assets in the portfolio will 
significantly differ between regimes that define presence and absence of downside risk. 
Third, default or credit risk of sovereign borrowers is generally pegged on fiscal 
policies and level of budget deficits of the borrowing government. CDS buyers and 
sovereign bondholder are less concerned with risk of default when sovereign borrowers have 
low budget deficits. However, when budget deficits balloon and foreign governments’ credit 
rating is downgraded, bondholder react by buying more protection. The CDS premium will 
increase while bonds prices will tumble (bond yield will increase due to higher default risk). 
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Stock prices will also react to credit risk and will try to price it accordingly. Therefore, non-
linear modeling is justified to capture periods of low and high budget deficits. 
Fourth, there exist country specific liquidity regimes as intimated by Delatte et al 
(2010). CDS, bonds and equities of small countries are less liquid and may be in different 
regime with more liquid CDS, bonds and equity of large, well-established sovereigns.  
Fifth, according to Mankiw and Miron (1994), identification of different regimes 
through threshold modeling is a way of incorporating uncertainty and time-variation in 
cointegration relationships and price discovery process since regimes represent different 
states of the world which investors face and respond to. These states also occur at different 
times.  
Lastly, the theory of finance suggests that there is a limit to arbitrage. Trivial 
deviations from long run equilibrium may not justify arbitrage process to generate profits 
hence there must be a threshold beyond which arbitrage becomes profitable. This requires 
definition of regimes of profitable and unprofitable arbitrage opportunities especially in CDS 
and bond markets which “playing fields” of many speculators who assess mispricing of 
bonds and the underlying derivative (CDS) to engage in arbitrage activities. 
We contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, this is the first 
study, to the best of our knowledge, to investigate nonlinear co-integration and short term 
and long run dynamic interaction of sovereign CDS premium, bond spreads and equity using 
a large data set of seventeen emerging markets. Two, we assess the effects of momentum 
(intensified reaction in one regime relative to substitute regime or direction) in cointegration 
and price discovery process. This accounts for asymmetry in the relationships and the role of 
10 
 
trading adjustment costs among arbitrageurs. Three, in assessing price discovery among the 
three markets, we employ a unified econometric model (Threshold error correction model) 
and compare it with linear models to uncover contradictions and similarities. For example: Is 
linear price discovery more consistent with lower regime or upper regime? The sign of error 
correction term in different regimes can help identify which market can trigger momentum 
and arbitrage opportunities as regime shifts occur and presence of any price bubbles. Lastly, 
we implicitly incorporate 2007-8 financial crises since this period is captured as part of the 
“volatile” regime during which momentum is likely to occur. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and 
develops testable hypotheses. Section III details econometric methodology. Section IV 
explains empirical results and findings and section V shall summarize and conclude 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis development 
A. Theoretical foundation: Relationship between Bond and equity markets 
 
The option pricing theory of Merton (1974) is the fulcrum around which the relationship 
between bond and equity prices revolves. According to the theory, equity is equivalent to a 
call option whenever a limited liability firm issues a bond or is financed by debt. By issuing 
a bond (assumed a zero coupon bond) and using the assets of the collateral, equity holders 
have theoretically ‘sold’ the firm to creditors or bondholders. Equity holders thus hold a call 
option to buy back and own the assets only after paying back the face value (strike price) of 
debt to creditors. The option life is equal to maturity period of the bond.  If we define C as 
value of call option, S as market value of assets at maturity and F as face value (Strike price) 
of a zero coupon bond, then,  at maturity,  C=max(S-F, 0) 
11 
 
If S-F>0, the firm’s assets are worth more than the debt’s face value and the call 
option is “in-the-money”. Equity holders will exercise it by paying off the debt and ‘buy 
back’ the assets otherwise, equity is worthless, and the call option is “out-of-the-money.” In 
Merton’s capital structure framework, the face value of bond constitute a lower threshold 
which the value of firm’s assets cannot breach. If this barrier is breached (S<F), the firm is 
likely to default on its debt. S-F is ideally a distance to default. As this distance is reduced, 
the leverage of the firm increases, credit risk rises and bond yield increases (to reflect higher 
credit risk) and value of equity declines further.  Merton’s (1974) structural model is used to 
estimate the probability of default (PD) of a firm and risk premium (yield of a risky bond 
less yield of a risk-free bond of same maturity) 
Emerging markets Credit rating*5 (Adapted**6) 
Country Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela China Indonesia Malaysia 
Credit rating CCC- BBB- BB+ BBB B+ A+ BB- A- 
Country Philippines Bulgaria Hungary Poland Russia Turkey S. Africa Tunisia 
Credit rating BB- BBB- BBB A- BBB BB BBB+ BBB 
 
When PD or credit risk is high (as characterized by high leverage and below 
investment-grade credit ratings, for example, all countries except China, Malaysia and 
Poland), there is a strong positive correlation between equity and bond prices since both 
prices will plummet to incorporate higher credit risk. Zhu (2006) and Realdon (2008) finds 
that the firm's stock price contain important information regarding default intensity 
especially when the default risk is high (call option is out-of- the-money) and the markets are 
                                                            
5*Laura Jaramillo and Catalina Michelle Tejada, Sovereign Credit Ratings and Spreads in Emerging Markets: 
Does Investment Grade Matter?, Working Paper WP/11/44, IMF 
 
6 **Average sovereign long-term foreign currency rating across S&P, Moody's and Fitch. Source: Bloomberg, 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Services 
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distressed. However, equity prices are less useful conduits of conveying default risk of the 
firm when default risk is low. This is because equity prices will be driven primarily by firm’s 
fundamentals and not default risk. 
The co-movement of corporate stock and bond yield has been observed in a variety 
of other models by French and Roll (1986), Fama and French (1989, 1996), Asquith, 
Gertner, and Sharfstein (1994), Opler and Titman (1994), Denis and Denis (1995), Fleming 
and Remolona (1997), Campbell and Taksler (2003), and Vassalou and Xing (2004)). The 
overall evidence shows that the relationship between equity and bond yield and returns vary 
over time, particularly under exogenous influences. From the forgoing, I develop the 
following hypothesis:  
Ho1; There exists time varying and nonlinear cointegration relationship between bond yield 
(spreads) and equity prices. The influence of exogenous factors creates momentum in one 
regime relative to alternative regime. 
 
B. Relationship	between	CDS	and	Equity	and	CDS	and	bonds	
 
Merton theory can be extended to explain the relationship between CDS premium and 
equity prices. When credit risk is a key concern to bondholders, investors will dump equity 
which will precipitate a decline in stock prices. There will also be intensified demand for 
CDS of the firm to insure against potential default. This will lead to increase in CDS 
premium. We can thus again infer that relationship between CDS premium and equity prices 
has to be negative (See also Zhang et al, 2008). Yu (2006) notes that the premise of capital 
structure arbitrage is that the theoretical relation between the CDS spread and the equity 
price would reign in the long run. The attainment of the long run relation implies that CDS 
position can cushion the loss from the equity position and vice versa. This will eliminate the 
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arbitrage opportunities and make the CDS and equity markets more integrated and efficient 
in pricing default risk.  
Hull and White (2000, 2001), lucidly explain that CDS spread makes the bond 
default risk free similar to interest rate of a par-floating treasury bond since the par value is 
guaranteed. If y is the yield to maturity of a bond and CDS premium is cost of insurance, the 
default risk free (rf) bond yield is y–CDS. If arbitrage opportunities do not exist, then, y–
CDS=rf or equivalently, y–rf=CDS. The CDS is thus the price of credit and should be equal 
to bond spread, BYS=y–rf of a zero-coupon, par-floating. If markets are frictionless and 
payment of the CDS spread discontinues on occurrence of a credit events, CDS and BYS 
should exhibit a one-to-one changes in terms of price dynamics.   
However, factors such as relative liquidity of each market, contract specifications 
under bond indentures, transaction costs, taxes, regulations and “cheapest-to-deliver” option 
in the CDS contract (the option which allows the CDS buyers to deliver a bond which is 
worth less than the one referenced in the contract if a credit event occurs) make the basis 
(BYS-CDS) to exist. For example: If Sovereign bonds are more liquid than CDS contracts, 
CDS premium will be higher than bond spreads due to illiquidity premium. Nevertheless, 
bidirectional liquidity migration from one market to the other will trigger divergence of CDS 
and bond spreads.  
There are two important inferences that we can make from Merton’s theory exposition of 
Hull and White (2000, 2001). First, there is negative relationship between measures of credit 
risk (CDS premium and bond spreads) and equity prices. Second, CDS premium, bond 
spreads and equity prices adjust simultaneously whenever new information on credit risk is 
released in the market. Empirical evidence by Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Blanco, 
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Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Longstaff, et al (2005) show that corporate CDS in U.S and 
Europe adjusts to or incorporate new credit risk information well before bond prices. 
Therefore, corporate CDS market leads in price discovery process. Acharya and Johnson 
(2007) investigate the impact of CDS innovations on stock return and financial stability.  
They find that negative credit news lead to shocks in equity market. They conclude that this 
is indicative of insider trading in the over-the –counter CDS market.  
Can we employ Merton’s theory and argument to emerging countries’ sovereign bonds, 
equity and CDS markets especially given that a sovereign issuer may choose to default even 
when it is technically solvent?  What is the pecking order of price discovery and 
informativeness of sovereign CDS premium, equity and bond spreads? 
A Merton-type theoretical justification can be explained as follows: A country with a 
higher default risk will experience a decline in its stock market performance either because 
economic and financial fundamentals are deteriorating or because domestic and international 
investors are demanding higher risk premium or both. The cost of buying insurance (CDS 
premium) against country’s potential default risk will increase. This exerts a further pressure 
on equity prices since sellers of credit derivatives will be shorting either bonds or equity to 
mitigate their exposure from potential losses or downside risk. 
In summary, we expect a negative relationship between sovereign CDS premium and 
equity prices. Forte and Lovreta (2008) argue that credit risk in the stock market is implicit 
in nature since CDS and stock markets have stark differences in several fronts such as 
organization, participants (Longstaff et al 2005)), investor base, risk preferences, reactions to 
news, liquidity, and stage of development. For example: Sovereign bond market is 
dominated by less diverse institutional investors who tend to buy and hold bonds, not 
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tending to react to developments in other markets. These differences among CDS, bond and 
equity markets are likely to cause short-term deviations from the long-term relationship. 
Ho2: There exist a nonlinear pair-wise short term and long-term relationship among 
sovereign CDS premium, bond spreads and equity prices.  
C. Price discovery and Informativeness of security prices 
Stein (1987) argues that the entry of new investors potentially lowers the informativeness 
of bond prices. This lowers the ability of pre-existing investors to conjecture asset value. 
This could trigger price instability and reduction in welfare benefits. According to Acharya 
and Johnson (2007), the opacity of the over-the-counter (OTC) CDS market potentially 
makes it the preferred venue for informed or insider traders seeking to hide their trades. 
Blanco et al. (2005) finds that corporate CDS spreads respond more rapidly to changes in 
perceived default risk than bond spreads. They argue that price discovery occurs in the CDS 
market because of (micro) structural factors that make CDS the most convenient location for 
trading of credit risk.  
          In analyzing the three corporate markets, Longstaff, et al (2005) investigates the lead-
lag relationship among bond spreads, CDS spreads and stock returns. The equity and CDS 
markets adjust faster than bond market to new information. However, neither CDS nor 
equity market clearly dominates in the price discovery role.  In contrast, Norden and Weber 
(2005, 2009) finds that equity returns lead CDS and bond spread in price discovery. CDS 
spreads lead bond spreads in price discovery. The CDS price leadership over bond spreads is 
more prevalent in US firms than European firms. CDS market is also found to be more 
sensitive to the stock market changes than the changes in bond market. The co-movement 
between CDS and stock market is increasing and strengthening in deterioration of credit 
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quality and size of the bond. Forte and Peña (2008) employ VECM framework and stock 
market implied credit spreads and find that generally, equity market frequently dominates 
CDS and bond market in price discovery process. They attribute this outcome to relative 
illiquidity of the embryonic CDS market. This evidence is supported by Levy (2009) who 
confirms that the CDS market does not always lead the bond market in price discovery. CDS 
spreads are increasing in illiquidity of the CDS contracts and counterparty risk. However, 
when there is reduced trading (and liquidity) in the sovereign bond market, the CDS market 
becomes the attractive platform for investors to change the exposure in their sovereign bond 
portfolio. CDS contracts, unlike bond indentures, facilitate transfer of credit risk embedded 
in the fixed bond security. The demand for credit risk transfer (credit risk insurance) is 
higher the more volatile, uncertain and the higher the probability of default by the corporate 
entity. 
There is limited research on the price discovery function of the sovereign CDS. 
Anecdotal evidence7 shows that CDS has higher default risk anticipatory power than both 
stock and equity market. Zhang (2008) finds that Argentina’s CDS could predict credit 
events in the country well before the rating agencies since credit rating often lags credit 
events. Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) perform cointegration and causality tests and price 
discovery analysis for the stock market, sovereign bond market, and the CDS market. They 
find no equilibrium relationship between sovereign bond and CDS markets while price 
                                                            
7 For example, some weeks before GM’s debt was downgraded to junk bond on May 5, 2005, the 
CDS market had anticipated the deterioration in credit quality of GM. Zhang (2008) also find 
evidence that CDS market anticipated default by Argentina. Again, according  to The Wall Street 
Journal, 
“Trading in Harrah's Contracts Surges Before LBO Disclosure,” Oct. 4, 2006, Harrah experienced a 
dramatic spike in the CDS contracts well before the news of leveraged-buyout (LBO) were divulged 
to the public. However, the stock market lagged the CDS market in incorporating the LBO news. 
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discovery and causality tests yielded mixed results. In particular, equity markets play 
insignificant role in price discovery while sovereign CDS leads in price discovery in some 
sovereigns in the study. Ammer and Cai (2008) investigate price discovery between 
sovereign bonds and CDS. They find that in four out of the nine sovereigns studied, CDS 
market lead bond market in price discovery. They attribute the significant short run deviation 
between the two markets to relative liquidity and contract specifications of each market 
particularly the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option which encumbers CDS liquidity for riskier 
sovereigns.  
Aktug, Geraldo and Bae (2008) study thirty sovereigns and find mixed evidence in 
which sovereign bond markets lead CDS markets in 48% of the time but lag CDS spreads in 
22% of the time). Fung et al (2008) investigates the market-wide relations between the U.S. 
equity and CDS markets and find that there is significant bidirectional information and 
volatility feedback between equity market and the high-yield CDS (high credit risk). 
However, the equity market leads the investment-grade CDS (low credit risk) in price 
discovery. Investors should thus seek information from the two markets when evaluating 
trading, hedging and price discovery alternatives.  
Chan, Fung and Zhang (2009) find that price discovery takes place primarily in the 
CDS market in six out of seven emerging markets. They attribute this to shallow and 
underdeveloped stock market while the counterpart CDS market has fewer restrictions, 
broader investor base, and greater information advantage. From the foregoing findings, I 
develop the following hypothesis 
Ho3: The price discovery process is non-linear and regime dependent. Therefore, 
linear and nonlinear modeling will yield conflicting results 
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The mixed findings by individual authors and among the authors who have utilized linear 
modeling confirm that there is inconclusive evidence as to which market in the pair leads in 
price discovery.  
D. Return spillover among CDS, Bonds and equity 
 
Fama and Roll (1986) finds that asset price returns are much more volatile during 
weekdays than during weekends, primarily due to information flow reflected by volatility 
spillover between the markets. However, Fama and French (1996) and Fleming and 
Remolona (1997) find that the movements in bond yields and stock returns are no pure 
random walk. This is because bonds and equity generate fixed and variable cash flows 
respectively. As such, portfolio managers often regard the two assets as complements for 
portfolio diversification. In a bull market, both assets tend to exhibit upward trend. In a bear 
market, there is “flight to quality” and investors will dump equity and seek safety in bonds 
with fixed returns. The two assets prices will be negatively correlated. 
Fama and French (1989, 1996) find that many interest rate-related instrumental 
variables such as term spreads, quality spreads and short-term T-Bill yields have forecasting 
power for time series of stock and bond returns.  There are two contrasting strands of 
evidence regarding the nature of credit risk and volatility influence on equity returns. One 
view by Campbell and Taksler (2003) find that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility contributes 
explanatory power in cross-sectional variation in bond yields as can credit ratings. Since 
aggregate corporate yield spreads widen during periods of higher idiosyncratic risk, equity 
volatility helps to explain not only movements in corporate yield spreads, but also their 
longer-term upward trend. This partly explains why high-default-risk firms earn higher 
equity returns than low default risk firms.  This view is supported by Opler and Titman 
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(1994) and Asquith, Gertner, and Sharfstein (1994) who find that default risk is related to 
idiosyncratic factors.  A contrasting view by Denis and Denis (1995) and Vassalou and Xing 
(2004), find that corporate default risk is systemic since it varies with business cycles and 
macroeconomic factors. Therefore, changes in corporate bond yields (measures of credit 
risk) should affect firm’s equity returns.  
A new strand of literature on relationship between sovereign bond yield and stock 
returns has provided inconclusive evidence. Aburachis and Kish (1999) quantify the 
relationship between stock returns and bond yields for nine industrialized countries during 
the period 1984-1994 and provide empirical evidence that support the view that stock and 
bond yields do not follow a pure random walk. Elli (2002) examines the relationship 
between real stock returns and matched-maturity long-term bond yields for 16 countries. He 
finds a strong positive correlation for every country in the sample. The findings suggest that 
volatility of long term real stock returns and long term real bond yields are closely related. 
None of the above studies have investigated the asymmetric return spillover among the 
sovereign CDS, bond and equity returns. I argue that the three securities are held by 
investors in a portfolio and investors will rebalance the portfolio as states of the world 
(regimes) or market conditions change. Calm regime is characterized by positive returns 
while a volatile regime is characterized by negative returns. Equity and bonds are usually 
held as substitute assets (fixed return versus variable return investment). Investors will 
substitute equity for bonds during volatile regime and vice versa. This is consistent with the 
findings by Fung et al (2008) who state that investors in the stock and CDS markets are more 
readily to take action under deteriorating market conditions than under normal (calm regime) 
market conditions.  They will also sell equity and buy more CDS during volatile regime. I 
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thus expect a return spillover or a three-way feedback among the equity, CDS and bond 
markets under different regimes. 
 
In relation to the direction of return spillover, King and Wadhani (1990) proposed asset 
substitution hypothesis. The hypothesis asserts that derivative instruments and their 
underlying securities are substititutes and information favoring one market will inevitably 
alter the attractiveness of one security at the detriment of the other two. For example: Any 
news of budgeoning budget deficits and potential default on sovereign bonds by government 
(bad news or negative return shock) will make the bonds (and by extension, equity) less 
attractive and sovereign CDS more attractive as investors are buoyed to hedge against 
default. Moreover, because of high leverage in the CDS markets, CDS instruments are more 
sensitive to new information relative to bond and equity markets.Alexopoulou et al (2009) 
finds that the during the 2007-8 financial market turmoil, there was significant shift in the 
way market participants priced credit risk in corporate sector. This strengthened the price 
discovery role of the corporate CDS  
As investors take leverage position in the unfunded CDS market, CDS spreads will 
increase. The positive returns shocks in the CDS market will thus transmit negative return 
shocks (distabilizing effects) in bond and equity markets. I thus develop the following 
hypothesis 
Ho4: There is asymmetric short term return spillover among sovereign CDS spreads, bond 
spreads and equity markets returns. Positive (negative) return shocks in CDS spillover into 
equity and bond markets with a negative (positive) sign.  
 
According to news-based view of spillover advanced by Campbell and Vuolteennaho 
(2004), stock-unique news emanating from stock market will lead to substitution effects as 
investors substibute stock for bonds and vice versa. Price changes in each market conveys 
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different magnitude and uniques nature of information regarding that market or asset class. 
For example: Changes in stock prices generally reflect corrections of firm values due to 
changes in both systematic factors and firm’s fundamentals. Therefore, positive stock-
specific news (positive stock return shocks) will transmit negative spillover effect on the 
bond market (and CDS market by extension). By the same vein, positive (negative) bond-
specific news or return shocks relaying aggregate economic conditions, positively 
(negatively) affects both equity and CDS prices and transmit the shocks into equity and CDS 
returns with the same sign but asymmetric effects. The asymmetric effects may be due to 
multiplier effects of CDS instruments.  CDS derivatives enable more complex credit 
derivative products, such as synthetic CDOs and CDS index-related products to be weaved. 
Any increase in CDS volatility for any given entity may cause investors to result in these 
complex synthetic alternative investment assets to adjust their portfolios. This will not only 
intensify volatility of the CDS spreads but will also trigger asymmetric return and volatility 
in both equity and bond markets. It is thus the varying investment strategies and styles in the 
financial system that becomes the return shocks transmitting mechanism among the three 
markets or assets as they interact in a complex way. This also creates potential that trading in 
one market may potentially create momentum in the other two markets. Consistent with 
financial contagion and news specificity views, I hypothesize that 
Ho5: Short term return spillover occurs in any one of the three markets and asymmetrically 
spreads to the other two markets.  
 
III. Data and Econometric Methodology 
E. Data sources and data characteristics 
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I use the daily closing prices of sovereign CDS premium, Emerging market bond indices 
(EMBI) and national stock indices of each sovereign. Different sovereigns have different 
starting dates but ending date is 11/02/2009. The data is provided by Datastream and JP 
Morgan Chase. The two sources are the main providers for of credit derivatives research 
data. The EMBI Global total return index consist of bond prices accrued dividends and cash 
payments (total returns). The index is market-value weighted, 5-year, US-dollar issued 
Eurobonds, Brady Bonds, traded loans and local market debt securities issued by sovereign 
government and quasi-sovereign entities. The minimum current face value outstanding is 
US$500 million. In the global credit derivative trading, the 5-year sovereign CDS contracts 
are among the most liquid and most actively traded securities. 
Anecdotal evidence from data provided by Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC) shows that the top six reference names are EMs sovereign CDS by gross notional 
value. Among the top-100 U.S dollar denominated reference entities in the CDS market, 
nineteen were sovereign entities. Of these nineteen, eleven were EMs sovereign CDS which 
account for almost 30% of the $1.46trillion trading volume of the top-100 reference names 
taken together.  
My study covers seventeen emerging markets from four major economically diverse 
geographical regions. These regions are Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela), Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines), Africa (Tunisia 
and South Africa) and Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey, Among these 
sovereigns, Brazil, Philippines, Mexico and South Africa are the most liquid and frequently 
traded sovereign bonds. 
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 Financial time series exhibit unique characteristics which make modeling an arduous task. 
Among these features are (i) volatility clustering (high volatility is oftentimes followed by 
high volatility while low volatility by low volatility) identified by Campbell et al., 1997 (ii) 
leptokurtosis or fat-tail distribution of returns, discovered in early studies by  Mandelbrot 
(1963) and Fama (1965) and (iii)“leverage effect.”  
F. Econometric Methodology 
 
i. Non-Linear and linear Unit Root Tests 
 
In contemporary empirical finance, there is a consensus that financial time series data 
display nonlinearities. Therefore, traditional non-stationary (unit root) tests such as 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) may not have enough power to identify the mean reversion 
nature of time series data. To this end, this study utilize a new nonlinear stationary test 
model developed by Kapetanios, Shin and Snell (2003, henceforth, KSS) to test whether 
sovereign CDS spreads, bond spreads and equity prices are nonlinear stationary.  
The KSS test of nonlinear stationary of time series data attempts to detect non-stationarity in 
mean reversion against nonlinearity of a series using a globally stationary exponential 
smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) process. Specifically, the test is modeled as 
follows 
(i)                                                                                             tttt yyy    )}exp(1{ 2 11  
In equation (i), ytis the time series of a security and t  is i.i.d error term~N(0, σ2).   is a 
non-negative transition parameter indicating the speed of transition in the ESTAR model. 
The model tests Ho:  =0 against the alternative, H1: >0 but the null is not testable since β 
24 
 
is not identified. To overcome this hurdle, KSS (2003) compute first order Taylor series 
approximation of the function )exp(1 2 1 ty to yield an auxiliary equivalence of equation 
(with augmentation) such that 
(ii)                                                                                           1
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We test the following hypotheses: 
Ho:  =0 (Series is nonlinear non-stationary) 
Ha:  <0 (Series is non-linear ESTAR stationary) 
The simulated critical values for different lags, p, are in table I of KSS (2003). The 
non-linear unit root test will be complemented with one conventional linear unit root tests 
namely generalized least squares Augmented Dickey Fuller (DF-GLS) method of Elliot, 
Rothenberg and Stock (1996). In addition to comparative nonlinear and linear unit root tests, 
we also employ a battery of other nonlinear tests including the Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman 
and LeBaron , BDS(1996) using Z-statistic to test non-linear dependence using two and three 
embedding dimension. The null hypothesis is that series observations are drawn from an i.i.d 
process. We also test the null of constant conditional correlation (CCC) of residuals of any 
pair of the three markets. Lastly, we use Tsay (1986) test of quadratic nonlinearity where the 
null is linear dependence in time series data 
ii. Threshold co-integration tests 
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Our data is characterized by nonlinearities including nonlinear unit root. Therefore, we 
deviate from the conventional Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
cointegration tests and instead employ the threshold cointegration test of Enders and Granger 
(1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001). Threshold or non-linear cointegration test involves two 
steps.  First, Co-integration equation which takes the form 
(iii)                                                                                                                       ttt xy  
t is the estimated  stochastic disturbance error term or residuals which represent divergence 
from long run relationship. These residuals tˆ are saved and then used to estimate the second 
equation which takes the form of threshold autoregressive (TAR) regression 
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t  is i.i.d white noise with zero mean. It is Heaviside indicator while  is the threshold 
values such that
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For t  to be stationary, I(0), then, -2<( 1 , 2 )<0  otherwise series x and  y will most 
certainly not converge in the long run. The larger of the t-statistic of 1 and 2, usually called 
the tmax is also used to test for cointegration such that a significantly negative tmax is an 
indication that1<0 and2<0.  We test for co-integration as follows: 
Ho: 1 = 2 =0 (No co-integration/ equilibrium relationship between x and y= test) 
Ho: 1 = 2  (There is symmetric adjustment to equilibrium relationship between x and y) 
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To make the decision regarding the null of “no co-integration”, we compare generated F-
statistic with non-standard F-critical values (commonly denoted as  test) provided by 
Enders and Siklos (2001). The null of symmetric relationship between x and y is based on the 
standard F-distribution.Evaluation of equation “(iii)’ and ‘(iv)” evince how deviation from long 
run equilibrium [captured by t  in equation (iii)] can explain the threshold effects in the 
cointegration relationship. In the long run, x and y should converge such that tˆ =0. If tˆ  is 
above (below) equilibrium, it has to calibrate downwards (upwards) in the next period (day) 
by 1 1ˆ t ( 2 1ˆ t ) to remain in equilibrium path. 
iii. Momentum in co-integration relationship 
 
Can the adjustment process of the residuals, from equation (iv) be dynamic? Enders 
and Granger (1998) and Caner and Hansen (1998) suggest that if we permit the Heaviside 
indicator, It, to rely on the first difference of residuals (Δ tˆ ) as an alternative to levels ( tˆ ) 
we can develop Momentum-Threshold Autoregressive (M-TAR) version of equation (iv) in 
which the Heaviside indicator, It, now takes the following form: 
(vi)                                                                                                                      
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The implication of M-TAR is that correction mechanism dynamic since using Δ 1ˆ t , it is 
possible to assess if the momentum of the series is larger in a given direction relative to 
momentum in the alternative direction. In such a scenario, M-TAR can efficiently capture 
largeand smooth changes in a series. Specifically, unlike TAR model which shows the 
‘depth’ of the swings in equilibrium relationship (For example, are negative (positive) 
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divergences from equilibrium path more prolonged than positive (negative) divergences?), 
M-TAR can capture spiky adjustments in the equilibrium relationship since it permits decay  
in the relationship to be captured by  Δ 1ˆ t  instead of 1ˆ t  
iv. Non-linear price discovery Threshold Error correction model (ECM). 
 
Engle and Granger (1987) developed the linear error correction model (ECM) for any 
two times series data which are both non-stationary and cointegrated. The linearity 
assumption of the model is too restrictive and implausible. In fact, Hall, Anderson and 
Granger’s (1992), in analyzing cointegration of treasury bill yields found that the linear 
ECMs remain stable during periods of short term interest targeting by Federal Reserve but 
the model exhibit instability during episodes of monetary policy regime changes. To 
overcome these limitations, Balke and Fomby (1997) took the idea of threshold (non-linear) 
auto-regression (TAR) of Tong (1978) and developed threshold cointegration which was 
further refined by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001). 
 There has been proliferation of research utilizing TVECM. 8The rationale for surge 
in the use of non-linear models can be explained from two main perspectives. First, 
Anderson (1997) argue that using non-linear as opposed to linear error correction models 
potentially permits transaction costs to be incorporated into empirical modeling. 
Arbitrageurs in CDS, bond and equity markets usually incur trading adjustment costs which 
may partly explain why any two markets (for example, CDS and bond markets) experience 
transient divergence from their long-run or equilibrium. A prolonged divergence from 
equilibrium relationship may be triggered by external shocks not related to adjustment costs. 
                                                            
8See, for example, Anderson, (1997); Obstfeld and Taylor (1997);  Tsay, (1998); Enders and 
Granger, (1998); Franses and van Dijk, (2000b), Lo and Zivot, (2001); Trinkler and Wolf, 2003, 
Vavra and Goodwin, (2005), Chang and Chiu (2007); Sheffel (2008); Ihle and Cramon-Taubadel 
(2008) among others. 
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This rational is predominantly attractive to research in purchasing power parity, pricing 
relationship between derivative instrument and underlying asset, differential pricing of 
similar commodities in different markets and other fundamental relationships. Second, there 
is evidence of non-linearity in financial series data. Stock and Watson (1999) and Scheffel 
(2008) find that non-linear models such as neural networks (NNs), threshold autoregressive 
(TAR) and smooth transition error correction model (STECM) have superior in-sample 
performance albeit their out-of-sample forecasting accuracy has been wanting, perhaps 
because of their a-theoretic nature as the models are not grounded on fundamental economic 
theory. However, proponents of nonlinear error correction models argue that the models can 
be overtly explained by economic theory of financial arbitrage in the presence of transaction 
costs.  
The TVECM can be explained as follows:From the cointegration equation (iii), we 
denote the lagged deviation from long run equilibrium as 1tz  
(vii)                                                                                                   ˆˆˆˆ 1111   tttt xyz   
However, 1tz can be above or below the threshold,  . Therefore, for any two series x and y, 
the TVECM takes the following form: 
(viiia)                                                                   
2
11
121
1
11
111
1






















tit
P
i
it
P
i
t
tit
P
i
it
P
i
t
t
xyz
xyz
y



 
(viiib)                                                                   
2
11
121
1
11
111
2






















tit
P
i
it
P
i
t
tit
P
i
it
P
i
t
t
xyz
xyz
x



 
29 
 
Where itit   and  are i.i.d white noise disturbance and Piis lag order. As explained a prior, 
the error correction term can be explained in terms of Heaviside indicator, It.. Specifically, 
(ix)                                                                                                         
) z if0
) z if 1
1-t
1-t
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

 



tI  
This study adopts the grid search for threshold using Chang (1993) approach. Specifically, 
this involves sorting the residuals, 11 ˆ   ttz  ,  in ascending order such that 1ˆ < 2ˆ …… Tˆ  
(where T is number of observations of residuals) and trimming the lower and upper 5%-15% 
of the observations. If π represents the trimming parameter and the probability of threshold,
)1,0(P , then 15.005.0    and [   1)( 1  tzP ]. The grid search for the 
threshold is then conducted on the remaining 70 to 90 % of the observations. The 
threshold,τ, yielding the lowest RSS is the consistent and optimal threshold, τ*. 
Financial markets perform the important function of price discovery. Lehmann 
(2002) defines price discovery as the efficient and timely adjustment of market prices to 
incorporate new information implicit in investor trading. Therefore, we expect one market to 
adjust first to new information (price leadership role) while the other market lags in 
adjustment information relating to credit risk. Long-run price discovery implies that a 
change in price series can predict the persistent change in price of the other instrument(s) 
since there is a common stochastic trend.  
To test for long-run price discovery and cointegration in the upper regime, we assess 
the statistical significance and sign of the parameters 2111  and  . The two measure the speed 
of adjustment to new information above the threshold (upper regime). Likewise, 2212  and   
measure the speed of adjustment to long run equilibrium in the lower regime. Engle and 
Granger, (1987) postulated that the existence of cointegration means that at least one market 
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has to adjust to new information before the other market.  This test complements any 
inconclusive evidence provided by the co-integration equations (iii) and (iv). 
We then test for speed of adjustment or price discovery for each regime as follows: 
If both 2111  and   ( ) and 2212  are statistically significant, then both markets y and x 
respond to new credit risk information at the same time (price discovery takes place in both 
markets) in the upper (lower) regime when the Heaviside indicator, It=1(It=0). If 11 (y) is 
significantly negative while 12 (x) is positive and insignificant, then, y adjusts to new 
information to clear misalignment or pricing discrepancy with x. Therefore, price discovery 
occurs in market x in the upper regime. Similarly, if 12 (x) is significantly negative while 
11 (y) is insignificantly positive, x adjust to new credit risk information and y leads in price 
discovery in the upper regime. The same arguments and tests are then replicated for lower 
regime when Heaviside indicator, It=0. If  ) and (  and 22212111   have the same sign, this 
is indicative of potential bubbles or burst in security prices. 
v. Asymmetric Return Spillover across markets 
 
In this section, I model return spillover among the CDS, bond and equity markets. 
The joint process governing  spillover of daily returns of the three markets is represented by 
the following system of equations 
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(xib)                          
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In the above system of equations, 
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Where t-1eb,t-1tc rrr ,,  and  , are sovereign CDS, bond and equity returns respectively. The returns 
are continuously compounded such that 100*
)ln(
)ln(
1
,


t
t
ti p
pr . The returns t-1eb,t-1tc rrr ,,  and  ,  
exhibit fat tail distribution hence we assume the conditional distribution of  t  is best 
represented by student-t distribution. In this case, 0E tt  )(1  and tttt hE  )'(1  .   is 
the degrees of freedom and 2< <∞. 
In equations (xia), (xib) and (xic), the returns of any of the three markets at time t-
1enter the information set at time t. This implies that, for example, the conditional returns of 
CDS market, tcr , , are influenced by own lagged returns, 1, tcr , and the lagged positive and 
negative returns of bond and equity markets ( 

 1,1,  and titi rr ) respectively. This also applies 
to conditional returns of sovereign bonds and equity returns. The inclusion of own lagged 
returns is imperative to mitigate the potential for misinterpreting serial return dependence as 
return spillover.I test for asymmetric return spillover as follows: 
)asymmetric isspillover (Return   :
symmetric) isspillover (Return   :
1

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

ii
ii
H
Ho


 
If either  ii  or  is statistically significant, there is return spillover. Moreover, if 

ii   and  are statistically significant and   ii    , then return spillover is asymmetric. As 
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long as there is return spillover whether symmetric (   ii  ) or asymmetric ( )  ii  , 
arbitrage opportunities are extant where investors in one market will potentially exploit 
information from the other two markets. Consistent with news-based hypothesis of 
contagion, this would create momentum trading in other two markets 
IV. Empirical results 
 
G. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table I provides the summary statistics of sovereign CDS premium, bond spreads 
and equity returns. The results indicate that equity returns have the lowest volatility 
(standard deviation) while the bond returns exhibit highest standard deviation with exception 
of Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela where CDS returns have the highest standard 
deviation. This observation could be explained by the fact that the few institutional sovereign 
bondholders ‘buy and hold’ the bonds while they trade on CDS which requires no funding, 
can be shorted and have few or no binding constraints. The bond market thus become more 
illiquid and thinly traded, which could partly explain the high volatility relative to CDS and 
equity rreturns. 
The mean returns vary among sovereign bonds, CDS and equity. For example: In 
Thailand CDS has the highest mean returns but the second highest standard deviation. In all 
cases, the coefficient of variation of equity return is positive since the mean returns are 
positive. Malaysia has the highest coefficient of variation (CV=259.80) of bond returns 
primarily due to high volatility of bond returns while Thailand has the lowest CV of bond 
returns (-499.27) due to high volatility couple with low returns. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics touching on measures of central tendency (Mean), measure of 
dispersions (Standard deviation, SD and coefficient of variation, CV), measures of distribution shape (skew and 
Kurtosis), test of normal distribution (Jacque-Berra, JB), tests of empirical distribution of the mean and 
standard deviation using Z-statistic(Mu(z) and sigma(z)) and a measure of association (Correlation). The 
correlation of returns (ln(pt/pt-1)) of sovereign bond spreads, CDS spreads and equity are to the right of the 
diagonal while correlation coefficients of price movements (levels) of the three series is to the left of the 
diagonal. Obs is the number of observations 
Correlations 
Argentina  Mean SD CV  Skew 
 
Kurtosis JB mu(z) sigma(z) Bond CDS Equity Obs 
Bond 0.00088 0.0486 55.06 1.761 22.70 25.39 0.708 *55.15 1.000 0.099 -0.270 1522 
CDS 0.01185 0.1709 14.42 0.978 19.84 18.22 *2.808 *55.15 0.973 1.000 -0.073 1522 
Equity 0.00083 0.0235 28.34 -0.389 9.53 2.74 1.377 *55.15 -0.225 -0.226 1.000 1522 
Brazil 
Bond -0.00190 0.2086 -109.89 0.120 17.70 17.44 -0.158 *62.23 1.000 0.085 -0.157 1937 
CDS -0.00049 0.0532 -108.53 -0.721 39.96 110.43 -0.581 *62.23 0.823 1.000 -0.225 1937 
Equity 0.00089 0.0257 28.81 -0.290 9.85 3.82 1.528 *62.23 -0.802 -0.472 1.000 1937 
Colombia 
Bond -0.00059 0.0349 -59.63 0.339 8.27 2.07 -0.705 *59.41 1.000 0.092 -0.297 1766 
CDS -0.00089 0.0438 -49.39 1.114 23.95 32.66 -0.851 *59.41 0.948 1.000 -0.143 1766 
Equity 0.00135 0.0196 14.51 -0.401 12.23 6.31 *2.896 *59.41 -0.879 -0.860 1.000 1766 
Mexico 
Bond 0.00317 0.2164 68.19 0.623 16.01 13.78 -1.023 *62.23 1.000 0.164 -0.130 1937 
CDS 0.00099 0.0477 48.04 2.623 34.00 79.80 -0.078 *62.23 0.922 1.000 -0.440 1937 
Equity 0.00066 0.0185 28.00 0.239 10.65 4.74 1.166 *62.23 -0.689 -0.539 1.000 1937 
Venezuela 
Bond -0.00057 0.0237 -41.57 0.561 12.02 6.08 -1.01 *59.41 1.000 0.260 -0.040 1766 
CDS -0.00031 0.0346 -110.10 0.952 10.64 4.56 -0.384 *59.41 0.765 1.000 -0.019 1766 
Equity 0.00115 0.0133 11.59 0.490 12.32 6.47 3.068* *59.41 -0.574 -0.081 1.000 1766 
China 
Bond 0.00936 0.2254 24.07 0.727 12.07 6.21 0.173 *59.43 1.000 0.031 -0.044 1767 
CDS 0.00090 0.0472 52.58 0.293 16.91 14.26 1.022 *59.43 0.870 1.000 -0.388 1767 
Equity 0.00102 0.0206 20.12 0.205 9.47 3.09 **2.088 *59.43 -0.027 0.043 1.000 1767 
Indonesia 
Bond 0.01102 0.2139 19.42 1.074 12.53 4.93 *3.149 *49.76 1.000 0.021 0.039 1239 
CDS 0.00224 0.0749 33.46 0.700 11.24 3.61 1.477 *49.76 0.519 1.000 -0.216 1239 
Equity 0.00094 0.0225 23.87 -0.031 9.26 2.02 1.474 *49.76 -0.199 -0.277 1.000 1239 
Malaysia 
Bond 0.00109 0.2834 259.80 0.155 8.92 2.83 -1.215 *62.23 1.000 0.064 -0.008 1937 
CDS 0.00098 0.0490 49.89 0.990 13.22 8.74 0.882 *62.23 0.798 1.000 -0.367 1937 
Equity 0.00036 0.0103 28.39 -0.501 11.66 6.13 1.55 *62.23 -0.499 -0.248 1.000 1937 
Philippines 
Bond 0.00033 0.0425 130.23 0.976 10.17 4.10 0.324 *59.70 1.000 0.483 -0.214 1783 
CDS -0.00011 0.0345 -319.65 0.609 11.63 5.64 0.04 *59.70 0.954 1.000 -0.341 1783 
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Equity 0.00077 0.0167 21.77 -0.293 8.21 2.04 ***1.939 *59.70 -0.883 -0.848 1.000 1783 
Thailand 
Bond -0.00031 0.1543 -499.27 0.075 27.34 37.58 -1.346 *55.15 1.000 0.238 -0.025 1522 
CDS 0.00172 0.0463 26.88 1.273 26.16 34.43 1.59 *55.15 0.938 1.000 -0.097 1522 
Equity 0.00003 0.0149 583.53 -0.757 15.85 10.61 0.067 *55.15 -0.698 -0.693 1.000 1522 
Bulgaria 
Bond 0.00232 0.2322 100.27 1.464 20.85 26.42 0.439 *62.23 1.000 -0.005 -0.037 1937 
CDS 0.00093 0.0463 49.98 0.813 19.69 22.69 0.88 *62.23 0.897 1.000 -0.108 1937 
Equity 0.00077 0.0153 19.97 -0.418 10.23 4.27 **2.204 *62.23 -0.686 -0.611 1.000 1937 
Hungary 
Bond 0.00731 0.1640 22.45 1.746 16.37 15.42 *2.648 *62.23 1.000 0.057 -0.039 1937 
CDS 0.00199 0.0481 24.20 1.052 14.53 11.09 ***1.934 *62.23 0.866 1.000 -0.350 1937 
Equity 0.00083 0.0236 28.63 0.322 14.06 9.90 1.537 *62.23 -0.438 -0.222 1.000 1937 
Poland 
Bond -0.00519 0.2054 -39.60 -0.325 15.84 13.34 -1.111 *62.23 1.000 0.064 -0.047 1937 
CDS 0.00153 0.0495 32.43 1.086 11.01 5.56 1.432 *62.23 0.948 1.000 -0.318 1937 
Equity 0.00063 0.0212 33.90 0.011 8.04 2.05 1.299 *62.23 -0.309 -0.313 1.000 1937 
Russia 
Bond -0.00635 0.2181 -34.35 -0.087 11.33 5.60 -1.281 *62.23 1.000 0.096 -0.101 1937 
CDS 0.00061 0.0447 73.16 1.481 18.58 20.29 0.602 *62.23 0.717 1.000 -0.449 1937 
Equity 0.00084 0.0267 31.98 0.158 18.01 18.18 1.375 *62.23 -0.861 -0.656 1.000 1937 
Turkey 
Bond 0.00039 0.1006 255.44 0.799 14.57 11.02 -0.287 *62.23 1.000 0.382 -0.314 1937 
CDS 0.00001 0.0363 3027.50 1.100 9.93 4.27 0.015 *62.23 0.928 1.000 -0.568 1937 
Equity 0.00108 0.0285 26.33 0.033 7.49 1.63 ***1.671 *62.23 -0.870 -0.792 1.000 1937 
S. Africa 
Bond -0.00221 0.2344 -106.28 0.603 12.55 7.48 -0.414 *62.23 1.000 0.042 -0.080 1937 
CDS 0.00062 0.0391 63.56 1.216 11.29 6.02 0.684 *62.23 0.793 1.000 -0.427 1937 
Equity 0.00067 0.0198 29.77 -0.192 7.86 1.92 1.479 *62.23 -0.719 -0.378 1.000 1937 
Tunisia 
Bond 0.00154 0.1400 90.87 0.364 22.30 27.70 0.628 *59.70 1.000 0.078 -0.041 1783 
CDS 0.00151 0.0911 60.53 2.315 48.90 158.10 **2.053 *59.70 0.660 1.000 -0.022 1783 
Equity 0.00073 0.0050 6.85 -0.264 13.63 8.42 *6.157 *59.70 -0.238 0.400 1.000 1783 
 
 
 
 
The results characterize the high risk (volatility) associated with emerging markets. 
The low returns and high volatility could be as a result of thin trading and low liquidity 
which characterize security returns in emerging markets. This may be one of the causes of 
nonlinearities in the data.The shape of distribution as epitomized by skewness and kurtosis is 
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consistent with stylized facts of financial series returns. There is asymmetrical distribution of 
returns in all three markets of each country since skewness is either positive or negative. An 
interesting feature of Eastern Europe countries except Bulgaria (Hungary, Poland, Russia 
and Turkey) together with Mexico and Venezuela is that they have positive skew of equity 
returns. All the rest of eleven emerging markets have negative skew of equity return (mean 
return less than median returns). All bond returns (except for Poland) and CDS returns 
(except for Brazil) exhibit positive skew implying that the mean return is greater than 
median returns.  
The asymmetry in return distribution is also supported by Jacque-Berra statistic 
which tests the null of normal distribution of returns. The null is decisively rejected due to 
high statistical significance of JB statistic (non-normal distribution of returns). However, JB 
is highly sensitive to extreme returns. To this end, I compute empirical distribution of the 
mean (mu(z)) and standard deviation (sigma(z)). Both statistics are asymptotic normal hence 
Z-statistic. The null hypothesis is normal distribution. The standard deviations of returns of 
bond spread, CDS premium and equity for each of the seventeen countries are non-normally 
distributed and exhibit nonlinear dependence (statistically significant z-statistic which 
decisively rejects null). The mean equity returns of Colombia, Venezuela, China, 
Philippines, Bulgaria and Tunisia exhibit non-normal distribution. This is the same case with 
CDS spread returns of Argentina, Hungary and Tunisia as well as bond spread return of 
Indonesia and Hungary. 
 All the returns exhibit leptokurtic (fat tail) distribution (Black, 1976) since Kurtosis 
is greater than 3 in all cases. Except for Colombia, Venezuela, Malaysia and Russia, equity 
returns exhibit the lowest leptokurtic distribution. 
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The CDS premium and bond spreads exhibit strong positive correlation which is as high as 
97.3% for Argentina and as low as 51.9% for Indonesia. This is justified since both CDS and 
bond spreads price the same credit risk. As postulated by Merton (1974) and Campbell and 
Taksler (2003), bond yield (spreads) and equity prices on one hand and CDS premium and 
equity on the other exhibit inverse relationship. This has important implication about the 
leverage and default risk of emerging markets. If default risk is high, bond spreads and CDS 
premium will increase while equity prices will decline to incorporate the reduction in 
distance to default or increased probability of default. This seems to characterize emerging 
markets as having high default risk. 
Returns of both markets are also positively correlated for all countries albeit weakly 
relative to prices. Both equity and bond returns and equity and CDS returns are negatively 
correlated since investors include equity (variable income security)and bonds (fixed income 
security) as substitute assets to hedge against decline in prices and returns of each other. 
H. Model Pre-specifications: Tests of asymmetry andnonlinearities 
 
The summary results in table 2(a) capture the salient features inherent in the behavior 
of security returns and asymmetry in series observations. Taken together with measures of 
distributional shape (skewness and Kurtosis), and dynamic conditional correlation test, the 
indicators will assist in the design and adoption of asymmetric modeling in return 
spilloverand nonlinear cointegration and price discovery process. 
Table 2(a):  Asymmetry Indicators and Model Pre-specification Tests 
In this table, SBT, NSBT, PSBT and JBT are Engle and Ng (1993) bias tests which are initial indicators of 
asymmetry in volatility. Specifically, SBT is the sign bias test defined as tititi bSc ,1,
2
,     . NSBT is the 
negative size bias test defined as titititi bSc ,1,1,
2
,     . PSBT is the positive size bias test defined as
titititi bSc ,1,1,
2
,     . 
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JBT is the joint bias test where tititititititi SbSbSbc ,1,31,1,21,1,1
2
,        
ti ,  is the residual (observation less mean),   1,tiS = 0 if 1, ti <0 and zero otherwise.  1,tiS =1 if 1, ti >0 and 
zero otherwise. For SBT, NSBT and PSBT, we check for statistical significance of coefficient b using t-
statistic.JBT utilizes F statistic for a joint test that of the null b1= b2= b3=0.ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) is the 
Engle (1982) test of an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effect whose Ho is: No ARCH 
(Conditional heteroskedasticity) effects in the series. LB (10) and LB2 (10) are the Ljung-Box Q statistics of 
serial correlation (up to 10 lags) of residuals and squared residuals respectively. The Ho is: No autocorrelation. 
*, ** and *** means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. CCC is constant conditional correlation test 
of Engle and Sheppard (2001).Its Ho is constant conditional correlation while Ha is dynamic conditional 
correlation using F-statistic. B/C, B/E and C/E refer to CCC test for sovereign bond and CDS residuals, 
sovereign bonds and equity residuals and sovereign CDS and equity residuals. 
Argentina SBT PSBT NSBT JBT ARCH(1) ARCH(2) LB(10) LB2(10) CCC F-Stat 
Bond *-5.609 *32.063 *4.440 *13.306 **2.016 *5.762 *43.91 *144.06 CCC: B/C **2.40 
CDS *-6.256 *20.455 *5.192 *9.523 1.104 0.871 *54.05 *94.98 CCC: B/E *5.27 
Equity **-2.05 *6.314 *-2.708 **1.041 0.007 *15.123 13.45 *450.80 CCC: C/E *3.55 
Brazil 
Bond *-5.124 *18.940 *3.860 *9.536 0.193 1.033 *40.58 *121.36 CCC: B/C *16.25 
CDS *-5.087 *17.501 *4.789 *9.642 0.185 0.361 6.27 6.58 CCC: B/E *6.25 
Equity *-3.905 *15.570 1.489 *7.685 1.297 *93.393 **21.12 *832.35 CCC: C/E *12.17 
Colombia 
Bond *-3.530 *12.353 -0.247 *7.374 1.667 *18.494 6.02 *238.74 CCC: B/C *16.55 
CDS *-3.396 *7.767 ***1.897 *3.749 0.614 *8.171 *43.11 *60.44 CCC: B/E *6.68 
Equity *3.525 *3.031 *-11.730 *6.289 1.568 *137.075 *51.72 *533.56 CCC: C/E *9.80 
Mexico 
Bond *-6.506 *21.695 *3.655 *8.083 0.828 0.802 ***14.69 *59.06 CCC: B/C *9.97 
CDS *-5.767 *14.387 *3.662 *4.427 0.266 *23.751 *36.13 *207.59 CCC: B/E *34.94 
Equity *-3.571 *15.913 **-1.977 *10.972 1.613 *19.022 8.78 *450.49 CCC: C/E *7.59 
Venezuela 
Bond *-4.941 *36.029 ***1.841 *7.260 1.939 *25.901 *31.31 *288.32 CCC: B/C *6.47 
CDS *-5.253 *31.267 *10.708 *5.907 0.186 ***2.410 **23.76 **25.33 CCC: B/E *7.04 
Equity 1.607 *13.581 *-27.480 *6.226 1.777 *5.599 *71.30 *48.64 CCC: C/E *4.48 
China 
Bond *-4.290 *14.640 ***1.723 *5.871 0.105 *19.787 **21.97 *135.81 CCC: B/C *39.18 
CDS *-4.543 *17.923 *4.041 *7.732 0.31 **5.8201 ***17.99 12.288 CCC: B/E *48.02 
Equity *-4.737 *10.130 *4.359 *5.661 1.61 *19.572 **19.62 *251.23 CCC: C/E *3.95 
Indonesia 
Bond *-2.901 *8.775 0.263 *2.201 0.389 0..208 **20.42 3.76 CCC: B/C *2.85 
CDS *-5.897 *13.137 *4.848 *2.612 ***2.175 1.186 **21.19 **31.28 CCC: B/E 0.52 
Equity **-2.382 *11.733 *-3.558 *4.377 0.914 *8.422 **23.65 *57.19 CCC: C/E *6.59 
Malaysia 
Bond *-5.341 *18.110 0.279 *8.098 1.25 *20.105 **26.22 *52.26 CCC: B/C 0.30 
CDS *-4.531 *8.063 *3.920 *2.649 1.923 *19.866 *31.28 *76.71 CCC: B/E **2.04 
Equity *-7.936 *19.549 **2.004 *11.757 1.276 *9.1902 *29.52 *48.26 CCC: C/E *6.91 
Philippines 
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Bond -0.065 *5.302 *-5.907 *6.181 ***3.087 *27.918 5.21 *127.82 CCC: B/C *7.46 
CDS -1.14 *5.266 *-3.137 *3.080 ***2.055 *22.603 ***14.97 *147.98 CCC: B/E *9.23 
Equity *-5.030 *15.813 -0.097 *8.735 1.897 *27.933 *29.72 *145.5 CCC: C/E *6.17 
Thailand 
Bond *-4.394 *16.120 *2.987 *4.830 0.211 *4.655 *50.95 *289.49 CCC: B/C *12.78 
CDS *-4.628 *12.123 *4.392 *3.863 ***2.431 1.235 *27.29 **29.76 CCC: B/E *4.26 
Equity *2.664 *3.307 *-20.958 *7.785 0.005 1.508 ***18.03 13.48 CCC: C/E *18.74 
Bulgaria 
Bond *-5.383 *19.506 *3.393 *8.751 1.411 0.909 14.14 *31.33 CCC: B/C *10.54 
CDS *-4.403 *12.496 *3.354 *5.935 ***2.083 1.731 13.59 *30.84 CCC: B/E *2.83 
Equity *-2.849 *12.060 -0.203 *7.281 *7.113 *5.883 *61.69 *66.03 CCC: C/E *14.77 
Hungary 
Bond *-4.628 *20.754 *2.551 *10.820 0.739 0.79 ***18.60 *70.13 CCC: B/C *6.24 
CDS *-6.203 *18.031 *5.952 *9.662 3.362*** *7.265 10.06 *35.58 CCC: B/E *3.65 
Equity 0.349 *8.114 *-5.274 *7.403 1.297 *93.393 ***21.12 *832.35 CCC: C/E *9.57 
Poland 
Bond *-3.720 *14.055 **-2.386 *9.982 1.193 *4.685 13.52 *47.96 CCC: B/C *17.37 
CDS *-4.799 *11.010 *4.105 *6.350 ***2.293 **3.786 9.57 **26.06 CCC: B/E *8.13 
Equity *-4.812 *16.728 -0.464 *9.155 0.16 *22.938 ***14.97 *466.73 CCC: C/E *19.61 
Russia 
Bond *-4.604 *14.061 *3.690 *9.812 0.226 *4.208 ***18.50 *73.67 CCC: B/C *20.46 
CDS *-4.754 *13.058 *3.534 *4.981 0.775 *35.251 ***14.88 *86.52 CCC: B/E *15.03 
Equity *-6.803 *14.531 **2.373 *8.170 0.803 *12.891 13.3 *149.72 CCC: C/E *20.03 
Turkey 
Bond *-6.168 *23.632 *3.482 *12.004 0.91 ***2.258 12.85 *37.05 CCC: B/C *56.47 
CDS *-6.587 *19.547 *5.068 *8.530 ***2.457 *15.986 *42.99 *157.64 CCC: B/E *68.42 
Equity *-4.234 *8.502 *-4.464 *5.753 0.701 *6.124 ***22.78 *123.42 CCC: C/E *75.94 
S. Africa 
Bond *-5.802 *14.903 0.929 *6.733 1.426 1.104 ***16.23 *57.55 CCC: B/C *8.98 
CDS *-3.840 *12.967 *2.669 *4.972 ***2.626 1.894 **27.33 *57.99 CCC: B/E *12.73 
Equity *-2.774 *7.496 *-7.331 *7.629 1.513 *62.869 ***22.60 *393.02 CCC: C/E *62.50 
Tunisia 
Bond ***-1.72 *12.265 *-3.922 *5.412 1.694 *6.325 **25.48 *120.83 CCC: B/C *4.30 
CDS *-4.145 *13.791 *2.778 *6.051 0.119 0.081 *42.38 *71.19 CCC: B/E *6.83 
Equity *-3.389 *9.458 0.741 *7.624 0.071 *6.575 *117.46 *125.21 CCC: C/E **1.84 
 
The Ljung-Box Q statistics (LB (10) and LB2 (10)) test the presence of inter-
temporal dependence of residuals and squared residuals up to tenth order. The null 
hypothesis is that there is serial independence of residuals. The first order serial dependence 
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in security returns is symptomatic of non-synchronous trading in security returns while 
second order serial dependence in residuals indicates ARCH effects and volatility clustering. 
The bond spreads of Colombia, Philippines, Bulgaria and Turkey exhibit weak serial 
dependence in residuals (Insignificant LB Q-statistic) while CDS spreads of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Bulgaria as well as Russia equity show weak or no serial dependence of 
residuals. However, these series exhibit strong serial dependence using squared residuals 
(Significant LB2 (10) Q-statistic). ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are the Engle’s (1982) LM test 
of ARCH effects. The null is that there are no ARCH effects.  
The bond spreads of Bulgaria, Indonesia, Hungary, Mexico and S. Africa do not 
exhibit ARCH effect up to order two (Insignificant LM statistic) while the CDS spreads of 
Indonesia, Argentina, Tunisia and Thailand do not have ARCH effects up to order two. Only 
Thailand’s equity returns do not exhibit Arch effects. However, these series still exhibit 
other features of asymmetry necessary for modeling return and volatility spillovers. 
Specifically, the joint bias test (JBT) of Engle and Ng (1993) decisively provide evidence of 
asymmetry since all F-statistics are significant.  
Moreover, apart from Indonesia and S. Africa’s bond spreads, the series exhibit 
asymmetry since negative size bias test (NSBT), positive size bias test (PSBT) and sign bias 
test (SBT) all have significant t-statistic. SBT, NSBT, PSBT and JBT afford strong evidence 
for the need to adopt an ARCH/GARCH type model in assessing volatility spillover among 
the three markets or assessing asymmetry in return shock spillovers. 
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Lastly, the constant conditional correlation or covariance (CCC) test9 of Engle and 
Sheppard (2001) tests the null hypothesis of constant conditional correlation. That is: 
whether covariances between residuals of any two series are constant or dynamic over time. 
Table 2(b) results indicates that at any conventional significance level, only residuals of 
Indonesia bonds and equity and Malaysia’s bonds and CDS residuals have constant 
conditional correlation since the F-statistic is jointly insignificant. The remaining 49/51 
series exhibit dynamic conditional correlation of residuals (F-statistic is jointly significant). 
The dynamic conditional covariance of residuals of any two markets is important for 
modeling nonlinear relationships, asymmetric volatility and return spillover. 
Table 2(b) provides various tests of nonlinearities in data including Ramsey RESET 
test of specification errors in regression equations in cointegrating equations. Using the 
linear DF-GLS unit root test, only sovereign CDS spreads of Poland are weakly stationary (t-
statistic weakly significant at 10%). All the other series for all countries are linearly non-
stationary.  
Table 2(b): Nonlinear modeling tests: Nonlinear Unit root and Nonlinear Indicators 
This table summarizes linear and non-linear unit root tests and BDS nonlinearity test. DF-GLS is the t-statistic 
of Dickey-Fuller Generalized least squares unit root test. It test Ho is: unit root. Critical values are 2.566, 1.941 
and 1.616 at 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. KSS in the t-statistic of Kapetanios, Shin and Snell (2003) test 
using demeaned series (DM) and detrended series (DT). The Ho is: Series is non-linear and non-stationary. The 
critical values are non-asymptotic normal distribution and are provided at the bottom of table 2(b). BDS is the 
Brock, Dechert, Scheinkman and LeBaron (1996) Z-statistic to test non-linear dependence using 2 and 3 (BDS 
(2) and BDS (3)) embedding dimension with ɛ/σ=0.9. The Ho is that series observations are drawn from an iid 
process and Ha is non-linear dependence. Tsay test of nonlinearity tests the Ho that all coefficients are equal to 
zero (linear dependence in time series data) The Ha is non-linear dependence in time series data. C.E is the 
cointegrating equation. C, E and B are CDS premium, equity prices and Bond spreads respectively. C/B, for 
example, is the cointegration equation:   BYScCDS 1 . RESET (2) is the Ramsey (1969) Regression 
Specification Error Test with 2 additional regressors to test for nonlinearity and misspecifications in 
cointergating equation. Example:   33221 CDSCDSBYScCDS  The F-Statistic tests the 
null β2=β3=0 
                                                            
9Specifically, this test involves extracting two series of residuals (regress y on x and get residuals and then 
regress x on y and get the residuals), get the product of the two residuals and then regress the product on its 
own 10 lags. The Joint F-statistic (and its P-value) is used to make decision. 
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Argentina DF-GLS KSS-DM KSS-DT BDS(2) BDS(3) 
Tsay 
Test Order C.E 
RESET(2) 
F-stat Obs 
Bond -0.98 -1.255 -1.746 10.767* 13.858* *2.709 18 C/B *674.52 1522 
CDS -0.428 -1.012 -1.256 8.36* 8.433* *32.19 0 C/E *80.05 1522 
Equity -1.465 -1.425 -1.667 9.637* 13.21* 2.341 1 E/B  *122.22 1522 
Brazil 
Bond 0.693 -0.649 -1.127 22.009* 23.342* *7.821 17 C/B *3318.06 1937 
CDS -1.337 -0.848 -0.954 10.356* 11.83* *48.46 31 C/E *996.36 1937 
Equity 0.206 -1.069 -1.939 10.583* 14.851* *4.559 19 E/B  *1324.29 1937 
Colombia 
Bond 0.254 -2.368 -2.139 8.494* 12.581* 1.44 3 C/B *39.61 1766 
CDS 0.345 -2.1 -2.088 9.133* 12.338* *17.4 32 C/E *257.00 1766 
Equity 0.842 -0.799 -1.608 14.167* 16.839* *8.556 4 E/B  *191.71 1766 
Mexico 
Bond -1.355 -2.302 -1.982 -0.023 -0.031 4.442* 7 C/B *170.98 1937 
CDS -1.808 -1.925 -1.867 10.662* 13.025* 18.01* 28 C/E *20.71 1937 
Equity -0.246 -1.384 -1.535 12.473* 14.943* 2.492*** 2 E/B  *141.73 1937 
Venezuela 
Bond 0.231 -2.396 -1.269 9.169* 12.134* 6.854* 2 C/B *12.45 1766 
CDS -0.523 -0.599 -0.79 8.741* 10.867* 7.76* 13 C/E *220.69 1766 
Equity 1.024 -1.163 -1.31 12.681* 14.054* 29.46* 6 E/B  *110.94 1766 
China 
Bond -1.698 -1.899 -2.224 17.31* 17.602* 2.522* 13 C/B *286.00 1767 
CDS -1.522 -1.449 -1.26 10.693* 14.183* 21.95* 29 C/E *41.38 1767 
Equity 0.113 -0.785 -0.9 8.252* 13.306* 3.464*** 1 E/B  *11.48 1767 
Indonesia 
Bond -1.423 -1.797 -2.016 18.201* 20.022* 4.746* 30 C/B *348.69 1239 
CDS -1.662 -1.911 -2.414 5.381* 6.634* 18.35* 21 C/E *17.52 1239 
Equity -0.214 -1.243 -1.249 7.692* 9.762* 1.378 2 E/B  *15.57 1239 
Malaysia 
Bond -1.224 -2.917*** -2.4 -0.023 -0.031 0.6133 3 C/B *91.79 1937 
CDS -1.162 -1.559 -1.644 11.787* 14.582* 25.65* 29 C/E *46.09 1937 
Equity 0.028 -0.804 -1.168 7.777* 11.714* 7.204** 4 E/B  *24.02 1937 
Philippines 
Bond -0.151 -2.772*** -1.699 8.975* 13.974* 6.299* 11 C/B *22.66 1783 
CDS -0.318 -1.567 -1.343 15.539* 17.851* 10.18* 20 C/E *368.43 1783 
Equity -0.06 -1.115 -1.453 7.531* 10.143* 2.056*** 2 E/B  *93.18 1783 
Thailand 
Bond -1.367 -1.303 -1.68 21.143* 23.742* 15.46* 28 C/B *763.32 1522 
CDS -1.348 -1.256 -1.541 15.156* 15.611* 39.87* 30 C/E *1504.25 1522 
Equity -1.299 -1.309 -1.525 11.609* 13.611* 8.678* 3 E/B  *156.98 1522 
Bulgaria 
Bond -0.672 -1.958 -1.783 21.66* 23.506* 1.44 3 C/B ***2.72 1937 
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CDS -0.46 -0.974 -1.045 10.672* 12.268* 17.4* 32 C/E *268.24 1937 
Equity -1.2 -0.487 -0.284 14.267* 15.796* 8.556* 4 E/B  *48.07 1937 
Hungary 
Bond -1.6 -1.046 -1.306 18.234* 20.107* 3.592* 22 C/B *488.01 1937 
CDS -1.098 -0.938 -1.128 10.098* 11.421* 64.24* 0 C/E *37.51 1937 
Equity -0.491 -1.438 -1.318 12.254* 14.096* 3.002* 5 E/B  *25.99 1937 
Poland 
Bond -0.757 -1.679 -1.892 23.086* 24.499* 1.499 3 C/B *106.81 1937 
CDS -1.666*** -0.658 -0.695 13.437* 14.795* 40.29* 25 C/E *17.58 1937 
Equity -0.477 -1.288 -1.425 7.519* 10.641* 2.32*** 2 E/B  *151.39 1937 
Russia 
Bond 0.292 -1.288 -1.157 21.132* 22.902* 0.7074 1 C/B *15.77 1937 
CDS -1.394 -1.017 -0.985 17.434* 18.655* 18.97* 32 C/E *303.77 1937 
Equity -0.505 -1.093 -1.544 9.065* 12.22* 4.283* 22 E/B  *539.48 1937 
Turkey 
Bond 0.825 -1.004 -1.299 18.682* 21.544* 2.651** 2 C/B *912.60 1937 
CDS -1.101 -1.023 -1.643 14.788* 17.064* 8.622* 22 C/E *789.02 1937 
Equity -0.348 -1.397 -1.662 7.655* 9.84* 3.377*** 1 E/B  *351.35 1937 
S. Africa 
Bond -1.194 -2.055 -1.471 21.837* 22.682* 2.386* 32 C/B *55.20 1937 
CDS -1.637 -1.29 -1.414 13.968* 14.52* 17.48* 20 C/E 0.61 1937 
Equity -0.267 -1.74 -1.722 8.934* 13.573* 5.693* 5 E/B  *34.10 1937 
Tunisia 
Bond 0.231 -2.551 -1.69 21.814* 22.446* 3.307* 7 C/B 2.11 1783 
CDS -0.523 -1.408 -1.666 7.807* 8.72* 7.835* 29 C/E *717.36 1783 
Equity 1.024 1.387 -0.224 15.705* 17.027* 0.00406 1 E/B  **4.48 1783 
 
Asymptotic critical values for the kss test: Significance level Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Significance level Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 
1% –2.82    –3.48       –3.93 
5% -2.22 -2.93 -3.40 
10% -1.92 -2.66 --3.13 
Notes: Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 refer to the underlying model with the raw data, the demeaned data and the 
detrended data, respectively. These values apply for both serially uncorrelated and correlated cases. The 
critical values are reproduced from KSS. (2003, p. 364). 
 
Using the KSS non-linear unit root test, only sovereign bond spreads of Malaysia and 
Philippines are weakly non-linear stationary when the series are demeaned. However, all the 
de-trended series for all countries shows insignificant t-statistic implying that the null of 
non-linear non-stationary cannot be rejected. This supports the need for threshold 
cointegration and price discovery tests of the sovereign bond spreads, CDS and equity.  
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BDS statistic follows a standard normal distribution and hence uses Z-statistic in 
testing whether series observations exhibit non-linear dependence. Brock and Sayers (1988) 
recommend that ɛ/σ should be selected to fall between 0.5 and 2 and embedding dimensions, 
m, to range between two to five. In this study, we select ɛ/σ=0.9 and report BDS test with 2 
and 3 dimensions. Apart from Mexico and Malaysia sovereign bond spreads, the Z-statistics 
are statistically significant. This means that the series observations are not drawn from 
identically and independently process. Put differently, there is strong evidence of non-linear 
dependence in time series data in 49/51 series (51=17 emerging market countries*3 series 
each) at both 2 and 3 embedding dimensions. Tsay test by Tsay (1986) is a non-linear test 
which focuses on quadratic serial dependence in the data. It complements the BDS test. Tsay 
test has a null of linear dependence and provides the appropriate lag order. The CDS spreads 
of all the seventeen countries exhibit non-linear (quadratic) serial dependence since we reject 
the null in all cases. The equity of Argentina, Indonesia and Tunisia, much like the bond 
spreads of Colombia, Malaysia, Bulgaria, Poland and Russia have linear dependence (We 
fail to reject null). In sum, 42/51 series, on the basis of this test, have nonlinear dependence. 
Both BDS and Tsay tests conclude that Malaysian bond spread have linear serial 
dependence.This evidence provides additional incentive to apply non-linear methodology in 
testing cointegration and price discovery mechanisms among the three markets in emerging 
countries.  
Previous studies have used regression equation to test cointergation relationship 
between two series x and y. Ramsey (1969) and Ramsey and Alexander (1984) developed a 
simple test to assess if a regression equation is mis-specified or has nonlinear relationship. 
For example: A simple regression such as   BYScCDS 1 could be tested by first 
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running the regression and saving the fitted values of y. A second test regression is run with 
powers of the fitted values such as   221 CDSBYScCDS (RESET=1) or 
  33221 CDSCDSBYScCDS (RESET=2). The F-statistic tests the hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the powers ( 2 and 3 ) of fitted values are all zero. Ramsey and 
Alexander (1984) showed that the RESET test could discover specification error in 
regression equation which nevertheless had passed all other mis-specification tests. I test for 
mis-specification in cointegration equations of any two combinations of the three securities 
(CDS premium, bond spreads and equity prices. Results from table 2(b) indicate there are 
nonlinear cointegration relations in 49/51 possible cointergation pairs. The exception are 
CDS premium and equity (South Africa) and CDS premium and bond spreads (Tunisia) 
which exhibit  simple linear relationship since the coefficients of the powers are statistically 
insignificant. This evidence provides additional rational for nonlinear cointegration, speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium relationship and price discovery mechanism. 
I. Asymmetric return spillover 
 
Table 3 presents interesting results. First, in all individual countries, there are multiple 
positive or negative return shocks spillovers from one market to the other. Moreover, the 
three markets are jointly significant (Using F-statistic) which indicate that Sovereign bonds, 
CDS and equity markets respond to own and each other’s return shocks. This has important 
implications. 
 
Table 3: Asymmetric return spillover 
This table summarizes, using t-statistic, asymmetric return spillover among sovereign bond (b), CDS (c) and 
equity (e) markets. The equation 
45 
 
 is used to derive the 
results. is the return of each market computed as ln(Pt+1/Pt). I use Newey-West method to correct for both 
heteroskedasticity and serial auto-correlation up to seven lags. are parameters to be estimated. 
 are lagged negative and positive returns decomposed from . In each of the three rows for 
each country,  and  is the dependent variable respectively. Panels A, B, C and D capture 
emerging markets in Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa respectively. *, ** and *** is statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 

b  b  c  c  e  e  0i  F-Stat 
Panel A:   Latin   America              
Argentina: 
Bond 2.575* 2.392** -1.322 0.622 -0.063 -0.390 0.702 *11.237 
CDS -2.025** -2.488** -2.278** -1.957*** 0.493 0.711 1.342 *9.986 
Equity 2.734* -0.143 -0.533 0.402 -0.331 0.189 1.111 *3.078 
Brazil:  
Bond 3.147* 2.551** 0.522 0.221 -0.284 0.553 0.602 *15.131 
CDS -2.070** -1.424 0.078 -1.818*** -3.611* -2.210** 0.822 *28.093 
Equity 2.441** 1.769*** 0.091 0.072 -0.469 0.556 0.163 *8.512 
Colombia: 
Bond 2.931* 3.537* -0.097 -0.436 -1.124 -0.836 0.880 *18.624 
CDS -5.388* -6.451* -0.181 0.754 -5.542* -4.483* 1.009 *140.297 
Equity 3.102* 0.499 0.523 -0.266 0.519 1.360 1.791*** *7.472 
Mexico:  
Bond 3.430* 1.739*** 1.002 0.192 -1.015 2.570** -0.177 *40.723 
CDS -2.592* -1.383 -0.770 -1.210 -0.318 -2.197** 1.714 *22.394 
Equity 1.054 1.269 1.173 -0.419 -0.005 1.563 0.492 *5.173 
Venezuela: 
Bond 2.604* 0.420 -3.415* -4.913* 1.065 1.544 1.570 *82.819 
CDS -2.153** -1.90*** 1.526 -0.288 -1.474 -0.275 0.232 *6.382 
Equity 2.332** -0.385 0.639 -1.593 -0.451 3.850* 0.443 *12.050 
Panel B:   Asia               
China: 
Bond -0.539 -1.095 -2.128** -1.183 -0.325 -0.332 0.969 **1.927 
CDS 0.256 3.193* -0.925 0.222 0.796 -1.408 -0.869 *5.218 
Equity 0.403 -0.558 -0.171 -1.793*** -0.458 0.793 1.534 *2.591 
Indonesia: 
Bond 3.929* 0.555 -1.464 -2.525** -0.383 2.212** -0.097 *21.262 
CDS -1.623 -0.865 -2.824* -2.703* -0.396 -1.623 -0.751 *13.607 
Equity 2.289** 0.193 -0.304 -1.966** 0.598 2.683* 0.963 *7.317 
Malaysia:  
Bond -0.737 1.370 0.884 -1.634 1.197 1.470 1.950*** *10.078 
CDS -0.375 2.155** -2.422** 1.407 1.340 -2.111** -1.920*** *5.243 
Equity 0.382 -2.599* 1.149 -3.038* -0.208 4.100* 1.852*** *10.948 
Philippines: 
Bond              
 
3.219* 
 
1.301 
 
-0.649 
 
-1.864*** 
 
-2.298** 
 
1.132 
 
-0.393 
 
*43.739 
CDS -1.815*** -0.381 -0.287 0.876 3.199* -1.849*** 1.298 *10.560 
Equity 0.563 1.061 -1.433 -5.886* -0.675 2.017** 1.254 *30.694 
Thailand: 
Bond 1.509 5.520* 5.283* -0.218 0.744 1.880*** 0.188 *54.173 
CDS -0.376 -6.731* -5.515* 2.886* -2.384** -1.867*** -2.759* *46.974 
titereteretcrctcrctbrbtbrbtir ,1,1,1,1,1,1,10,        
tir ,

ii   and 
 1, and 1, tirtir tir ,
tbr , tcr , ter ,
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Equity 2.020** 1.974** 1.953*** -0.543 -1.537 1.866*** -1.047 *10.306 
Panel C:   Europe               
Bulgaria: 
Bond -1.026 0.594 0.975 -3.055* 1.808*** -1.058 2.919* *8.809 
CDS -0.383 -0.962 -0.674 -0.053 -1.86*** 1.542 -1.072 **1.727 
Equity 1.992** 0.412 0.396 -2.322** 1.331 2.233** 2.523** *9.701 
Hungary: 
Bond 1.517 1.086 1.131 -2.351* -0.284 -0.233 1.561 *18.346 
CDS -0.739 -0.299 -0.975 -0.326 -2.266** -2.218** 0.077 *6.127 
Equity 2.112** -0.526 -1.202 -1.124 0.660 1.519 1.327 *12.072 
Poland: 
Bond 1.960*** -0.345 1.681*** -1.211 -0.600 1.725*** 2.015** *3.973 
CDS -0.444 1.349 -2.232** -0.435 -2.673* -2.426* -1.165 *6.983 
Equity -0.553 -0.048 -0.618 -1.017 1.689*** 0.816 0.710 *3.136 
Russia: 
Bond 0.916 0.607 -0.596 -2.074** 1.388 -0.258 2.465* *18.743 
CDS -0.976 -1.618 0.014 -0.156 -1.80*** -0.291 -0.466 *8.483 
Equity 2.240** -1.096 -0.798 -0.618 0.152 1.033 1.074 *6.779 
Turkey: 
Bond -0.109 -0.014 -2.714* -2.805* -1.576 -0.744 1.240 *39.159 
CDS -1.776*** 0.262 1.597 -0.482 -0.505 -1.272 0.274 *7.271 
Equity -0.614 -0.521 -2.195** -3.065* -2.282** 0.092 0.378 *13.439 
Panel D:   Africa               
S. Africa: 
Bond 2.763* 2.260** -0.006 -1.869*** 1.563 0.970 1.528 *24.802 
CDS -3.142* -2.885* 0.826 -2.061** -2.823* -0.840 0.884 *43.708 
Equity 2.561* 0.747 0.451 -0.268 0.666 0.552 1.242 *6.377 
Tunisia: 
Bond -0.438 -2.790* -0.659 0.056 1.753c 1.015 2.803* *5.141 
CDS -0.364 0.652 -2.576* -2.113** -0.816 1.860*** -1.406 *19.903 
Equity 0.722 -0.203 -0.912 -0.153 1.492 4.181* 1.882*** *16.123 
 
The first implication interconnected markets create potential for participants in any of 
the three markets to engage in arbitrage trading by exploiting information in one market and 
trading in the other market.. The existence of such arbitrage opportunities means the three 
markets are inefficient. In fact, the mere existence of statistical significance of negative and 
positive return shocks means that current returns are still responding to past (lagged) 
information. Second, all   ji  . Therefore, the return spillover process is asymmetric. 
Positive and negative return shocks have nonlinear or asymmetric effects on current returns 
of each security. Third, the absence of any significant spillover could indicate that either the  
market is efficient (henceit has already incorporated past (lagged) own positive and negative 
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return shocks) or the sovereign has low default risk hence returns are influenced by 
fundamentals of the country and not credit risk. This seems to be the case of China and 
Malaysia, both of which have A- credit rating and few spillovers among the three markets. 
However, no market has all statistically insignificant t-statistic implying that all the three 
markets are inefficient in incorporating past information or news.  
In majority of the emerging market countries, negative return shocks have higher 
impact on the current compared to positive return shocks. For example: In all countries 
except Tunisia, Colombia, Malaysia and Thailand, negative bond returns shocks have higher 
t-statistic than the t-statistic of positive bond returns. This provides additional evidence that 
investors react more to “bad” news than to “good” news (Black 1976 and Glostein et al 
1993) in the markets not only in the equity market but also in the sovereign CDS and bond 
markets. In Brazil, lagged negative and positive bond returns shocks significantly influence 
current bond returns (t=3.147 and t=2.551 respectively) but negative lagged returns (bad 
news) have strong influence. Lagged negative and positive CDS and equity returns do not 
influence current bond returns. Current CDS returns are significantly influenced by negative 
lagged bond returns (t=2.07), positive lagged CDS returns (t=-1.818) and both negative and 
positive lagged equity returns (t=-3.611 and -2.210 respectively).  
This summary provides evidence in support of substitution hypothesis of King and 
Wadhani (1990) and news-based hypothesis of Campbell and Vuolteennaho 
(2004).Specifically, I find that in indonesia, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Philippines, the sign of 
positive CDS return shocks ( C ) negatively and significantly influence both equity and bond 
returns. However, in Venezuela, China, Malaysia and S. Africa, positive CDS return shocks 
negatively and significantly spillover to equity markets only. In Hungary, positive CDS 
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return shocks negatively and significantly influence the bond returns. This supports the asset 
substitution hypothesis. The mere existence of statistically significant and insignificant  
return spillovers with both positive and negative signs indicates the convoluted nature of the 
relationship of the three markets. Asymmetry also mean that each market returns are 
influenced by the fundamentals of that particular market and trading in one market can 
trigger momentum in the other market. For example: Increase in default risk activates CDS 
buying and disposal of equity thus opposite trading momentum in both markets. This 
confirms the news-based hypothesis. 
J. Threshold autoregressive (TAR) or momentum threshold autoregressive 
(MTAR) 
 
Before testing nonlinear cointegration and asymmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium 
relationship between any two markets (CDS, equity and bonds), I first estimate the threshold 
values though grid search and consistent use of Chan’s method. I trim the first and last 15% 
of ordered observations to eliminate outliers and estimate the threshold values on the 
remaining 70%. Threshold values can estimated through either Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Swartz Bayesian information criterion (BIC or SIC) and minimization of sum of 
squared residuals (SSR). The lower the measure is, the better the model. Table 4 presents the 
model selection using BIC. In 41/51 possible cointegrations, BIC selects MTAR. In all 
cointergations involving CDS premium and equity and bond spreads and equity, BIC selects 
MTAR modeling. The CDS-bond spreads of Colombia, Mexico, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Tunisia require TAR modeling according to BIC 
selection and the rest of the countries’ CDS-bond spreads require MTAR modeling. Four out 
of five Asian and three out of five Europe sovereigns in the sample do not require MTAR in 
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CDS-bond spreads. This is an interesting observation that requires further investigation. The 
selection of MTAR by CDS-equity spreads and equity-bond spreads provide partial evidence 
that each spread is characterized by autoregressive decay that depends on whether the spread 
is increasing or decreasing. There is intensified trading by investors in volatile regimes 
which may reverse dynamic relationship among the three securities, speed of adjustment to 
new information (Delatte et al, 2010) and even the price informativeness of each security. 
K. Non-linear cointegration asymmetric adjustment and momentum 
 
We now employ the model identified in table 4 in establishing whether non-linear 
cointegration and asymmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium relationship exists. Table 5 
provides summary results. Hypothesis Ho1 tests the null of nonlinear cointegration. Thailand, 
Poland and Turkey do not exhibit non-linear cointegration in any combination of the three 
markets (CDS and bonds, CDS and equity and equity and bonds). Mexico, China and 
Philippines also exhibit non-linear cointegration between CDS and equity on one hand and 
equity and bond spreads on the other. The absence of nonlinear cointegration could be 
attributed to a number of possible reasons. 
Table 4: Threshold values and Selection between TAR and MTAR 
In table 4, CDS is credit default swap. TAR is the threshold auto regressive (TAR) model while 
MTAR is momentum threshold auto regressive. TH is the threshold value selected using Bayesian 
Information criterion (BIC). The * indicates the model (TAR or MTAR) selected by BIC. The lower 
the BIC is, the better the model.  
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We now employ the model identified in table 3 in establishing whether non-linear 
cointegration and asymmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium relationship exists. Table 4 
provides summary results. Hypothesis Ho1(1=2=0) tests the null of non-linear 
cointegration. I find 28/51 possible nonlinear cointegration relationships. All countries 
except Turkey have at least 2 out of 3 possible nonlinear cointegrations. The absence of non-
linear cointegration could be attributed to a number of possible reasons. First, non-linear 
modeling is not appropriate for Turkey and hence we should employ linear modeling. 
Second, one or more of the three markets are highly illiquid such that minimal or no trading 
occurs. This is not unusual because of the structure of CDS market and nature of sovereign 
bondholders. Sovereign CDS market is is dominated by large institutional investors who 
trade in over-the-counter market. These investors may just buy and hold sovereign bonds as 
CDS and BONDS CDS and EQUITY EQUITY and BONDS
TAR MTAR TAR MTAR TAR MTAR
Country TH BIC TH BIC TH BIC TH BIC TH BIC TH BIC
Argentina 155.78 12141.03 -7.22 12134.61* 1501.34 13440.53 -43.74 13416.01* 1144.39 12386.5 -41.46 12375.46*
Brazil -180.50 14607.16 13.42 14606.45* 490.33 16491.41 -38.97 16482.08* 541.36 16032.6 41.29 16019.61*
Colombia -43.72 9589.579* 8.18 9620.77 -180.32 10034.86 -10.28 9912.517* 180.38 9192.41 9.66 9173.31*
Mexico -19.40 8719.956* -5.75 8750.90 1320.39 16836.79 -37.04 16812.71* 1129.94 16765.3 49.44 16745.54*
Venezuela -140.33 12381.61 14.44 12355.03* 5413.48 22253.57 -230.06 22234.83* 5307.05 22251.6 -216.74 22233.26*
China -18.73 7010.797* -4.90 7022.27 37.82 5825.10 1.06 5811.04* -56.09 6774.64 5.45 6759.26*
Indonesia 104.52 7237.565* -10.08 7253.83 -131.57 7855.42 7.08 7808.39* 94.93 6702.26 -8.02 6653.35*
Malaysia 31.87 8581.726* 5.75 8593.99 -83.61 8451.61 3.89 8388.95* -91.24 7854.93 -6.30 7836.48*
philippine 42.85 8580.224* -7.96 8601.62 -112.46 9471.07 8.10 9377.262* -94.36 8549.25 7.90 8500.66*
Thailand -28.75 7579.07 6.28 7477.709* 133.16 7800.54 -8.30 7734.67* -219.90 9447.13 12.22 9306.66*
Bulgaria -32.13 9048.282* 6.71 9055.42 492.82 10589.12 9.51 10503* 394.30 10298.2 -7.45 10254.94*
Hungary 36.44 8914.098* -5.82 8917.90 246.64 11613.71 10.19 11542.76* 241.25 11195.8 -12.85 11170.75*
Poland -35.22 7684.756* -4.08 7692.54 348.32 11650.60 -14.74 11632.15* 236.47 11602.1 5.82 11596.23*
Russia 12.72 9939.68 5.55 9879.313* 493.74 12991.79 8.71 12911.7* 484.19 12224.9 15.66 12208.02*
Turkey 57.57 10550.31 7.07 10381.22* -365.96 12193.85 -16.62 12155.08* -333.53 11582 -14.11 11565.54*
S. Africa 31.48 9283.35 -5.18 9271.472* -120.59 10309.21 6.43 10274.52* 143.29 9243.10 -8.48 9238.43*
Tunisia 32.87 7872.485* -5.67 7882.81 -141.64 9745.99 -6.96 9716.57* -123.63 9805.49 11.11 9760.06*
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they observe the fundamentals of the reference entity. As such, the bond market may become 
very illiquid coupled thin trading. Third, the stock index or sovereign bond index are 
unsuitable proxies for evaluating credit risk (Chang-Lau and Kim, 2004). Fourth, and most 
plausible reason, could be that the countries have low sovereign debt levels (Low credit risk) 
to which equity and bond prices do not respond since their distance to default is very 
high.This is consistent with Merton (1974) explanation that equity prices react more to 
changes in credit risk for highly leveraged (high default risk )  firms (countries). Anecdotal 
evidence shows that these countries have relatively better credit rating (low credit risk, low 
leverage and high distance to default). In general, only three countries do not exhibit any 
non-linear cointegration in the pairwise combination of the three markets. Lastly, it is 
notably possible that the forces of market frictions such as transaction costs, regulations in 
equity markets and taxes are too strong to allow investors to engage in arbitrage 
opportunities which, once exhausted, would allow the markets to regain their long run 
equilibrium relationship. 
Turning to hypothesis Ho2, we allow 1 and 2 to take dissimilar values to recognize 
that positive and negative deviations from long run equilibrium relationship can be adjusted 
for at different speeds. I find existence of asymmetrical equilibrium relationship irrespective 
of the TAR or MTAR model, since coefficients 1 and 2 are statistically different from 
zeroin 49/51 possible cointegration relationships. When applying MTAR model, rejection of 
Ho2 in table 5 confirms the divergence from equilibrium relationships exhibit higher 
momentum in one of the two alternative directions (upper and lower regime). In these pairs 
of the markets, adjustment varies with the magnitude of the error term and positive and 
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negative deviations from long run equilibrium relationship can be adjusted for at different 
speeds and sizes. 
The rational for observation is on a number of possible explanations. First, the 
changes in sovereign CDS spreads depend on the size of the government budget deficits. 
Small budget deficits do not require any intervention and the CDS spreads and equity prices 
remain calm. However, huge and spiraling government budget deficits require aggressive 
interventionary policies to smooth them and prevent default (See Enders and Siklos, 2001). 
CDS and equity prices will experience high volatility as huge deficits increases probability 
of default (distance to default is short and the borrower is about to breach the debt barrier or 
threshold such as case of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and EU in general).  
Second, sovereign bond holders are only concerned with down-side risk hence they 
reacts more in the face of market convulsions by buying more CDS to hedge against possible 
default (bad news). As CDS premium increases, stock prices will be plunging in response to 
increased credit risk. Third, the liquidity of the market plays a significant role. CDS prices, 
unlike bonds, can be easily shorted, do not require any funding, are not constrained by 
contract indentures and tend to be highly liquid relative to the bonds and equity markets. 
Sovereign bonds and CDS of large, well known countries with established history tend to be 
more liquid relative with buoyed trading relative to bonds and CDS of small countries. 
Therefore, momentum of CDS and bonds of large countries tend to be higher. Forth, 
investors react sharply in rebalancing their portfolios which constitute bonds, CDS and 
equity. Equity prices and CDS premium have negative relationship in volatile market 
conditions. This may intensify trading as investors liquidate their positions hence 
reinforcement of momentum in such periods.  
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Table 5: Non-linear cointegration and asymmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium 
In this table, CDS, BS and EQ represent credit default swaps, bond spreads and equity prices or index. TAR 
and MTAR is threshold autoregressive and momentum threshold autoregressive models as selected in table 5. 
DW is Durbin Watson statistics which tests the null of no serial correlation in error term. Ho1 tests the null of 
linear cointegration using non-standard F-statistic while Ho2 tests the null of symmetric adjustment to long-run 
relationship between series x and y. Ho3 is a joint test of the sum of coefficients 1 and 2 in the TAR equation 
(iv) and (v)     ˆ)1(ˆˆ t1211    ttttt II . In MTAR model, we use the first difference of the 
regressors. Ho2 and Ho3 are based evaluated using the Standard F-statistic.*, ** and *** is 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level.  
Ho1 Ho2 Ho3: 
Country Variables Model 1 2 DW 1=2=0 1=2 1=-2 
Argentina CDS and BS MTAR **-0.0830 -0.0079 1.99 ***3.08 *5.43 *10.71 
CDS and EQ MTAR -0.0337 *-0.1345 2.01 **3.85 *8.11 **1.59 
EQ and BS MTAR -0.0026 **0.0679 2.00 1.87 ***1.98 *6.23 
Brazil CDS and BS MTAR **-0.00855 -0.002 1.99 **3.85 1.54 *2.54 
CDS and EQ MTAR **0.07015 0.0266 1.99 ***2.41 *5.06 *6.34 
EQ and BS MTAR 0.0346 *-0.0829 2.00 1.08 *4.57 0.9500 
Colombia CDS and BS TAR -0.0160 ***-0.063 2.00 ***2.71 1.68 *126.58 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.3111 *-0.2127 1.98 **4.47 *63.36 *10.00 
EQ and BS MTAR -0.0243 *-0.1291 2.00 **4.67 *9.20 **1.86 
Mexico CDS and BS TAR -0.0184 **-0.0814 1.99 **4.69 *2.87 *19.32 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1256 **-0.07374 1.99 1.31 *10.01 *15.79 
EQ and BS MTAR *-0.1111 **-0.0713 1.99 0.75 *7.93 *24.46 
Venezuela CDS and BS MTAR -0.0292 *-0.2043 2.02 *13.76 *18.27 **1.28 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1084 ***-0.054 1.98 *11.37 *5.85 **1.06 
EQ and BS MTAR 0.1049 ***-0.055 1.98 *11.04 *5.63 *13.97 
China CDS and BS TAR *-0.0236 **-0.0364 2.18 0.64 *11.62 *14.41 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.0946 *-0.1091 2.02 0.09 *9.34 *14.41 
EQ and BS MTAR -0.0494 *-0.1328 2.01 ***3.26 *10.04 *10.84 
Indonesia CDS and BS TAR *-0.0339 -0.0029 1.98 *15.24 *11.88 *41.82 
CDS and EQ MTAR -0.198 *-0.1856 2.03 0.04 *23.09 *41.15 
EQ and BS MTAR *-0.1029 *-0.2488 1.97 *7.08 *23.37 *31.53 
Malaysia CDS and BS TAR *-0.0422 *-0.0208 2.00 **3.66 *16.37 *52.97 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1021 *-0.2250 1.98 *7.48 *32.45 *4.75 
EQ and BS MTAR -0.016634 **-0.0821 2.00 2.09 *3.32 *31.44 
Philippines CDS and BS TAR *-0.0488 **-0.0176 1.96 *6.93 *17.39 *92.37 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1932 *-0.2538 2.00 1.70 *49.35 *42.37 
EQ and BS MTAR *-0.1853 *-0.1286 1.99 1.38 *21.27 *106.90 
Thailand CDS and BS MTAR *-0.2864 *-0.2283 2.01 1.36 *53.49 *64.46 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.2351 *-0.1684 2.03 1.76 *32.86 *144.85 
EQ and BS MTAR *-0.3301 *-0.2657 2.03 1.70 *72.48 **1.11 
Bulgaria CDS and BS TAR 0.0212 **-0.0692 2.00 **3.96 *8.83 *68.92 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1456 *-0.2338 2.02 **3.73 *42.09 *36.82 
EQ and BS MTAR *0.1059 *-0.1683 2.01 1.90 *20.21 *18.71 
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Hungary CDS and BS TAR *-0.0291 ***-0.012 1.80 ***3.00 *10.98 *63.49 
CDS and EQ MTAR *0.1384 *-0.2184 1.99 ***3.20 *34.35 *19.20 
EQ and BS MTAR **0.0900 *-0.1123 2.00 0.23 *10.55 *11.99 
Poland CDS and BS TAR **-0.0093 *-0.0157 1.96 0.80 *6.04 *16.49 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.0832* *-0.1007 2.00 0.15 *8.33 *1.84 
EQ and BS MTAR -0.000275 **-0.0623 2.01 1.88 **2.07 *67.00 
Russia CDS and BS MTAR *-0.2378 *-0.1279 2.00 *6.05 *36.06 *71.99 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1585 *-0.2234 2.00 2.08 *39.44 *7.71 
EQ and BS MTAR 0.0071 *-0.1212 2.00 *6.09 *8.60 *202.11 
Turkey CDS and BS MTAR *-0.3404 *-0.2772 2.00 2.11 *105.67 *36.82 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1670 *-0.1070 2.01 1.76 *18.81 *14.02 
EQ and BS MTAR ***-0.0611 *0.1086 2.00 1.10 *7.65 *17.71 
S. Africa CDS and BS MTAR *-0.2212 0.0317 2.02 *31.57 *26.80 *15.36 
CDS and EQ MTAR *0.2021 -0.0234 1.98 *24.46 *17.40 *3.494 
EQ and BS MTAR 0.032 0.05301 2.00 0.21 **1.82 *44.38 
Tunisia CDS and BS TAR *-0.0738 **-0.0173 2.13 *17.05 *23.84 *26.09 
CDS and EQ MTAR *-0.1519 *-0.0889 2.01 1.79 *13.81 *38.10 
EQ and BS MTAR *-0.1849 *-0.1066 2.00 ***2.75 *19.57 *38.11 
 
L. Short term Asymmetric Adjustment process 
 
In the next two sections, we use the following equation to analyze asymmetry in short run 
and long run adjustment processesin upper (+) and lower (-) regime. The short-run 
adjustment of )(x tty depends on parameters )  and   , ,(  and , ,
- _   . This 
implies that in the short run, the dynamics of )(x tty depends on its own past dynamics 
or/and the lagged outcome of )(y ttx . 
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From the two equations, I test for the null )  ( or    ) ( - _    when 
)(x tty  is the dependent variable. Rejection of any of the null hypotheses is indicative of 
asymmetry in short run adjustment process. Table 6 present the results. There is short run 
asymmetric adjustment process in 21/34, 23/34 and 21/34 cointegration relations between 
CDS premium and bond spreads, CDS premium and equity prices and equity prices and 
bond spreads respectively. All countries except China [Which has the lowest (highest) 
default risk (credit rating) shows asymmetry in short run dynamic short run adjustment 
process in the two regimes. Overall, the results show that the markets are informative with 
regard to credit risk in either upper or lower regime. This is certainly because most investors 
in the sovereign bond markets are institutional investors who buy and hold the bond and only 
operate in the CDS market where short selling is easier and contract specifications and 
indentures do exist. It could also be that investors respond to fundamentals such as 
government fiscal policies (which take time) before trading in the bond market. 
M. Asymmetric long run adjustment and price discovery process 
 
The use of threshold vector error correction model takes care of uncertainty in price 
discovery process and ensures that this process is also time-varying since two regimes occur 
at different times. It also allows the adjustment process of )(x tty to vary according to 
positive and negative divergences from equilibrium relationship in each regime. 
Table 6: Short term asymmetric adjustment 
In this table BYS, CDS and EQU are bond spreads, credit default swap premium and equity 
respectively. (+) and (–) represent upper and lower regime. We test three pairs of short-term 
asymmetric adjustment process namely bond spreads and CDS, equity and CDS and equity. The 
short term asymmetric adjustment process is tested through Ho: 
 =   (all lags of y in upper 
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regime=all lags of y in the lower regime) and 
 =  ( all lags of x in upper regime=all lags of x in 
the lower regime) 
Country 
CDS and 
BONDS F-Stat 
EQUITY and 
CDS F-Stat 
Bonds and 
EQUITY F-Stat 
Argentina BYS+=BYS- 0.113 EQU+=EQU- ***2.874 BYS+=BYS- ***3.469 
CDS+=CDS- **4.454 CDS+=CDS- *22.918 EQU+=EQU- 0.167 
Brazil BYS+=BYS- *12.71 EQU+=EQU- ***3.382 BYS+=BYS- **4.90 
CDS+=CDS- ***3.366 CDS+=CDS- *38.471 EQU+=EQU- 0.921 
Colombia BYS+=BYS- **4.571 EQU+=EQU- 0.229 BYS+=BYS- **3.813 
CDS+=CDS- **5.476 CDS+=CDS- 0.384 EQU+=EQU- 0.001 
Mexico BYS+=BYS- 0.966 EQU+=EQU- ***2.791 BYS+=BYS- 0.12 
CDS+=CDS- *7.979 CDS+=CDS- *10.776 EQU+=EQU- 0.043 
Venezuela BYS+=BYS- **4.368 EQU+=EQU- *27.561 BYS+=BYS- *30.769 
CDS+=CDS- ***3.658 CDS+=CDS- **5.157 EQU+=EQU- ***2.672 
China BYS+=BYS- 0.397 EQU+=EQU- 0.054 BYS+=BYS- ***3.286 
CDS+=CDS- 0.589 CDS+=CDS- 0.058 EQU+=EQU- 1.255 
Indonesia BYS+=BYS- *8.018 EQU+=EQU- 2.028 BYS+=BYS- 0.174 
CDS+=CDS- *21.383 CDS+=CDS- *7.21 EQU+=EQU- *6.641 
Malaysia BYS+=BYS- 0.332 EQU+=EQU- *18.809 BYS+=BYS- 0.523 
CDS+=CDS- ***2.620 CDS+=CDS- ***3.427 EQU+=EQU- *10.009 
Philippines BYS+=BYS- 0.973 EQU+=EQU- ***2.981 BYS+=BYS- 0.33 
CDS+=CDS- 0.011 CDS+=CDS- 1.377 EQU+=EQU- 0.873 
Thailand BYS+=BYS- 0.071 EQU+=EQU- *7.65 BYS+=BYS- *7.165 
CDS+=CDS- **5.991 CDS+=CDS- 0.159 EQU+=EQU- *6.158 
Bulgaria BYS+=BYS- ***2.654 EQU+=EQU- *10.148 BYS+=BYS- *7.641 
CDS+=CDS- ***2.663 CDS+=CDS- 1.084 EQU+=EQU- ***2.231 
Hungary BYS+=BYS- *20.16 EQU+=EQU- *11.102 BYS+=BYS- *11.449 
CDS+=CDS- ***2.957 CDS+=CDS- **5.016 EQU+=EQU- ***3.445 
Poland BYS+=BYS- 0.931 EQU+=EQU- *6.92 BYS+=BYS- ***3.459 
CDS+=CDS- ***2.971 CDS+=CDS- *6.65 EQU+=EQU- 0.000 
Russia BYS+=BYS- 2.334 EQU+=EQU- **5.263 BYS+=BYS- **5.938 
CDS+=CDS- **5.944 CDS+=CDS- ***2.542 EQU+=EQU- *7.742 
Turkey BYS+=BYS- 0.199 EQU+=EQU- ***3.626 BYS+=BYS- 0.142 
CDS+=CDS- 0.408 CDS+=CDS- 2.118 EQU+=EQU- ***3.156 
S. Africa BYS+=BYS- ***3.546 EQU+=EQU- 1.89 BYS+=BYS- ***3.222 
CDS+=CDS- *5.810 CDS+=CDS- *8.021 EQU+=EQU- *12.012 
Tunisia BYS+=BYS- *7.845 EQU+=EQU- ***3.854 BYS+=BYS- ***2.734 
CDS+=CDS- 0.151 CDS+=CDS- 1.297 EQU+=EQU- 0.003 
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If the error correction term in the upper regime Z+ =ECT+= 1101-tx  ty , then, a 
positive (negative) shock to ty will result in tx being below (above) the equilibrium relative 
to ty such that )(x   x 1101-t1101-t   tt yy  . Therefore, tx will require upward 
(downward) adjustment to track ty , correct the price discrepancy or deviation and restore 
equilibrium relationship with ty . The same logic can be applied with respect to positive and 
negative shock to tx in any of the two regimes. This captures nonlinearity in error correction 
process and price discovery process. In tables 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c), the null hypothesis, 
ECT+=ECT- tests the symmetric long-run adjustment of y (CDS or bond spreads or equity) 
to long run equilibrium relationship. If ECT+ECT-, there is asymmetry in long run 
adjustment process. Looking at table 7(a) and focusing on Argentina, we can conclude that 
1)The long run adjustment process is asymmetric in the CDS market (rejects null 
ECT+=ECT-) but symmetric in the bond market (fail to reject the null ECT+=ECT-) 
2) In the upper regime denoted by ECT+, price discovery takes place in the bond market 
since CDS ECT+ is statistically significant while BS ECT+ is insignificant. 
3) In the lower regime, ECT- for both BS and CDS is insignificant hence neither BS nor 
CDS move to restore equilibrium relationship since during normal times, these relationship 
is extant and need no restoration or the markets are too illiquid or market frictions prevent 
the markets from attaining equilibrium relationship 
4) In a single regime model (linear ECT), price discovery takes place in the CDS market 
since BS ECT is statistically significant and has the opposite (positive) sign of CDS ECT. 
These results contradict the findings of TVECM. 
58 
 
An interesting finding occurs in panel B of table 7(a). Specifically, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland and Philippines exhibit symmetric long-run adjustment process in the bond market 
(BS) since we fail to reject the null ECT+=ECT- . This supports evidence in previous tables 
where 
(i) The countries’ CDS-bond spreads were modeled using TAR as selected by BIC  
Table 7(a): Non-linear price discovery between CDS and Bond spreads BS 
This table provides summary information on asymmetrical price discovery between CDS and bond spreads. BS 
and CDS are bond spreads and credit default swap. DW is Durbin Watson statistic which test the null of no 
(zero) autocorrelation in the residuals. LB(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic which test the null of no autocorrelation 
in residuals up to four lags. ECT+ and ECT- is the error correction term (speed of adjustment parameter) in 
upper and lower regime respectively. Each series (BS and CDS) adjusts to long-run equilibrium relationship 
under two regimes (above and below the threshold. The null hypothesis, Ho: ECT+=ECT- is a test of 
asymmetry in error or deviation adjustment process. *, ** and *** is 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
Linear ECT is the error correction term in a linear model which assumes a single regime. 
Panel A Country Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
BS ECT+ -0.0028309 *-0.00799 0.002065 -0.004909 *0.0067144 
ECT- 0.0002761 **0.003839 *0.021946 *0.029354 -0.0004134 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 0.62 *21.804 **5.006 **5.233 *9.492 
LB(4) & DW 0.90 & 1.99 1.00 & 1.99 0.98 & 1.99 0.98 & 2.00 0.98 & 2.00 
CDS ECT+ *-0.040415 **-0.011363 *-0.037174 *-0.056087 *0.016354 
ECT- -0.005688 -0.003846 **-0.026217 *0.027189 *-0.009543 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *8.348 ***2.43 0.538 *24.167 *32.665 
LB(4) & DW 0.01 & 2.03 0.99 & 1.99 0.00 & 2.00 0.77 & 2.00 0.92 & 2.02 
Linear ECT BS *0.02834 *-0.008896 *-0.032107 ***-0.0124 *-0.015064 
CDS -0.001093 0.000245 0.00507 *0.018633 -0.001132 
Panel B China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
BS ECT+ *0.041695 -0.0027931 **0.012457 -0.005144 *-0.38943 
ECT- **0.023778 -0.0009758 **0.01673 -0.006101 **0.03892 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 1.352 0.102 0.191 0.261 *16.742 
LB(4) & DW 1.00 & 1.99 1.00 & 2.00 1.00 & 2.00 0.21 & 2.04 0.89 & 2.03 
CDS ECT+ **-0.013797 *-0.0206911 -0.00852 -0.002536 *-0.167004 
ECT- -0.008101 ***-0.01165 -0.002252 *-0.054335 0.005653 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 0.263 0.943 0.349 *10.023 *17.57 
LB(4) & DW 1.00 & 2.02 1.00 & 1.99 0.00 & 2.09 0.10 & 2.01 0.86 & 2.02 
Linear ECT BS -0.003817 -0.001827 *-0.017867 *-0.027531 -0.010234 
CDS *0.036276 **0.00242 *0.021948 0.008467 0.003592 
Panel C Bulgaria Hungary Poland Russia Turkey 
BS ECT+ *0.017513 0.00279 0.004889 -0.0009391 *0.018292 
ECT- 0.006101 *-0.017892 **0.017777 0.0070418 -0.001144 
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Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat ***2.098 ***2.851 ***2.761 1.901 *8.517 
LB(4) & DW 1.00 & 2.00 0.95 & 1.99 0.88 & 1.99 0.90 & 1.99 0.99 & 1.98 
CDS ECT+ **-0.011735 **-0.011626 -0.0022752 *-0.015555 0.00521 
ECT- -0.002225 *-0.027667 0.0008117 0.007667 *-0.012987 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 1.061 **4.322 0.283 **5.046 ***3.445 
LB(4) & DW 0.58 & 2.00 0.05 & 1.99 0.90 & 1.99 0.00 & 2.00 0.90 & 1.99 
Linear ECT BS ***-0.007954 -0.00385 **-0.006273 *-0.013937 ***-0.009897 
CDS *0.017576 *0.023218 *0.016126 *0.007761 **0.008694 
Panel D S. Africa Tunisia 
BS ECT+ 0.002596 -0.002405 
ECT- **0.017733 ***-0.010737 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *5.845 **4.037 
LB(4) & DW 0.98 & 2.03 0.95 & 1.99 
CDS ECT+ 0.005146 -0.00633 
ECT- *-0.028943 **0.012494 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *13.876 0.709 
LB(4) & DW 1.00 & 2.00 0.99 & 2.00 
Linear ECT BS *-0.018108 *0.86273 
CDS *0.015526 **0.06159 
 
(ii) The countries showed linear cointegration in at least two pairs of the market 
among the three markets. 
(iii) The countries had positive skew in returns 
I find asymmetry in long run adjustment process in 21/34 possible regimes. In the 
upper regime (ECT+), price discovery takes place in the bond market in Colombia, 
Mexico, Indonesia, Hungary and Russia. In the lower regime, CDS leads in price 
discovery in Brazil, China, Malaysia, Thailand and Poland.  In a linear ECT, price 
discovery takes place in CDS market in all the five Latin American countries. In 
Malaysia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, S. Africa and Tunisia, both CDS and bond 
markets are sources of price discovery under a single regime or linear VECM. There are 
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contradictions between the threshold model and linear model as to where price discovery 
takes place.  
Table 7(b) summarizes asymmetric long run adjustment process and price discovery 
when cointegration relationship is based on CDS premium and equity prices.In 17/34 
possible long run adjustments, we find asymmetry. Therefore, long run adjustment is 
regime-dependent. In relation to price discovery, Venezuela, China and Tunisia indicate 
that price discovery takes place in equity market in the upper regime. This is consistent 
with the linear model. In the lower regime, only Tunisia and Indonesia offer the 
leadership in price discovery as equity market which is consistent with linear model. All 
the rest of evidence between linear and non-linear price discovery is contradictory but in 
support of non-linear model. In lower regime,  five countries (Mexico, Venezuela, China, 
Philippines and Turkey) shows that neither CDS nor equity prices move to restore 
equilibrium relation (insignificant adjustment coefficients) while another five countries 
(Colombia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Russia and South Africa) offer similar evidence in upper 
regime. This is either because the markets are illiquid or long-run equilibrium 
relationship between CDS and equity exists hence no need to disturb that equilibrium or 
market frictions forces deter price informativeness of either CDS or equity market.  
Table 7(c) offers more evidence in support of asymmetric long run adjustment 
process when we assess cointegration relationship between equity and bond markets. 
Also, different regimes have different markets that lead in price discovery. Specifically, 
we find 17/34 asymmetric long run adjustment processes implying that the presence of 
regimes determines the equilibrium relationship between equity prices and bond spreads. 
In relation to price discovery and informativeness of either equity prices or bond spreads, 
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three countries (Colombia, Venezuela and Turkey) offer equity as price discovery leader 
which is consistent with linear VECM in lower regime. In 6/17(7/17) countries, price 
discovery occurs in equity (bond) market in upper regime. In sum, the existence of two 
regimes make price discovery to be regime-dependent unlike the linear price discovery. 
Table 7(b): Asymmetrical price discovery between CDS and Equity 
This table provides summary information on asymmetrical price discovery between CDS and equity. CDS is 
the credit default swap. DW is Durbin Watson statistic which test the null of no (zero) autocorrelation in the 
residuals. LB(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic which test the null of no autocorrelation in residuals up to four lags. 
ECT+ and ECT- is the error correction term (speed of adjustment parameter) in upper and lower regime 
respectively. Each series (BS and CDS) adjusts to long-run equilibrium relationship under two regimes (above 
and below the threshold. The null hypothesis, Ho: ECT+=ECT- is a test of asymmetry in error or deviation 
adjustment process. *, ** and *** is 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Linear ECT is the error correction 
term in a linear model which assumes a single regime. 
Panel A Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
CDS ECT+ -0.0004157 **-0.00515 -0.0011639 -0.0030380 *-0.013988 
ECT- *-0.01536 *-0.017459 -0.0009236 -0.007678 -0.00989 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *9.274 *8.33 0.028 0.515 0.158 
LB(4) & DW 0.11 & 2.00 0.22 & 2.04 1.00 & 2.00 0.00 & 2.01 0.00 & 2.00 
Equity ECT+ -0.000394 -0.00229 0.001192 **0.0027776 -0.003992 
ECT- 0.000284 -3.04E-06 *-0.00386 -0.000245 0.001522 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 0.575 0.156 *7.269 **4.412 0.622 
LB(4) & DW 0.75 & 2.00 0.74 & 2.00 0.99 & 2.00 0.53 & 2.00 0.82 & 2.00 
Linear ECT CDS *1.04047 -0.0001 *-0.016375 **-0.006804 *-0.003489 
EQUITY **-0.05115 ***0.00018 **-0.00567 -0.027535 -0.005821 
Panel B China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
CDS ECT+ **-0.01227 *0.025067 *-0.008194 *0.0274985 -0.0051440 
ECT- 0.001001 **-0.01046 *-0.248408 0.0002024 -0.006101 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *6.539 *11.497 *149.973 *9.714 0.006 
LB(4) & DW 0.21 & 2.00 0.67 & 2.01 0.31 & 2.06 0.54 & 1.99 0.03 & 2.05 
Equity ECT+ 0.0110775 0.000713 0.005172 **-0.008365 -0.002536 
ECT- 0.0008269 0.00148 *0.791326 -0.001942 *-0.003946 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 1.061 0.023 *23.839 ***2.879 0.159 
LB(4) & DW 0.01 & 2.01 0.67 & 2.01 0.98 & 2.01 1.00 & 2.00 1.00 & 2.00 
Linear ECT CDS *-0.009494 *-0.035907 **-0.00680 **-0.009607 *-0.025197 
EQUITY -0.000715 -0.00539 *-0.003126 *-0.003993 *-0.021171 
Panel C Bulgaria Hungary Poland Russia Turkey 
CDS ECT+ 0.0000932 **-0.01374 *0.028761 -0.0074140 0.0001013 
ECT- **-0.00207 *-0.00834 **-0.00836 ***-0.02320 9.64E-05 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *4.402 0.56 *27.19 1.306 0.000 
LB(4) & DW 0.84 & 1.99 0.00 & 1.98 0.99 & 1.98 0.19 & 2.04 0.92 & 1.99 
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Equity ECT+ -0.0004742 0.01398 0.0009039 -0.006571 ***0.0008375 
ECT- 0.0049845 -0.00499 0.0027286 **-0.040081 -0.001704 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 1.763 *4.194 0.141 ***3.107 **4.926 
LB(4) & DW 0.50 & 2.00 0.59 & 2.00 1.00 & 2.00 0.98 & 1.99 1.00 & 1.99 
Linear ECT CDS -0.002351 *-0.015439 **-0.00597 *-0.007212 -0.002741 
EQUITY *-0.011108 **-0.01752 **-0.02555 -0.003422 ***-0.0025 
Panel D S. Africa Tunisia 
CDS ECT+ 0.0017950 *-0.004448 
ECT- *-0.040512 *0.0558 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *37.822 *14.339 
LB(4) & DW 0.91 & 2.00 0.93 & 1.99 
Equity ECT+ -0.00244 0.011664 
ECT- -0.001256 -0.09867 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 0.081 0.19 
LB(4) & DW 1.00 & 2.00 0.21 & 1.96 
Linear ECT CDS **-0.01025 **-0.00489 
EQUITY *-0.007394 -0.00176 
 
 
 
Table 7(c): Asymmetrical price discovery between equity and bond spreads 
This table provides summary information on asymmetrical price discovery between CDS and equity. 
BS is the bond spreads. DW is Durbin Watson statistic which test the null of no (zero) 
autocorrelation in the residuals. LB(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic which test the null of no 
autocorrelation in residuals up to four lags. ECT+ and ECT- is the error correction term ( speed of 
adjustment parameter) in upper and lower regime respectively. Each series (BS and CDS) adjusts to 
long-run equilibrium relationship under two regimes (above and below the threshold. The null 
hypothesis, Ho: ECT+=ECT- is a test of asymmetry in error or deviation adjustment process. *, ** 
and *** is 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Linear ECT is the error correction term in a linear 
model which assumes a single regime. 
Panel A Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
BS ECT+ 0.0001612 ***0.0030451 0.0004577 **-0.2415 **0.009237 
ECT- -0.0018313 -0.0006683 ***-0.01126 9.52E-03 **-0.004317 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 0.965 **4.007 ***2.934 **4.558 *7.552 
LB(4) & DW 0.97 & 2.01 0.38 & 2.00 1.00 & 2.00 0.97 & 2.00 0.30 & 2.00 
Equity ECT+ 0.0004409 -0.001273 **-0.00731 ***-0.0329 -0.0084 
ECT- *-0.02078 -0.002332 0.0050743 -0.002508 8.75E-05 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *14.294 0.046 1.415 ***2.637 ***2.262 
LB(4) & DW 0.97 & 2.01 0.65 & 2.00 0.96 & 2.01 0.60 & 2.00 0.98 & 2.00 
Linear ECT BS **-0.00496 **-0.004056 *-0.008262 -0.001835 **-0.004823 
EQUITY -0.000231 0.001044 -0.004487 ***-0.0003 -0.0000181 
Panel B china Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
BS ECT+ ** -0.00524   -0.003314 0.0004957 -0.001381 -0.026919 
ECT- *-0.031179 -0.001377 **-0.000457 0.008851 0.002002 
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Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat *5.711 0.075 *7.306 0.929 1.325 
LB(4) & DW 0.78 & 2.01 0.50 & 2.00 0.82 & 2.00 0.98 & 1.99 0.31 & 2.00 
Equity ECT+ 0.001455 -0.002076 -0.003645 ***-0.0026   **-0.02113 
ECT- 0.034804 *-0.017963 -0.000809 -0.007532 *-0.007031 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat ***2.373 *6.505 0.819 0.1071 ***2.201 
LB(4) & DW 0.00& 2.01 0.10 & 1.98 0.88 & 2.00 0.10 & 1.99 0.96 & 2.00 
Linear ECT BS -0.001165 -0.00055 -0.001679 *-0.007054 *-0.006734 
EQUITY *-0.016556 *-0.003338 -0.004231 -0.005574 *-0.016599 
Panel C Bulgaria Hungary Poland Russia Turkey 
BS ECT+ 0.237 **-0.0208645 **-0.007566 *-0.030355 ***0.018471 
ECT- -0.0009749 0.0002724 **-0.018075 0.003563 **-0.005349 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat -0.0017949 **5.273 1.563 *14.494 **4.406 
LB(4) & DW 0.22 & 2.01 0.92 & 1.99 0.92 & 1.99 0.47 & 2.02 0.93 & 1.99 
Equity ECT+ **-0.0075 ***0.035603 0.0016258 0.0004104 ***-0.03962 
ECT- -0.002064 ***-0.008018 0.0102636 **-0.00387 0.00384 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 1.178 **4.499 1.091 0.737 **4.647 
LB(4) & DW 0.45 & 2.00 0.55 & 1.99 0.55 & 1.99 0.99 & 1.99 0.95 & 1.99 
Linear ECT BS *-0.001751 -0.002168 **-0.005436 ***-0.0036 *-0.007025 
EQUITY -0.000299 *-0.004248 ***-0.00136 -0.000496 -0.000163 
Panel D S. Africa Tunisia 
       
BS ECT+ 0.002544 **-0.0027609 
ECT- -0.010526 0.1126989 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 1.146 0.136 
LB(4) & DW 0.03 & 1.99 1.00 & 1.99 
Equity ECT+ ***-0.0057 0.02058 
ECT- -0.010088 *-45.96876 
Ho:ECT+=ECT- F-stat 0.203 *25.787 
LB(4) & DW 0.46 & 2.00 0.21 & 2.02 
Linear ECT BS **-0.00722 -0.000591 
EQUITY ***-0.0061 **0.000876 
V. Conclusion 
 
According to Chan-Lau and Kim and Chang (2004), bond spreads and equity prices may be 
characterized by a nonlinear relationship that linear modeling cannot capture. To this end, I 
investigate if sovereign CDS premium, bond spreads and equity prices are characterized by 
nonlinearities and errors in modeling specifications. I find evidence of nonlinearities and 
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misspecification in cointegration relationship using simple linear regression equations. I 
proceed to investigate nonlinear pairwise cointegration relationship among sovereign CDS 
premium, bonds spreads and equity prices. I not only find existence of threshold but also a 
clear evidence of momentum whereby the divergence from long term equilibrium between 
any two series evince more momentum in one direction relative to substitute direction. In 
41/51 spreads, MTAR modeling was identified as the appropriate modeling tool in 
investigating nonlinear cointegration. I find evidence of asymmetric cointegration in 28/51 
possible pair-wise cointegrations. In 49/51 pair-wise cointegrations, I find that positive and 
negative divergences from long run relationship can be corrected for at dissimilar speeds. 
All countries with TAR modeling and positive skew in returns, especially Eastern 
Europe nations, exhibit symmetric cointegration relation and price discovery process. 
Interestingly, these countries also exhibit positive skew in their CDS spreads, bond spreads 
and equity returns.  The absence of non-linear cointegration may indicate that the countries 
have very low credit risk. Therefore, equity prices and bond spreads respond fundamentals 
of each country and not to credit risk information. (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). Other 
possible reason could be illiquidity of the markets, the need for linear as opposed to non-
linear modeling and severe market frictions which prevent utilization of arbitrage 
opportunities to achieve long run equilibrium relationship between markets. These frictions 
occur in both regimes.   
I find evidence of asymmetric short run (long run) adjustment in 66/102 (66/102) 
pairs of the markets. Every country (except China) in the sample has at least two short run 
and long run asymmetric adjustment processes. The price discovery and speed of adjustment 
to new information is generally regime specific. Latin American countries have the highest 
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number of asymmetric price adjustments followed by Asia, Eastern Europe and then Africa. 
CDS has the highest number of asymmetric adjustment to long run equilibrium process 
followed by bond spreads and lastly equity. There seems to be measured evidence in 
Colombia, China, Turkey, Tunisia and Venezuela indicating that whenever price discovery 
occurs in equity market (Irrespective of regime) under non-linear price discovery, price 
discovery also occurs in equity market using linear VECM. 
This study can be extended to new frontiers. For example: Why are most of divergences 
(12/17 countries) between CDS and bond spreads supported by TAR and not MTAR? Why 
do Eastern Europe countries exhibit positive skew in returns, symmetric cointegration 
relationships yet all of them are supported by TAR modeling? Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that they don’t have better credit rating than the sample countries covered in this study. The 
study can also be extended to investigate the role of liquidity in non-linear cointegration, 
adjustment process and price discovery process. 
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Chapter 2: 
Non-linear Effects of Monetary Policy on Liquidity and Financial 
Structure 
I. Introduction 
Central banks have traditionally relied on banking institutions to transmit monetary 
policy and liquidity into the real economy. Central banks control the lending and borrowing 
activities of banking institutions via reserve requirements and adjusting the inter-bank 
borrowing rate which is used as an anchor when setting the lending and borrowing rate of 
commercial banks, credit unions and savings institutions. The open market operations (sale 
and repurchase of treasury bills and bonds) also significantly affect liquidity of banking 
institutions which invest heavily in these government securities.In U.S, commercial banks, 
credit unions and saving institutions are under control of Federal Reserve Bank (Fed 
henceforth). I classify them as bank-based institutions (BBIs). 
Institutions such as security dealers and brokers (SBDs), finance companies (FCs), 
Asset-backed securities (ABS) firms which “collateralize” non-real estate loans, receivables, 
leases, credit card receivables, auto loans and student loans among others and government 
securities enterprises, GSEs (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and Farmer Mac) deal 
with tradable securities which they give as collateral for borrowing (tradable liabilities) and 
accept the same securities when lending (tradable assets). Examples of ABS firms include 
Citibank, Sears, Roebuck, Unisys, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Brothers. The bulk of these 
securities are marked to market on daily basis. The prices of the securities are affected by 
short term interest rate which is used as discounting rate.The short term rate depends on the 
Federal fund rate, FFR, which is used as a benchmark for lending and borrowing by all 
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institutions). FFR thus has indirect effect on the prices of ‘collateralized securities used by 
the four categories of institutions.  
These institutions provide much needed liquidity10 in the economy yet the Fed cannot 
directly ‘use’ them as conduits of transmitting liquidity into the economy since they are 
regulated by different agencies. SBDs and Asset-backed Securities (ABS) firms are 
regulated by Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). FCs are largely unregulated. GSEs, 
created by the Congress to provide liquidity and stability in secondary mortgage markets, are 
regulated by U.S department of Housing and Urban development (HUD). ABS, FCs, GSEs 
and SBD are classified as market-based institutions (MBIs). The demarcation of financial 
intermediaries into MBIs and BBIs defines financial structure in this study. 
A. Theoretical Foundation 
This study is based on financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999). During economic boom which is characterized by expansionary or loose monetary 
policy (lower interest rate, more supply of liquidity and/or reduced reserve 
requirements),surplus economic units (savers) willingly extend credit to deficit economic 
units (borrowers such as financial intermediaries, firms and individuals) since they (savers) 
can withstand the risk they face. Moreover, financial markets are able to efficiently price the 
risk (including risk premium) savers face and compensate them accordingly. Money is cheap 
and readily available. This creates a positive feedback loop where financial intermediaries 
(BBIs and MBIs) borrow more (low funding risk) and lend more. This leads to expansion 
and strengthening of the balance sheets(Adrian and Shin, 2008, 2009) due to lower perceived 
                                                            
10Liquidity here is defined as supply of credit into the real economy by financial intermediaries. The alternative 
definition for this study could be conversion of illiquid balance sheet assets such as mortgage loans into liquid 
and tradable assets. 
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risk and higher profits from increased lending. Succinctly, there is increased supply of 
liquidity in the economy as funds flow from savers to borrowers.  
However, in stressful and more uncertain financial and economic conditions 
punctuated by contractionary or ‘tight’ monetary policy, financial intermediaries, just like 
other borrowers, find it difficult and costly to acquire funds from savers (increased funding 
risk). Their ability to lend is also diminished primarily due to either shortage of funds to lend 
or, according to Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), there is ‘flight to quality’ by both 
lenders and savers where lending is concentrated only to high credit-worthy customersor 
toward securities with low margin requirements due to reduced funding liquidity. While 
riskier financial intermediaries borrow at a premium, the riskiest financial intermediaries 
cannot borrow (or lend) on any term. Adrian and Shin (2008) and Kahn (2010) shows that 
balance sheet contracts as borrowing and lending volume decline while liquidity dissipates. 
This is essentially an adverse feedback loop effects of financial accelerator model. If 
financial intermediaries cannot lend, profits will decline and balance sheet will weaken. It is 
thus safe to conclude that liquidity of both MBIs and BBIsheavilydepends on the expansion 
and contraction of the balance sheet and the resulting profitability. 
B. Why Non-linear Modeling? 
 
Most studies in monetary policy and liquidity are based on linear relationship 
between policy and liquidity in different economic regimes (see for example, Adrian and 
Shin, 2008 and Jovanovic and Zimmermann, 2010). However, the magnitude and intensity 
of monetary policy actions are non-linear across different economic cycle and financial 
conditions (Morgan, 1993). The actions are inherently more pronounced during economic 
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recession. A small and transient deviation in macro variables such as liquidity, interest rate, 
inflation and government budget deficits during normal economic times usually require mild 
policy interventions.During economic boom, the build-up of financial imbalance(persistent 
increase in asset prices or/and liquidity) is slow. The monetary policy response of the Fed is 
infrequent, slow, measured and less interventionary. For example: The persistently slow 
increase in FFR between 2003 and 2006 even as asset prices soared.  
Events such as sudden “dry up” of liquidity that could destabilize financial system, 
economic activities or trigger recession call for more quick, aggressive and interventionary 
policy actions. For example: The former chairman of Fed, Alan Greenspan, aggressively 
slashed Federal fund rate. This lender support to Jovanovic and Zimmermann (2010) 
assertion that it is hard for any Central bank to signal its readiness and mettle in combating 
financial markets uncertainty shocks without substantial reduction in short term interest rate. 
During the financial turbulence episode of 2007-8, the Fed dramatically and unprecedentedly 
decreased FFR by 325 basis points between the summer of 2007 and January 2009.  The 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) made major buy-back of long term Treasury 
bonds which caused significant decline in the yields of Treasury bonds in addition to 
indirectly pumping liquidity into the market (Doh, 2010). In October 2008, the Fed started 
paying interest on bank reserves while the U.S Treasury provided liquidity support through 
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of 2008-10 
to buy toxic assets of nine financial institutions with the aim of “cleaning” their balance 
sheets to mitigate contraction in lending11. In November 2008, Term Asset-backed Loan 
                                                            
11These banks included JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, State Street, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Bank of New York Mellon. 
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Facility (TALF) was launched and in February 2009, financial stability plan (FSP) was 
established.  
From the foregoing, it seems credible that the Fed also mind about the aggregate 
liquidity of financial markets, a reason why Garcia (1989) clearly describe how central banks 
use monetary policy during financial crisis to ease market illiquidity. Bernanke (2009) 
confirms this view by stating that the Fed provided liquidity to private banking sector to 
manage the recent financial crisis since pure interest rate cuts to satisfactorily reduce the 
spiral effects of financial markets shocks and distress on the real economy were ineffective. 
Bernanke (2009) thus admitted that “In historical comparison, this policy response 
stands out as exceptionally rapid and proactive.” Taylor (2010) calls this response one of the 
“great deviations” punctuated by more interventionist, less rules-based, and less predictable 
macroeconomic policy actions during and post-2007-8 financial crisis. The monetary policy 
(among other actions12) divergedfrom the practice of at least the previous two decades. 
Mishkin (2009) argues that if the FED had not taken numerous abrasive monetary actions in 
the wake of 2007-8 financial crises, economic recession would have deteriorated, financial 
markets instability amplified and quick recovery of the U.S. economy jeopardized. However, 
Taylor (2007) and Kahn (2010) argue that asset price bubbles will arise whenever there is 
excess liquidity in financial markets. The lengthy period of very low Federal fund rates that 
preceded dotcom bubble burst in year 2000 and the low interest rates during 2003-2006 
precipitated the housing price bubble of 2007. This cycle of events will certainly be repeated 
given the current very low Federal fund rate (0-0.25% since 2008) in the face of financial 
market uncertainty and rising inflation. 
                                                            
12 See Taylor (2010) for the list of the Great Deviation and detailed discussion thereof. 
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 If we take economic boom as the regime during whichthe liquidity of MBIs and 
BBIs build-up and another regime during which the drying-up of liquidity israpid and 
accompanied by aggressive policy intercession, there must be a threshold which divides 
these regimes and make monetary policy stance have dissimilar or nonlinear effects in the 
two regimes. Specifically, the effect of monetary policy stances on liquidity of MBIs and 
BBIs is expected to be non-linear.  
I identify the threshold that separates two regimes. Using Federal fund short term 
interest rate deviation (FFDEV) and growth in money base or monetary aggregate (BMG) as 
monetary policy instruments, this study aims to investigate how monetary policy stance 
affects liquidity of MBIs (LIQMBI) and BBIs (LIQBBI) under different regimes. 
Specifically, I attempt to answer the following questions: 
(a) Does a statistically significant threshold level of monetary policy stance exist above 
(below) which monetary policy stance affects liquidity of BBIs and MBIs differently? 
Put differently, is there a statistically significant non-linear effect of monetary policy 
stance on liquidity? 
(b) Do different monetary policy stances have different effects on market-based liquidity 
(LIQMBI) and Bank-based liquidity (LIQBBI) below and above the threshold? If so, 
which monetary policy tool is more suitable for BBIs and MBIs for each regime? 
(c) Does monetary policy affect MBIs liquidity more than BBIs liquidity? The Fed 
hastraditionally relied on BBIs as conduits of monetary policy and liquidity 
transmission. If any of the monetary stances has higher impact on LIQMBI (which is 
beyond the control of Fed), should the Fed include MBIs as conduits of transmitting 
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monetary policy and liquidity in the economy to make monetary policy more 
effective?  
I find that monetary policies tools, whether FFDEV or BMG are fraught with uncertainty 
and time variation as a result of existence of multiple regimes. Liquidity of BBIs (LIQBBI) 
and MBIs (LIQMBI) respond differently not only to different monetary policy instruments 
under different regimes but also to financial market conditions and degree of real economic 
activities. LIQMBI respond more to monetary aggregate policy (BMG) shocks during 
contractionary monetary policy intervention (economic downturn) relative to expansionary 
monetary policy intervention. However, LIQBBI is generallymore responsive to FFDEV 
shocks under expansionary monetary policy as opposed to contractionary monetary policy. I 
conclude that the Fed cannot continue to ignore MBIs if it expects in formulate and 
implement more broad-based and effective monetary policy. It should consider the changing 
nature and structure of financial intermediaries and the associated financial innovations. 
I contribute to existing literature in three main ways. First, my study empirically 
investigates the presence of threshold in two different measures of monetary policy stance 
and non-linear effects of the stances on liquidity of different structures of financial 
intermediaries.I use threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model. Second, this study uses 
higher frequency (monthly) data and covers twenty four years. It does not narrowly focus on 
2007-8 financial crises. The mere existence of regimes and threshold implicitly indicates 
uncertainty and time variation inherent in monetary policy since different regimes occur in 
different times. Third, I investigate the effects of monetary policy stance on different 
structures of financial intermediaries (market-based and bank-based institutions). This is 
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important because MBIs and BBIs fall under different regulatory authorities yet MBIs 
provide much need liquidity and stability in financial markets.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows; Section II reviews the literature and develops 
the hypotheses to be tested. Section III describes the data and econometric methodology. 
Section IV details empirical evidence and section V concludes. 
II. Literature review and Hypothesis development 
 
C. Liquidity and leverage 
 
The BBIs hold a proportionately large share of their assets in form of book value loans 
which are not marked to market to capture changes in liquidity, credit risk, business and 
financial cycles. The funding of BBI is majorly through insured demand deposits. During 
economic and financial downturn, the market values of financial assets of BBIs loans are 
less than the book value hence there will be overvaluation equity (financial assets less 
financial liabilities). Conversely, during economic and financial boom, the market values of 
BBIs’ financial assetsare higher than the book value hence there is undervaluation of equity. 
This argument suggest that liabilities and equity of BBIs will exhibit higher volatility than 
assets while leverage (Assets/ (assets-liabilities) and assets are either inversely related or 
have very low positive correlation.13 
 
The lending and funding activities of MBIsdepend on repurchase agreements (repos) and 
reverse repos. In case of a repo, a financial institution (borrower) sells a security such as 
Treasury bill and bond to another party (lender) to raise capital at, say $100. However, the 
                                                            
13 See Adrian and Shin (2008) 
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seller agrees to buyback the security at a specified future date and price, say $120. The 
security buyer (lender) earns $20 interest income. The tradable security can thus be 
construed as collateral for the loan borrowed by the seller the liabilities. The same 
transaction from the perspective of the security buyer (lender) is reverse repo. Therefore, 
MBIs will have a disproportionately large portion of their assets as reverse repos (Lenders) 
and corresponding liabilities of repos. Both repos (liabilities) and reverse repos (assets) are 
marked to market. The changes in market prices of reverse repos and repos reflect the 
changes in financial assets and financial liabilities of the MBIs. Changes in prices of repos 
and reverse repos determine the trading positions (Long or short) MBIs will take in financial 
market. Assets and liabilities of MBIs are thus highly liquid and marketable. 
From the forgoing, volatility of assets and liabilities of MBIs track each other over time. 
In contrast to BBIs, there is a positive relationship between assets and leverage. The pro-
cyclical nature of this relationship has important implications. An increase in the price of 
reverse repos will trigger an increase in demand for repos and the MBI balance sheet will 
expand. Any rewinding of trading positions in repos and reverse repos (due to external 
shocks) will lead to immediate contraction of the balance and the effect is more magnified 
on the asset side. This means assets decline more than liabilities and equity is wiped out. 
Liquidity will eventually disappear.14  Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) find that the buildup 
of leverage in financial market during economic boom can help explain why adverse shocks 
in such times lead to severe dry-up of liquidity and deep discounting of asset prices. 
Specifically, the drying of liquidity triggers a series of small ‘burst’ in the highly leveraged 
MBIs which quickly spread to all the financial and non-financial firms (banks, hedge funds 
among others) in the complex network within the financial system to form a contagion. 
                                                            
14See Paul McCulley, PIMCO Investment Outlook, Summer 2007 
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Opinions and empirical evidence are converging to the reality that leverage of financial 
intermediaries is an imperative financial variable which can assist in envisaging stress in 
financial markets and understanding business and financial cycles.Since financial assets and 
liabilities of MBIs (BBIs) are (not) marked to market, we expect them to be more (less) 
synchronized or exhibit higher (lower) correlation with financial and economic activities. 
Ho1:  Volatility of equity of BBIs (MBIs) is higher (lower) since financial 
assets and liabilities are not (are) marked to market. There assets (and 
equity)of MBIs (BBIs) have exhibit higher (lower) correlation with financial 
conditions and economic activities   
 
D. The Threshold effects 
 
Peek and Rosengren (1995) find that the health of the banking sector, the nature and 
the size of banks’ response to changes in monetary policy depend on the liquidity of the 
bank.Glick and Plaut (1988) argue that monetary policy makers should pay more attention to 
off-balance sheet liquidity when choosing targets and operating procedures. This is because 
they are marked to market but have received less attention. The channel through which 
monetary policy operates becomes more complex when bothon and off-balance sheet 
liquidity co-exists. By focusing on banks to transmit on-balance sheet liquidity to the 
economy, the Fedignores the uncontrollable market-based liquidity provided by non-bank 
financial institutions. Moreover, since the money channel of monetary policy works through 
bank liabilities while the credit channel works through the assets, the responses of financial 
intermediaries to a shift in monetary policy should differ depending on the characteristics of 
assets/liabilities 
In a similar line of study, Berger and Bouwman (2010) investigate how monetary 
policy affects banks’ on- and off-balance sheet liquidity creation during normal and financial 
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crises times. They find that during normal times, a contractionary monetary policy leads to a 
significant reduction in on-balance sheet liquidity creation by small banks, while the impact 
is insignificant on liquidity creation ability of large and medium-sized banks, which account 
for 90% of aggregate bank liquidity. However, the effect of monetary policy on on-and off-
balance sheetliquidity creation by all banks is weaker during financial crises than during 
normal times. Consistent with findings by Kahn (2010) and Owsley (2011), they also find 
high liquidity relative to trendas a harbinger to financial crises and financial imbalance 
(Persistence increase in the price of assets without support of sound fundamentals) in 
housing prices, stock markets prices, and commodity prices among other assets. This leads to 
the second hypothesis 
Ho2: There exists a threshold above (below) which monetary policy stance affects 
liquidity of MBIs and BBIs differently. 
 
E. Changing structure of financial intermediaries and monetary policy 
 
Silber (1977) early identified the need to focus on market-based financial intermediaries in 
the definition of market liquidity.  He argued that the sole focus on banks as providers of liquidity 
ignored marketplace as a source of liquidity. This marketplace liquidity arose from trading of 
financial assets in financial market. For example: Saving and Loans institutions that concentrate on 
mortgages and create savings deposits might generate no more liquidity than Government National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie mae) mortgage-backed securities that are traded actively in a 
secondary market. This trading facet to liquidity is ignored by monetary policy.  He suggested that 
marketability of securities (market-based liquidity), maturity of the securities and price volatility may 
be potential candidates for inclusion in monetary policy setting. This would capture the interaction 
between monetary mechanism, market liquidity and financial structure. This view is supported by 
Cagan (1979) and Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009) who explain that there is mutual 
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interaction between liquidity of securities market and funding liquidity of financial 
intermediaries. The capital and margin requirements determine the ability of financial 
intermediaries to provide liquidity. 
Walsh and Wilcox (1995) state that business cycles may be tied to bank liquidity and 
balance sheet condition especially if there is correlation between bank loans and output. 
However, financial deregulation15  and innovations which led to the growth of the secondary 
markets for residential mortgages and new forms of credit acting as substitute for bank loans 
can reduce the special role banks play in providing firms and households with credit or 
liquidity. Such innovations, according to Modigliani and Papademos (1990) distort the 
definition of “money” and created a new set of assets with almost interchangeable 
distinctiveness of liquidity and risk. This has complicated the ability to select the appropriate 
monetary aggregate as a policy target.  
Blinder (1999) raises the important question of the implications of high-tech finance 
for the conduct of monetary policy. Should contemporary central banks respond to the 
explosion of derivatives and all things financial exotica? Should they operate in derivative 
and other exotic markets instead of confining themselves to open market operations based on 
government securities only? How should the design of monetary policy adapt to these 
developments? It is imperative to know that since the inception of Federal fund rate futures 
trading on Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the Fedhas covertly and consistently used 
Federal Fund futures interest (FFFR) rate as bellwether of market expectation of future 
monetary policy decisions. More importantly, most of these “new markets” contain a great 
deal of information, are exceptionally deep and liquid and often create opaque and enormous 
                                                            
15 See for example, the replacement of Glass-Steagall or banking Act of 1933 with financial Services 
Modernization Act/Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which removed financial specialization and allowed 
insurance firms, commercial banks and investment banks to compete in financial services offerings 
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leverage (For example: the repos and reverse repos, Eurodollar, Futures, options and Credit 
default swap markets). The high-tech financial instruments have not only affected the 
monetary policy transmission channel but have also shortened monetary policy lags and 
provided a new dimension of the link between short and long-term interest 
rate.Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009) states that structure of financial institutions (defined 
here as BBIs and MBIs) determines the liquidity in the economy hence the same structure 
should be used to transmit liquidity during recessions. Moreover, liquidity highly affects real 
economic activity and we may be interested in uncovering which liquidity (BBIs or MBIs) 
has higher effects on real activity 
Ho3:   Liquidity of MBIs and BBIs respond differently to different monetary policy 
stance measures below or above the threshold. 
 
F. Type of BBIs and non-linear monetary policy stance response 
 
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the effectiveness of the credit channel 
depends on the response of the bank to the monetary policy. For example: A contractionary 
monetary policy that squeezes bank reserves will reduce the supply of bank loans or liquidity 
in the economy. However, should the bank change the composition of its liabilities (Such as 
selling bonds, issuing CD’s and interbank loans which are not subject to reserve 
requirements), monetary contraction will neither affect the supply of  loans nor the real 
economy. Li and St-Amant (2010) use TVAR to empirically study how financial market 
conditions (financial stress) affect the transmission of monetary policy shocks in Canada. 
They find that contractionary and expansionary monetary shocks have asymmetric effects on 
output under different regimes defined by financial market conditions.  
86 
 
Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999) investigate the response of bank loans in France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain to monetary policy contraction of 1992. They find that different 
banks (country and size-wise) respond differently to liquidity squeeze to mitigate reduction 
in supply of loans. Frenandez et al (2010) investigate the impact of monetary policy on stock 
market liquidity in Euro zone. For all the seven measures of stock market liquidity, they find 
that expansionary monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) leads to increased 
liquidity in the German, French and Italian stock markets. 
Ho4: The liquidity of different categories of BBIs responds differently and 
asymmetrically to either of the two monetary policy stance measures. As such, 
each has a unique threshold and threshold value. 
 
III.Data and Econometric Methodology 
The data to measure the monetary policy stance comes from different sources. The monthly 
output measure, coincidence of economic indicators (CEI), is from U.S department of 
commerce (Conference board) website. The Federal fund interest futures rate (FFFR) is from 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The monthly consumer price index (CPI) is from Federal 
Reserve Economic database (FRED). The monthly real national economic activity index 
(NEAI) and adjusted financial market stress or condition index (AFCI) are from Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The quarterly data for BBIs and MBIs comes from the Federal 
Reserve Bank (FRB) website (Flow of funds). Specifically, I gather data relating to financial 
assets and financial liabilities of BBIs which comprise commercial banking (CB: Item 
L.109), Savings institutions (SI: Item L.114), Credit unions (CU: item L.115). The MBIs 
comprise Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs: Item L.124), issuers of asset-backed 
securities (ABS: Item L.126), finance companies (FC: Item L.126) and Securities brokers 
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and dealers (SBD: Item L.129). The quarterly data is converted into monthly data. All data 
spans the period January 1988 through October 2011. 
G. Defining liquidity 
 
The definition of liquidity for both MBIs and BBIs is adopted from Adrian and Shin (2008, 
2010). They define liquidity of each category of financial intermediary (BBIs and MBIs).  
Market-based liquidity (LIQMBI) and Bank-based liquidity (LIQBBI) are proxied by 
leverage since changes in leverage indicate contraction and expansion of balance sheets of 
BBIs and MBIs. 
(i)                                       
s)liabilitie total-assets (FinancialEquity 
)securities government  (excluding Assets FinancialLIQBBIor  LIQMBI
 
This definition has been applied in empirical work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Kahn 
(2010) and Owsley (2011). The data of interest is total financial assets and total financial 
liabilities. 
H. Measures of Monetary stance 
 
There are two commonly used measures of monetary policy stance namely (i) Interest rate 
deviation and (ii) Changes in monetary aggregate or money base. To derive the interest rate 
stance, we need an “optimal” FOMC target interest which is derived using the Taylor (1993) 
rule. 
 
(ii)                                                                                )()( 21 ttttt
N
t
FFR
t yyrr   
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In equation (ii), FFRtr is the FOMC target rate proxied by Federal fund futures contract interest 
rate (FFFR) in month t.There is no consensus about what interest rate to use to determine 
deviations from Taylor rule. Example: Ellingsen and Soderstrom (1999) use the three-month 
Treasury bill, Poole and Rasche (2000), Sack (2004) and Goukasian and Whitney (2006) use 
the 1-month-out federal funds futures contract rate. Kuttner (2001) and Faust, Swanson and 
Wright (2002a) use the current-month federal funds futures contract rate; However, 
Cochrane and Piazzessi (2002) use the one-month Eurodollar deposit rate, and Rigobon and 
Sack (2002) use the three-month Eurodollar futures rate.  A study by Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson (2002) show that FFFR dominate FOMC target rate and other market-based 
measures of monetary policy expectations up to about five months out horizons. Blider 
(1999) also intimates that FOMC use FFFR from CME as an indicator of market’s 
expectations about future monetary policy actions before setting the target rate.  In light of 
the forgoing argument, I use the FFFR since it is market determined, is forward looking and 
is also used by FOMC to extract market-expectation information. 
t ( t )  is  the actual inflation rate (target or tolerable inflation rate)in month t. The 
difference is the inflation deviation or gap. Inflation, t , is the rolling percentage change in 
consumer price index (CPI) over the last twelve months.16 
(iii)                                                                                               100*ln
12




t
t
t CPI
CPI
 
                                                            
16 The GDP deflator could be used as an alternative measure of inflation as originally used by Taylor (1993) but 
this inflation measure seems inconsistent after 1992. We could also employ core Personal Consumption 
Expenditure (PCE) index and PCE index to compute inflation rate as actually used by FOMC but Bernanke 
provides evidence showing that this measure consistently yield smaller deviations from Taylor rule. The CPI 
measure of inflation generates consistent results and is more reliable. Core CPI and core PCE exclude food and 
energy prices. 
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ty  ( ty )  is  the actual real output (potential real output)17 in month t. The difference represents 
the output gap in month t.  
There are three possible measures of output namely real industrial production, IP 
(Monthly frequency), real GDP (Quarterly frequency) and Coincident economic Indicators, 
CEI, (Monthly frequency). Most studies use IP which is a very narrow measure of aggregate 
economic activity. In this study, I use CEI since it is in monthly frequency (unlike GDP) and 
matches the frequency of other data variables used in this study. Moreover, CEI subsumes IP 
since it is an average of four variables namely employees on non-agricultural payrolls, real 
personal income less transfers, industrial production and real manufacturing and trade sales) 
CEI thus better reflects the aggregate level of economic activity. 
t is iid error term. This can be used to represent discretionary monetary policy of the 
central bank. It can be rationalized to mean that central banks make a partial adjustment to 
existing short term interest to set a new target interest rate. The parameters, 1  and 2 , 
)1,0( are the weights which the central bank put on inflation and output. Equation (ii) 
stipulates that if either inflation or output or both deviate from target, the nominal federal 
fund rate should be adjusted to capture such deviations. 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that 
policy makers have incomplete information (uncertainty) at the time of setting monetary 
policy. Similarly, since the ex-post realized contemporaneous inflation deviation and output 
gaps are not known at the time of the decision, policy makers base their decision on lagged 
                                                            
17 The potential output (coincidence of Economic indicators, CEI), y , and tolerable or target  inflation rate, 
 , are long run trend  variables derived using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 14400. 
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output and inflation gaps. Therefore, a forward-looking Taylor rule becomes more 
appropriate to explain both high and low inflation rates regimes and incorporate interest rate 
persistence by incorporating a smoothing parameter. Therefore, I construct a forward-
looking “optimal” monetary policy estimation equation by modifying equation (ii) as 
follows. 
    (iv)                                                        )|()|( t2t,121   tttNtFFRt yyEErr 
 
N
tr  is the long run equilibrium nominal interest rate, t,12 is the average inflation between 
month t and month t+1218defined as 
(v)                                                                                                           100* ln 12,12 


 
t
t
t CPI
CPI
 
 is the long run target inflation rate, which according to empirical evidence by  
Taylor (1993) and Clarida et al (1999) is set at two percent. )(y t

ty  is the real (potential) 
output premised on flexible prices and wages. t is the information set available to 
monetary authority at time t. The variables used in estimation of parameters are excluded 
from this information set. The information set at time t, t , is used by policy makers to form 
rational expectations (denoted by E).  
The nominal interest rate, Ntr , can be decomposed into real rate, 
R
tr  and target 
inflation rate. 
                                                            
18 I use observed inflation rate instead of expected. This may result in implied loss of observation if we had a 
small sample which is not the case here. Therefore, there is no difference whether observed or expected 
inflation rate is used. 
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(vi)                                                                                                                              RtNt rr
 
The Federal fund futures rate, FFRtr , can also be decomposed into real rate, 
FFR
trr  and 
expected inflation rate in 12 months since the model is forward-looking 
t
FFR
t
FFR
t rrr ,12 Hence (vii)                                                    )|( ,12 ttFFRtFFRt Errr    
Equations (vi) and (vii) are plugged into equation (iv) to yield equation (viii) below 
   
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We need to capture interest rate smoothing since the central bank partly adjusts the existing 
interest rate to set a new target interest rate. 
(ix)                                                                                                )1(1 t
N
t
FFR
t
FFR
t rrr     
The smoothing parameter is ).1,0( A very high ρ signifies that the prior period interest 
rate significantly influence the actual rate hence the higher the smoothing effect. The term t  
is an exogenous random shock that is i.i.d. FFRtr  is the right hand side of equation (iv). 
Therefore, if plug equation (ix) into equation (viii) to incorporate smoothing parameter, 
)1,0( we get a new equation. 
    (x)                )}|()|)(1({r )-(1 1t2t,121Rt tFFRttttFFRt ryyEErr   
 
We can remove unobservable “expectation” variables from equation (x) and express the 
equation in terms of realized variables to yield the following equation 
(xi)                              )]()-(1))(-(1r )-(1 
)]([r )-(1 
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We know that information set,  t contains all the variables the FOMC has at the time target 
interest rate is chosen. However, since   0|ΩE ttt  , we have orthogonality conditions. 
Therefore, the parameters  1 , and 1 , )1,0( in equation (xi) can be estimated using 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The joint estimation of the parameters permits 
measurement of expectation errors in setting target interest rates. The errors can be used to 
assess deviations from expectation model. 
To implement GMM, we need a set of instruments to replicate information set, tΩ . 
The instruments consists of twelve lags of log difference of commodity price index (to take 
care of price puzzle and assist in forecasting inflation), twelve lags of inflation measures (
   to 121  tt  ),  four lags of output measure ( 4321  and  , ,  tttt yyyy ) and one lag of policy 
rate, FFRtr 1 .  If we define ttZ  as a set of instrumental variables defined above and let tZ  
to be orthogonal to the error term in equation (x), that is,   0ttZE  , then, the equation (xi) 
becomes 
(xii)                       0]})]()-(1))(-(1r )-(1 -{[ 12,121
N
t   tFFRttttFFRt ZryyrE 
 
We equate the equation to zero since we are using rational expectation model which assumes 
there are no systematic errors in forecasting the target rate. 
In equation (xi), we substituted unobservable variables with realized variables. 
Therefore, GMM is implemented by correcting for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of 
unknown form with a lag truncation parameter of 12 since Taylor rule use t,12  . We have 
also selected Bartlett weights to ensure positive definiteness on the variance-covariance 
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matrix to be estimated. According to Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), GMM is a more 
efficient estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Moreover, the approach adopted in 
this estimation generates more accurate estimates and is consistent with the Fed’s monetary 
policy goal of stabilizing inflation or commodity prices. 
The estimated parameters of equation (xii) and observable variables are then fitted to 
estimate the “optimal” or “equilibrium” interest rate in month t ( FFRtrˆ )  according  to the 
systematic Taylor rule.The deviation of the actual target policy rate, FRtr (proxied by FFFR) 
from the estimated benchmark rate, FFRtrˆ , defines the interest rate-based monetary stance. 
Federal fund interest rate monetary stance/deviation, FFDEV= (xiii)                   ˆ FFRt
FR
t rr   
A positive (negative) monetary stance FFRt
FR
t rr ˆ )ˆ( FFRtFRt rr  is indicative of tight or 
contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy. The simple Taylor (1993) rule in equation 
(ii) and subsequent modifications have worked remarkably well. Taylor (2008) argues that a 
policy that steadily responds to economic conditions based on a simple rule such as Taylor 
rule have a number of benefits. First, it leads to near elimination of uncertainty about the 
process of setting monetary policy rates now and in future. Second, it depicts how policy 
makers should react to changing economic conditions. Third, it enables policy makers 
convey a cogent and data-dependent decisions to the public. Fourth, it helps to align short 
term actions with long term goals such as long run inflation objective. Lastly, the public can 
comfortably hold the policy makers accountable to for their decisions and actions. 
Deviations from the simple variant Taylor rules (equation (ii) without expectation 
adjustment) have been used by Hubrich, and Tetlow (2011), Khan (2010), Fernandez et al 
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(2010) Goukasian and Whitney (2006), Sack (2004) and Rigobon and Sack (2002) among 
others to define monetary stance. It is worth noting the large and persistent deviations with 
long-term inflation and economic effects, which may exacerbate liquidity or financial 
imbalance, are relevant in this study. Small and ephemeral deviations in response to 
contingent economic and financial conditions are appropriate and desirable 
The monetary aggregate approach is based on the growth of money base (M2 
money). Money base is simply the total currency (coins and bank notes) in circulation in the 
economy plus the reserves financial institutions maintain with the central bank. Any 
monetary authority or central bank has control over money base by either changing the 
reserve requirements of BBIs or open market operation (OMO). The change in money base 
or monetary aggregateis primarily implemented through the sale and purchase of Treasury 
bills by the government.  A higher or positive (negative) growth rate in money baseis an 
indicator of liquidity trap (excess liquidity) in the economy and is used during contractionary 
(expansionary) economic conditions to increase (reduce) liquidity in financial markets and 
real economy (Li and St-Amant, 2010). I define BMGt as growth rate in money base in 
month t, then, 
(xiv)                                                                                             100*
6
6
t


t
tt
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BMGt is defined as the rolling six month growth rate in money base. 
I. Why threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) modeling? 
 
I postulate that financial market liquidity, monetary policy and other macroeconomic 
variables are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, we have endogenous relationship among the 
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variables. The simultaneity relationship suggests that on one hand, market liquidity is a 
function of the monetary policy and macro variables. Conversely, central bank monetary , 
quantitative easing actions and macro variables (economic activity and financial market 
conditions) may be a function of financial market liquidity. To take care of this explicit 
simultaneity problem, I utilize threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR).  
In econometric modeling, conventional (Symmetric) VAR explicitly allow for 
endogeneity or simultaneity among time series data to evaluate dynamic interactions. Cook 
(2006), Meen (2008) and Feng and Wongwachara (2009), apply TVAR and find asymmetric 
behavior of UK house prices depending on economic upswings and downswings. They 
conclude that econometric models such as conventional VARwhich surmise linear and 
symmetry asset price behavior across different economic regimes are not only mis-specified 
but also yield biased results. This evidence motivates me to use TVAR to incorporate regime 
switch. 
Ehlers (2009) points out that the beauty and novelty of the TVAR model is that it permits 
easy and endogenous selection of the regime depending on the shocks in the system and 
other variables. The model provides an easy way to capture potential nonlinearities, 
conditional dynamics in responses to structural shocks and existence of multiple equilibria. 
The impulse response functions are non-linear since the effects of the shocks are permitted to 
vary not only with the sign and the size of the shock, but also with the initial conditions. It 
thus becomes possible to evaluate the effects of a specific variable under different regimes. 
Moreover, the variable by which different regimes are defined is potentially an endogenous 
variable included in the VAR. It thus becomes probable that regime switches may occur after 
the shock to each variable.  
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Tong (1978) developed the insightful TVAR (a multivariate version of threshold 
autoregressive model, TAR) to take care of endogenous conditional behavior of series with 
two uniquely different dynamics. TVAR works best when all the endogenous variables in the 
model are subject to similar regime switching behavior. Given two regimes, 1 and 2, the 
endogenous LIQMBI and LIQBBI under two monetary policy stances can be modeled as 
follows: 
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In equations (xva) and xvb), L is a lag indicator. tt yy 21  and  are LIQMBI and LIQBBI 
respectively. ty  is a vector of contemporaneous variables consisting of base money growth-
based monetary stance (BMG) and interest rate rule based monetary policy stance (FFDEV), 
lagged LIQMBI, national economic activity index (NEAI) and adjusted Financial stress 
index (AFCI)19. LIQBBI is evaluated used two monetary policy stances, BMG and FFDEV. 
ciis nx1 vector of intercepts.  iit iid ,0~ because I allow for heteroskedasticity.  
p
ipiiii LLLLL   ........)( 33221 is a lag polynomial with nxn matrix, 
 .p.1,2,3.....j , ij qtis regime indicator while γ is the value of threshold.  
                                                            
19 Financial stress index (AFCI) combines eleven variables indicating credit and liquidity spreads in U.S 
financial markets.19 These measures explain actual and expected behavior of financial assets prices.  The real 
economic activity index (NEAI) provides a broad range of measure of economic activity by combining a series 
of 85 macroeconomic data. Both indices are more useful than individual indicators, (for example real GDP as 
economic activity indicator and TED spread for financial market indicator) since they capture market wide 
conditions. They are available on monthly basis unlike real GDP which is available on quarterly basis. Still, 
other real economic activity indicators such as nonfarm payrolls are available on monthly basis but they capture 
only one aspect of the economy (labor market in this case). See Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Davig and 
Hakkio (2010) for details. 
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Equations (xva) and (xvb) can be combined and written in reduced form as follows:  
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Here,  )(tI is the indicator function where tI =1 if it γq   (Below threshold or regime 1) and 
tI =0 if γqt  (above threshold or regime 2).  The variance-covariance matrix of the residuals 
in equation ((xvi) differ under each regime such that 
              )(         )( 2,, 1,,



γ)(qt:I
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tttijtij
tttijtij

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J. Does threshold effect exist? 
 
After specifying the TVAR model and its basic mechanics, the next big question is whether 
threshold effects exist to justify the use of the model. In our case, the threshold variable is 
monetary policy stance (BMG or FFDEV). Testing for existence of threshold effects is 
ideally comparable to testing the null hypothesis of linear VAR against the alternative 
hypothesis of TVAR (two thresholds VAR) using equation (xvi). Specifically, testing for 
existence of threshold effects are equivalent to the null hypothesis to test if coefficients are 
equal under the two regimes. 
Ho: 2i1 i   (horizontally: No threshold effects) 
The resulting residual sum of squares (RSS) from equations (xvi) is derived as follows 
(xvii)                                                                                               )()()ˆ( ,,  tijtijRSS   
The variance of RSS= (xviii)                                                      )ˆ(1'1 ,,
2  RSS
TT tijtij
  
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 If we define RSS0 and RRS1 as residual sum of squares under null and alternative hypothesis, 
we can compute the F statistic. 
(xix)                                                                              
ˆ
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1 
RSSRSS
F
  
K. How do we estimated the threshold values, γ,? 
 
The threshold parameter, γ, is not known a prior and a complete grid search has to be 
endogenously carried out to identify all possible values of γ. This requires a non-standard 
inference procedure. Suppose the optimal threshold value is γ* which falls within a range of
   and , then γ* is chosen to minimize residual sum of squares (RSS). The minimization 
process simultaneously captures both the threshold parameter, γ*, and lag order, p, such that 
(xx)                                                                                          ),.........(RSS minarg)ˆ*,(
,
pp
PpY

 

 
The lag order, p, is determined using the Swartz Bayesian Information criterion (SIC)20. We 
now develop the hypothesis to test for existence of threshold value; γ. Since γ* is unknown a 
prior, the conventional t-tests have non-normal distribution. Hansen (1996, 2000) developed 
a bootstrap procedure to simulate possible asymptotic distribution using likelihood ratio 
(LR). Define )( 00 RSS and )( 11 RSS as the residual sum of squares sans (true RSS) and with 
threshold effects   
Ho: 10    
                                                            
20 I use SIC as opposed to the popular Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) since according to Canova (2007)  
AIC  is not only inconsistent in lag selection but it also known to overestimates the true lag order with positive 
probability. SIC on the other hand affords a larger penalty to the number of Parameters to be estimated in the 
model and hence yield more consistent and parsimonious. 
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 The LR1(γ) statistic is compared with non-normally distributed critical values derived by 
Hansen (2000). It is possible to form asymptotic confidence interval of γ* from the 
asymptotic distribution of LR1(γ). Specifically, the critical values, c, at a given significance 
level,  
c(α)=-2ln(1-√1-α). Therefore, if LR (γ) ≤c(α), we fail to reject the null of Ho: 10   .  Note 
that 1-α is the confidence level indicating non-rejection region. 
L. Impulse Response Functions 
Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) formulate the non-linear Impulse Response 
Function (NLIRF) of TVAR. The sign and magnitude of the shock depends on the initial 
conditions and vary with time. The shocks will generate varying Impulse responses (non-
linear). There are no restrictive symmetry conditions. Given k horizons or forward periods 
from period t (t+k horizons ahead) and information set, 1 t available at period t-1, (proxied 
by 1ty ), the set-up of the model is as follows: 
(xxii)                                                         )|(),|(),,( 111   tktttkttty YEYEkNLIRF 
 
The sign of the shock may also influence regime change if the shock exceeds the threshold 
value. For example: If we are currently using expansionary monetary policy, a large positive 
shock may trigger a shift in initial regime to contractionary monetary policy should such a 
shock exceed the threshold. This is not impossible given the aggressive interest rate cuts 
pursued by the Fed within a short period of time. If a shock causes a reallocation of regimes, 
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then it has a moving average representation of structural disturbanceand Wold 
decomposition of such a disturbance is non-extant. 
IV.Empirical Results and Discussion 
M. Forward-Looking Taylor Rule estimation 
The results of GMM estimation of the “optimal” or benchmark short-term interest rate are 
presented in table 1. The identity matrix estimation weights is based on two stage least 
squares method (2SLS) with GMM standard errors. The data was pre-whitened. As 
expected, all the coefficients are positive. Panel A estimate is based on the optimal inflation 
rate fixed at 2% according to a variant simple Taylor rule. The difference between computed 
inflation rate (% change in CPI) and 2% constitute the inflation gap in this case. In panel B I 
do a robustness check by estimating the optimal inflation rate through smoothing of interest 
rate using Hodrick-Prescott filter. This estimates the long-term inflation rate after 
eliminating spikes in interest rate. The difference between computed inflation rate (% change 
in CPI) and smoothed inflation constitute the deviation of Fed fund rate from optimal short-
term rate (FFDEV). From panel A, the smoothing parameter, , is very high at 0.986 
implying that the target short-term interest rate depend on the past short-term rate. The 
annual real interest rate is estimated at 2.76% (0.23*12) and is usually fixed at between 2% 
and 2.5% annually. Coefficients for inflation and output gaps are 0.649 (fixed at 0.50 in 
simple Taylor rule) and 0.844 (fixed at 0.5 or 1.0) respectively. Similar derivations of these 
coefficients byJovanovic and Zimmermann, (2010) yielded =0.973, β1=3.713, β3=0.457 
and average real interest rate, rr* of 2.46%. The difference in their results and mine could be 
due to different sample periods, minor difference in model specification and the measure of 
output gap (they use industrial production while I use coincidence of economic indicator 
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index). The J-statistic in panel A and B is insignificant hence the model is correctly 
identified and the instruments are valid. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that instruments 
are orthogonal to overall error term. The R-square (0.99) is very high. This is consistent with 
specification of equation (xii) where the regressors and instruments should fully explain the 
the Federal Fund rate (unexplained residuals equal zero). The results in panel A and B 
confirm the forward-looking Taylor rule. 
 
Table 1: GMM Estimation 
The table shows estimation results for GMM. The estimation is based on equation. Panel A results 
are based on fixed optimal annual inflation rate of 2%. Panel B is based on smoothed inflation rate 
using Hodrick-Prescott. Both estimations are based on equation (ix). *, ** and *** implies 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level. 
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
Parameter Panel A Panel B 
Coefficients Coefficients 
 0.986* 0.985* 
Β1 0.649*** 0.786*** 
Β2 0.844*** 0.330*** 
rN 0.234* 0.0539* 
Determinant residual covariance 0.0548 0.0532 
J-statistic 285*0.111635 285*0.106289 
R-squared 0.990111 0.990211 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989996 0.990097 
S.E. of regression 0.235964 0.232486 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.334161 1.365839 
 
N. Descriptive statistics and Correlation analysis 
As postulated in hypothesis 1, table 2 shows that the equity of BBIs (EQBBI) exhibit higher 
fluctuation (standard deviation) relative to equity of MBI (EQMBI) because the BBI assets 
and liabilities are not marked to market. However, the equity of Finance companies (EQFC) 
exhibit the highest volatility certainly because of their heavy short-term financing (use of 
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commercial paper) and long term lending (Assets) hence only one side of the balance 
respond to changes in market interest rate. The undervaluation of BBIs assets and liabilities 
during economic boom and overvaluation of the same during economic recession partly 
explains why volatility of LIQBBI is high (38.443) relative to volatility of LIQMBI (paltry 
0.508). Careful consideration is required in interpreting the liquidity results. Liquidity is 
proxied by financial leverage (total financial assets/equity). A higher liquidity indicates 
declining equity (Increasing leverage or expansion of balance sheet). A negative liquidity 
such as LIQSI implies that financial assets are less than liabilities (negative equity). 
Liquidity is thus given reverse interpretation. Irrespective of high volatility of equity and 
LIQBBI, LIQCB and LIQCU have lower financial risk because of higher equity levels and 
better capitalization as required by the Fed. LIQBBI is 0.993 compared to LIQMBI’s 1.069, 
an indicator of higher balance sheet expansion of MBIs relative to BBIs’. In panel C, 
financial market conditions, as shown by adjusted financial condition index (AFCI), 
fluctuate less than economic activity as shown by National Economic condition index 
(NEAI). This could be due to the fact that policy makers first intervene in financial markets 
to smooth fluctuations and expect the interventionary policy to permeate to real economy. 
Financial markets are thus the first ‘contact points’of positive interventionary policy while 
real economy is the secondary ‘contact point’ which slowly imbibes the positive effects of 
interventionary policies. All variables exhibit excess Kurtosis (Greater or less than 3), 
positive or negative skew distribution and non-normal distribution as evidenced by 
statistically significant Jarque-Bera which rejects the null hypothesis of normal distribution 
of the time series data. 
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Table 3 provides correlation analysis of different variables. The results in table two (panel 
A) reveal that as financial conditions deteriorate (AFCI increases), equity of bank-based 
institutions (EQBBI) increases (Positive correlation of 0.264). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
In table, panel is summary statistic of bank-based institutions (BBIs). Panel B details summary 
statistics of market-based institutions (MBIs) while panel C provide descriptive statistics of economic 
variables used in this study. EQBBI, EQCB, EQCU and EQSI is the equity of bank-based 
institutions, commercial banks, credit unions and saving institutions respectively. LIQBBI, LIQCB, 
LIQCU and LIQSI is the liquidity of the same institutions. EQMBI, EQABS, EQFC, EQGSE and 
EQSBD is the equity of Market-Based Institutions, Asset-Backed Securities firms, Finance 
Companies, Government Sponsored Enterprises and Securities Brokers and Dealers. LIQMBI, 
LIQABS, LIQFC, LIQGSE and LIQSBD is liquidity of the same institutions. These variables have 
been deflated by their own mean. AFCI is the adjusted Financial condition Index (Indicator), NEAI is 
the national Economic Condition Index, FFFR is the Federal Fund Futures interest Rate, BMG is 
base money growth (Monetary aggregate). FFDEV is the Federal Fund rate deviation from the 
optimal short-term interest rate as derived from forward looking Taylor rule. *, ** and *** indicate 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.CV is coefficient of variation. Data is monthly from 
01/1988-10/2011. Jarque-Bera (JB) tests the null of normal distribution. 
Descriptive statistics for bank-based institutions (BBI) 
Panel A  Mean Range  Std. Dev. CV  Skew  Kurtosis JB Obs 
EQBBI 0.998 3.885 0.977 0.979 0.478 2.065 *21 285
EQCB 0.998 8.466 1.776 1.78 0.804 3.014 *31 285
EQCU 0.997 1.663 0.529 0.531 0.066 1.571 *24 285
EQSI 0.998 2.077 0.531 0.532 -0.179 2.061 *12 285
LIQBBI 0.993 791.97 38.443 38.705 5.351 106.039 *127436 285
LIQCB 0.965 486.17 27.442 28.44 -4.537 81.472 *74101 285
LIQCU 1 0.772 0.212 0.212 1.222 3.174 *71 285
LIQSI -1.005 481.08 26.286 -26.15 -14.233 225.282 *596355 285
Panel B Descriptive statistics for Market-based institutions (MBI) 
EQMBI 1.027 2.972 0.681 0.663 1.045 3.208 *48 285
EQABS 1.096 3.395 0.749 0.683 0.968 3.04 *41 285
EQFC 0.606 19.884 4.41 7.276 0.517 2.843 **12 285
EQGSE 1.077 4.096 0.784 0.728 0.951 3.099 *39 285
EQSBD 1.046 1.9 0.53 0.507 0.41 1.705 *26 285
LIQMBI 1.069 3.394 0.508 0.475 1.647 9.079 *520 285
LIQABS 1 12.006 1.165 1.165 -1.877 22.225 *4173 285
LIQFC 1.099 115.887 10.326 9.394 8.666 79.336 *66637 285
LIQGSE 0.999 17.922 1.481 1.483 1.21 25.26 *5453 285
LIQSBD 1.069 2.068 0.375 0.351 0.793 4.359 *47 285
Panel C Descriptive statistics for Economic fundamentals 
AFCI -0.115 5.564 0.718 -6.239 1.563 7.933 *391 285
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NEAI -0.159 6.007 0.84 -5.282 -1.769 8.185 *452 285
BMG 0.756 34.401 2.426 3.207 6.289 60.312 *39449 285
FFFR 4.251 9.748 2.441 0.574 0.021 2.358 ***5 285
FFDEV -0.008 3.594 0.725 -92.492 0.442 2.651 **10 285
 
This can be attributed to regulatory pressure to increase the buffer capital or a cautionary 
approach due to financing uncertainty associated with financial stress in the economy. The 
low correlation between BMG and LIQBBI, LIQCB, LIQCU and LIQSI could be attributed 
to a number of reasons. One, the increase in monetary aggregate or money base may be 
considered as a substitute of changes in reserve requirements (Mankiw, 2011). Therefore, 
BMG may have insignificant effect on LIQBBI.  Two, these institutions maintain their assets 
and liabilities at book values, hence the balance sheet variables don’t respond to changes in 
monetary policy. Three, the institutions are regulated by the Fed through other mechanisms 
such as reserve requirements. Four, the change in liquidity is a lagging indicator of monetary 
policy. The use of monthly frequency means that we may not immediately capture the 
effects of monetary policy on liquidity of banking institutions. These explanations could also 
justify the relatively low correlation between Adjusted financial condition index, AFCI (or 
national Economic Activity Index, NEAI) and LIQBBI, LIQCB, LIQCU and LIQSI. The 
negative correlation between FFFR and EQBBI, LIQBBI, LIQCB, and LIQSI implies that 
conventionally, as short term interest rate increases, leverage or liquidity declines as these 
institutions cannot secure financing or the cost of borrowing is very high.  
The negative correlation (-0.272) between AFCI and NEAI implies that as financial 
conditions deteriorate (AFCI increases), economic activity declines. The positive (negative) 
correlation of 0.371 (-0.38) between AFCI (NEAI) and BMG confirms the idea that as 
financial conditions (Economic activities) deteriorates, the Fed will increase the money base. 
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Panel B indicates that as postulated in hypothesis one, the total assets of MBIs (BBIs), 
TAMBI (TABBI) exhibit ten times higher (lower) correlation (0.38 vs 0.038) with  LIQMBI 
(LIQBBI).Moreover, LIQMBIs, LIQABS, LIQGSE and LIQSBD are more synchronized 
with AFCI and NEAI due to relatively high correlations. Specifically, as NEAI declines, 
leverage/liquidity increases. TAMBI is also highly correlated with LIQABS and LIQSBD. 
Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
Panel A provides correlation among economic variables, economic variables and liquidity of BBIs and 
economic variables and equity of BBIs (EQBBI). Panel B provides correlation between economic variables and 
liquidity of MBIs on one hand and correlation between economic variables and equity of MBIs (EQMBI). All 
variables are defined in table 1. 
Panel A Correlations for BBI variables and Economic fundamentals 
EQBBI LIQBBI LIQCB LIQCU LIQSI AFCI NEAI FFDEV FFFR 
EQBBI 1.000 
LIQBBI 0.048 1.000 
LIQCB 0.191 0.001 1.000
LIQCU -0.569 -0.250 -0.252 1.000
LIQSI 0.074 0.014 0.018 -0.110 1.000
AFCI 0.264 0.002 0.148 -0.149 0.087 1.000
NEAI -0.351 0.043 -0.070 -0.034 0.038 -0.272 1.000 
FFDEV -0.017 0.044 0.037 -0.099 -0.112 -0.085 0.204 1.000
FFFR -0.596 -0.151 -0.065 0.439 -0.117 0.031 0.263 0.642 1.000
BMG 0.150 0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 0.371 -0.388 -0.270 -0.184
TABBI 0.934 0.038 0.194 -0.467 0.058 0.152 -0.334 -0.003 -0.683
Panel B Correlations for MBI variables and Economic fundamentals 
EQMBI LIQMBI LIQABS LIQFC LIQGSE LIQSBDTAMBI 
EQMBI 1.000 
LIQMBI -0.241 1.000 
LIQABS 0.614 0.248 1.000
LIQFC 0.100 -0.023 0.025 1.000
LIQGSE 0.047 0.507 0.241 -0.037 1.000
LIQSBD 0.214 0.623 0.481 0.044 0.047 1.000
AFCI -0.035 0.524 0.273 -0.067 0.304 0.345 0.168 
NEAI -0.067 -0.345 -0.381 0.056 -0.460 -0.204 -0.286 
FFDEV 0.110 -0.108 -0.016 -0.024 -0.312 0.065 0.009 
FFFR -0.424 -0.228 -0.491 -0.060 -0.475 -0.246 -0.125 
BMG -0.099 0.426 0.167 -0.014 0.647 0.066 0.191 
TAMBI 0.798 0.381 0.776 0.087 0.139 0.670 1.000   
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This is because through “repos” and “reverse repos”, the value of assets (reverse 
repos) decline at a faster rate than value of liabilities (repos). This is consistent with the 
arguments by Adrian and Shin (2008) that the expansion and contraction of balance sheet of 
market-based institutions can help explain economic swings and assist in predicting potential 
financial crisis. The negative relation with FFDEV also implies that pursuing contractionary 
monetary policy results in reduction in liquidity. As BMG increases, LIQMBI increases 
(correlation 0.426) but this can be largely explained by the high positive correlation between 
LIQGSE and BMG. Excess liquidity in the market allows firms to take more risk and expand 
their balance sheets.  
Overall, I fail to reject hypothesis 1 because the volatility of equity and liquidity of 
BBIs (LIQBBI) is higher than that of MBIs. Again, as postulated in hypothesis 1 LIQBBI is 
less synchronized with financial conditions (AFCI) and real economic activities (NEAI). 
Moreover, liquidity of MBIs (LIQMBI) at aggregate and individual levels is positively 
related to total assets, financial conditions and economic conditions. 
O. Does threshold exists? 
In order to establish whether threshold exists, I first establish if the data is stationary 
since this is a pre-requisite for threshold vector Autoregressive (TVAR) model. I use both 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. 
ADF tests the null of unit root in time series data while KPSS tests the null of stationary time 
series data. Both tests include intercept only and intercept and trend carried out at levels and 
first difference (using intercept only). All series are covariance stationary in levels except 
LIQMBI (under ADF intercept and trend KPSS both intercept and intercept and trend) which 
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becomes stationary after at first difference. The results are presented in table 4. Using ADF 
t-test statistic, we reject the null of unit root behavior and for KPSS, we use the LM statistic 
and fail to reject null of stationarity in the data. 
Table 4: Unit root test 
In this table, ADF is Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. KPSS is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test statistic. Both tests include intercept only. The unit root lags are selected 
using Swartz Information Criterion (SIC). The critical values for ADF and KPSS are shown at the 
bottom of the results. ADF tests the null of Unit root (non-stationary) while KPSS tests the null of 
Stationary time series data 
Unit root testing 
ADF KPSS 
  
Level 
(Intercept) 
Level 
(Intercept 
and trend) 
1st Diff 
(Intercept) 
Level 
(Intercept) 
Level 
(Intercept 
and trend) 
1st Diff 
(Intercept) 
Variable t‐Statistic  t‐Statistic  t‐Statistic  LM‐Statistic  LM‐Statistic  LM‐statistic 
LIQBBI -9.576 ‐9.773  -18.840 0.337 0.247  0.103 
LIQCB -5.991 ‐11.029  -15.784 0.595 0.146  0.075 
LIQCU -3.210 ‐0.798  -4.427 1.206 0.468  0.837 
LIQSI -15.384 ‐15.457  -13.394 0.187 0.053  0.118 
LIQMBI -2.635 ‐2.695  -9.010 0.777 0.234  0.060 
AFCI -3.724 ‐3.779  -15.658 0.129 0.083  0.154 
NEAI -3.164 ‐3.235  -18.712 0.317 0.102  0.071 
FFDEV -4.760 ‐4.770  -7.104 0.031 0.031  0.042 
BMG -6.103 ‐10.665  -16.649 0.324 0.107  0.066 
Critical Values            
1% level  ‐3.454  ‐3.991  ‐3.454  0.739  0.216  0.739 
5% level  ‐2.872  ‐3.426  ‐2.872  0.463  0.146  0.463 
10% level  ‐2.572  ‐3.136  ‐2.572  0.347  0.119  0.347 
 
In table 5, I employ the Hansen (2000) threshold test. In multivariate framework, the 
test has two null hypotheses for existence of threshold.  
 Ho1: There is one regime (linearity and Ha1: There are two regimes (one threshold).  
Ho2: There is one regime (linearity) and Ha2: There are three regimes (Two thresholds). The 
critical values are generated through bootstrap distribution of the threshold variable. To 
eliminate extreme observations, I employ a 10% trim of the observations and then employ 
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grid search for the threshold on the remaining 80% of the observations. The threshold is 
searched when the data is in levels (Threshold Autoregression, TAR). For robustness check, 
grid search is performed when the data is in first difference (Momentum autoregression, 
MTAR).  
The results are provided in table 5. Panel A tests for statistical threshold whereby the 
threshold variables (FFDEV and BMG) are tested for existence of threshold using their own 
lags. Using TAR and MTAR modeling, I reject the null of one regime (linearity).  Therefore, 
there exists one threshold (2 regimes). MTAR further renders support to existence of two 
thresholds (three regimes). 
This supports the arguments of Taylor (2008) that there is an “optimal” short-term 
rate below (above) which there is a financial imbalance. Therefore, when the Fed rate is 
below the “optimal” short term interest rate, we have a negative FFDEV and the Fed is 
pursuing an expansionary monetary policy. Persistently low Fed rate leads to availability of 
“cheap” money, excess liquidity in the market, increasing asset prices (bubbles) and eventual 
burst. A positive FFDEV means the Fed rate is above the optimal short-term rate and the Fed 
is pursuing a contractionary monetary policy. The money base growth (Monetary Aggregate) 
also has three regimes. Therefore, there exists a growth rate in supply of M2 money above 
(below) which there is excess liquidity in both BBIs and MBIs. 
Panel B tests for existence of threshold given LIQBBI and LIQMBI. Using FFDEV as the 
threshold variable, we find that there exists two and three regimes below (above) which the 
FFDEV will affect LIQBBI and LIQMBI differently. We find the same evidence when we 
use monetary aggregate (BMG) as the monetary stance instrument for LIQMBI. For BMG 
and LIQBBI, we fail to reject linearity against two regimes under TAR (p-values 0.148 and 
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0.332 for 2 and 3 regimes respectively). The existence of 3 regimes under MTAR is 
particularly interesting since it indicates that under both FFDEV and BMG, LIQMBI exhibit 
more momentum in either positive FFDEV (contractionary policy) or negative FFDEV 
(expansionary policy) and BMG (Strong rejection of linearity under TAR and MTAR 
compared to LIQBBI). In this case, the structure of financial intermediaries (MBIs and 
BBIs) does significantly matter.  
To test whether there is a link between monetary policy stance, LIQMBI and 
LIQBBI, we test for existence of threshold under different financial conditions (proxied by 
AFCI) and economic activities (proxied by NEAI). Under both TAR and MTAR, we find 
existence of two and three regimes implying thatAFCI and NEAI will behave differently and 
independently as either FFDEV or BMG shift from one regime to another. For example: if 
FFDEV is negative (contractionary policy), liquidity will dry-up and both financial and 
economic activities will flag. There are three main implications of these results: One 
LIQBBI and LIQMBI shift back and forth depending on the value of threshold variable 
(FFDEV  
Table 5: Testing for existence of threshold (linear vs Threshold model) 
This table provides summary results of tests of one regime (Linear) versus threshold (2 regimes and 
three regimes). All variables are defined in table 1. L(i) indicates lag order determined through SIC. 
TAR is threshold autoregression (Threshold tests at levels and MTAR is momentum threshold 
autoregression (Threshold tests at first difference). The P-values (Shown) and critical values (Not 
shown) are established through 500 bootstrap replications. The TAR and MTAR columns indicate 
the computed values. The null hypotheses are 1. There is one regime (linear) as opposed to 2 regimes 
(one threshold) and 2. There is one regime (linear) as opposed to 3 regimes (two thresholds). 
Panel A Statistical Threshold 
Threshold variable  (L4) FFDEV TAR p-Value MTAR P-Value 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 64.220 0.035 70.963 0.020
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 98.955 0.115 123.905 0.012
Threshold variable (L7) BMG 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 328.191 0.000 47.966 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 366.875 0.000 946.868 0.000
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Panel B Fundamental Threshold; Liquidity of BBIs, MBIs and Monetary stances  
Threshold 
variable,  (L4)FFDEV and LIQBBI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 252.467 0.008 231.207 0.008
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 317.778 0.004 276.200 0.012
Threshold variable  (L4)FFDEV and LIQMBI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 167.888 0.000 169.549 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 205.496 0.000 259.277 0.000
Threshold variable (L2) BMG and LIQBBI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 39.223 0.148 53.627 0.096
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 54.585 0.332 86.702 0.108
Threshold variable  (L4)BMG and LIQMBI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 188.257 0.000 207.251 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 239.252 0.000 341.284 0.000
Panel C Fundamental Threshold; Macro conditions and Monetary stances  
Threshold variable (L2)FFDEV and NEAI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 63.668 0.000 32.443 0.048
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 82.339 0.000 68.450 0.000
Threshold variable (L1)FFDEV and AFCI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 55.278 0.000 87.508 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 78.694 0.000 129.807 0.000
Threshold variable (L2) BMG and NEAI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 50.317 0.000 59.732 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 60.699 0.028 159.425 0.000
Threshold variable (L2) BMG and AFCI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 81.839 0.000 139.783 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 124.060 0.000 235.283 0.000
Panel D  Financial and Economic conditions and liquidity  
Threshold variable (L4) AFCI and LIQBBI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 125.570 0.016 429.840  0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 197.790 0.010 285.780  0.000
Threshold variable (L4) AFCI and LIQMBI  
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 121.511 0.000  111.424  0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 181.774 0.000 183.352  0.000
Threshold variable (L4) NEAI and LIQBBI  
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 153.082 0.020 51.579  0.197
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 184.791 0.037 247.870  0.017
Threshold variable (L4) NEAI and LIQMBI  
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 73.429 0.000 64.318  0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 106.404 0.003 105.030  0.000
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or BMG). Two, the existence of thresholds affords flexibility and ability to capture changes 
in LIQBBI and LIQMBI regimes that occur regularly over time as FFDEV and BMG 
change. Three, MBIs and BBIs frequently readjust their liquidity expectations shortly after 
fresh information regarding monetary policy becomes available to them. The news will also 
shift financial conditions and economic activities into a new regime. 
Panel D investigates if LIQBBI and LIQMBI respond to shift in regimes of  financial 
conditions (AFCI) and economic activities (NEAI). I find existence of two and three 
financial conditions and economic activities regimes, a shift to which BBIs and MBIs will 
also respond and adjust their liquidity (balance sheet expansion or contraction) accordingly. 
P. Is there a threshold monetary stance for each bank-based institution? 
To assess validity of the fourth hypothesis, I test whether the liquidity of each of the 
financial institution that constitute BBIs (commercial banks, credit unions and saving 
institutions with liquidity denoted as LIQCB, LIQCU and LIQSI respectively) switch 
regimes in response to changes in monetary policy. The rational for this assessment is that 
BBIs are primarily used as conduits of monetary policy transmission by the Fed. Panel A of 
table 6 shows that not only does one threshold (2 regimes) exists but also that increased 
uncertainty in monetary policy forces BBIs to switch regimes even three times (2 threshold) 
under TAR. The existence of two or three regimes under MTAR provides further evidence 
that there is momentum or overreaction in a given regime relative to the other. For example: 
There is little or no monetary policy intervention during expansionary period but aggressive 
actions are taken by policy makers and the BBIs themselves under contractionary monetary 
policy. This is a partial justification for existence of multiple regimes using MTAR 
modeling if threshold is extant. Panel A assesses existence of threshold using interest rate 
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monetary stance (FFDEV) while panel B provides summary results of the same under 
monetary aggregate monetary stance (BMG).  
Q. Estimation of threshold values 
Now that we know thresholds monetary stance exists using the results of table 6, what is the 
value of these thresholds? This is what table 7 provides. 
Table 6: Testing for existence of monetary stance threshold for each BBI 
This table provides summary results of tests of one regime (Linear) versus threshold (2 regimes and 
three regimes). All variables are defined in table 1. L(i) indicates lag order determined through SIC. 
TAR is threshold autoregression (Threshold tests at levels and MTAR is momentum threshold 
autoregression (Threshold tests at first difference). The P-values (Shown) and critical values (Not 
shown) are established through 500 bootstrap replications. The TAR and MTAR columns indicate 
the computed values. The null hypotheses are 1. There is one regime (linear) as opposed to 2 regimes 
(one threshold) and 2. There is one regime (linear) as opposed to 3 regimes (two thresholds). Panel A 
tests existence of threshold using FFDEV as threshold variable while panel B uses BMG as threshold 
variable. 
 
Panel A Bank based Institutions liquidity and FFDEV 
Threshold variable (L2)FFDEV and LIQCB TAR p-value MTAR P-value 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 150.902 0.008 88.250  0.040
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 175.952 0.044 142.615 0.052
Threshold variable (L4)FFDEV and LIQCU 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 94.785 0.104 110.552 0.024
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 173.188 0.152 233.222 0.008
Threshold variable (L4)FFDEV and LIQSI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 699.627 0.000 690.972 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 711.650 0.000 757.992 0.000
Panel B Bank based Institutions  liquidity and monetary Aggregate (BMG) 
Threshold variable (L7)BMG and LIQMB TAR p-Value MTAR P-Value 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 100.392 0.016 101.780 0.016
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 110.728 0.044 157.823 0.028
Threshold variable (L3)BMG and LIQCU 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 244.354 0.000 285.524 0.000
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 423.276 0.000 530.168 0.000
Threshold variable (L3)BMG and LIQSI 
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 2 regimes 121.873 0.012 334.255 0.004
Ho: Linear (1 regime) vs 3 regimes 200.624 0.020 350.667 0.004
 
 
 
113 
 
This identification of threshold values is important because it indicates the point at 
which policy makers need to intervene in the market and financial intermediaries need to 
adjust their liquidity or balance sheets. The table shows FFDEV, BMG, AFCI and NAEI 
threshold values for two and three regimes. The forgoing discussion is premised on threshold 
values under two regimes since two regimes have a more pragmatic economic interpretation. 
In panel A, we can deduce that if   a deviation from benchmark or optimal short-term interest 
rate of 1.0273% will persuade BBIs to change their leverage or liquidity (LIQBBI). Since 
this deviation is positive, it captures contractionary monetary policy. This is consistent with 
investor’s behavior where liquidity disappears rapidly during economic recession or when 
the Fed is pursuing contractionary monetary policy.  
Panel A also indicates that LIQBBI shifts to a new regime whenever adjusted 
financial condition index (AFCI) hits 0.1289 (financial stress condition starts to pick up). 
However, MBIs need to change their LIQMBI at a higher financial stress condition (0.6697). 
A positive AFCI indicates that financial markets are more uncertain and there is economic 
downturn. These results are consistent with monetary threshold values of FFDEV and BMG. 
LIQBBI (LIQMBI) will shift to a new regime when national economic activity index 
(NAEI) breaches the barrier of 0.6380 (-0.8691). In short, MBIs adjust their liquidity only 
when economic activities contract or declines (enter negative zone)unlike BBIs. 
MBIs will shift their liquidity (LIQMBI) to a new regime when interested rate 
deviation is 1.3292%. The BMG threshold values are 1.1419% and 0.0446% for LIQBBI 
and LIQMBI to switch regimes. Again, this represent a positive growth in money base 
which, consistent with FFDEV, represent a contractionary economic condition during which 
the Fed tries to increase liquidity into the economy or financial markets when faced with 
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liquidity trap.The fact the FFDEV and BMG threshold values (1.3292% and 1.1419% 
respectively) for LIQMBI are higher than those of LIQBBI (1.0273 and 0.0446 respectively) 
has important implications. One possible explanation is that a prolonged monetary policy 
stance has higher implications for the liquidity of MBIs.  This is because their assets and 
liabilities largely constitute marketable securities which have to be liquidated. They also take 
long and short positions in the market contingent on prevailing liquidity in the market and 
market interest. The second possible explanation is reaction time. Banks are more 
conservative hence react faster to changes in monetary policy changes. This could be due to 
regulations by the Fed or the need to avoid runs if a bank is highly leveraged and fails to 
meet its liquidity obligations.  
It is noteworthy that MBIs are not regulated by Fed and have no obligation to take 
less risk even under contractionary monetary policy. The third possible rational is that MBIs 
are unable to rewind their ‘repos’ and ‘reverse repos’ positions quickly hence their threshold 
is higher (longer reaction time). The fourth and last possible explanation is risk-taking 
behavior. Some MBIs such as FCs are characterized by high leverage and negative equity 
capital. By this very nature, MBIs continue with business as usual even as monetary policy 
stance signals the need to change liquidity regime. 
In panel A (bank-based institutions), all BBIs have different FFDEV threshold 
values. However, the BMG threshold values (1.1005, 1.2015 and 1.0922 for LIQCB, LIQCU 
and LIQSI respectively) all seem to coalesce around 1.1% money base growth rate below or 
above which there are different liquidity regimes. Therefore, as conduits of transmitting 
monetary policy, these institutions have synchronized reaction to changes in monetary 
aggregate (BMG). The negative FFDEV for LIQCB implies that commercial banks change 
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their leverage during economic boom which is punctuated by expansionary monetary policy. 
This is consistent with the threshold value of NEAI of LIQBBI (0.6380) which indicates 
increased economic activities which is spurred by expansionary monetary policy. The credit 
unions, which are member owned and are ideally non-profit making, shift their leverage or 
liquidity during contractionary monetary policy (FFDEV=1.0273%). This is the same for 
saving institutions which mostly engage in mortgage financing. The results in panel A (two 
regimes) provides evidence that BBIs have different FFDEV thresholds values above or 
below which they will change their liquidity.  
Panel B provides threshold values of FFDEV, BMG, AFCI and NEAI for three 
regimes. The results imply that the more the regimes, the higher the uncertainty and time 
variation of monetary policy tools, financial conditions (AFCI) and degree of economic 
activities (NEAI). 
Table 7: Estimation of Threshold values 
Table 7 shows the threshold values of FFDEV, BMG, AFCI and NEAI. A single threshold implies existence of 
two regimes. Two thresholds mean that three regimes exists. L is the number of lags.. Panel A shows the single 
threshold value (TH1) of FFDEV, BMG, AFCI and NEAI that separates two regimes. Panel B showstwo 
threshold values (TH1 and TH2) of FFDEV, BMG, AFCI and NEAI which separate three regimes. 
Panel A Threshold  variable 
FFDEV BMG AFCI NEAI 
1 Threshold (2 regimes) TH1 TH1 TH1 TH1 
FFDEV  0.9877
BMG  1.1915
LIQBBI 1.0273 0.0446 0.1289 0.6380
LIQMBI 1.3292 1.1419 0.6697 -0.8691
Bank-based institutions 
LIQCB -0.7022 1.1005
LIQCU 1.0273 1.2015
LIQSI 0.8395 1.0922
Panel B Thresholds variable 
2  thresholds (3 Regimes) FFDEV FFDEV BMG BMG AFCI AFCI NEAI NEAI
TH1 TH2 TH1 TH2 TH1 TH2 TH1 TH2
FFDEV  0.2273 1.0195
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BMG  -0.2291 1.2015
LIQBBI 0.4436 1.0273 0.0819 0.2241 0.1118 0.3982 0.2136 0.6380
LIQMBI -0.5689 1.0273 0.0756 1.1548 -0.1933 0.6697 -0.7141 0.1589
Bank-based institutions 
LIQCB -0.7022 -0.0499 0.4253 1.1005
LIQCU 1.0273 -0.0133 0.0756 1.2015
LIQSI 0.5611 0.9726 0.6403 1.0596
 
R. Regime Specific Impulse Response of liquidity to monetary stance 
 
Figure 1 and 2 shows the impulse response of LIQBBI to one standard deviation shock of 
LIQBBI and FFDEV in regimes 1 and 2. As expected, contractionary monetary policy 
(regime 1) has immediate impact on LIQBBI. The graph shows leverage or liquidity 
suddenly decline after just one month. However, the buildup of leverage in regime two is 
slow and seems to dissipate after 10 periods (Months). Therefore, there is differential 
reaction in the two regimes which further warrants the need for threshold modeling. Figure 
two is consistent with findings in table 7 where BMG threshold values vacillates around 
1.1%. BBI don’t seem to respond differently to BMG shocks since they are conduits of 
monetary transmissions. However, one standard deviation shock to LIQBBI has huge and 
immediate impact on the LIQBBI.  
Figure 3 and figure 4 show that MBIs react to FFDEV and BMG differently in both 
regimes. Perhaps, because of their risk-taking nature, LIQMBIs react more to negative 
FFDEV (which indicates expansionary monetary policy) than to contractionary monetary 
policy. This is certainly because they have locked-in repos and reverse repos agreements 
which they are unable to unwind quickly in regime 1. Unlike BBIs,, one standard deviation 
shock of LIQMBI has a positive impact on LIQMBI. 
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Figure 1: LIQBBI and FFDEV regime-specific shock 
 
 
Figure 2: LIQBBI and BMG regime-specific shock
 
This could be attributed to the positive relationship between assets and leverage (liquidity) of 
MBIs. However, according to figure 4, MBIs react more to decrease in money base growth 
(BMG) than increase in base money. This is because the high cost of financing leads to 
contraction of the liabilities side of their balance sheets. 
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Figure 3: LIQMBI and FFDEV regime-specific shock 
 
Figure 4: LIQMBI and BMG regime-specific shock 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study set out to investigate whether monetary policy stance have different effect on 
liquidity of BBIs and MBIs. I find evidence that supports hypothesis one since result 
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indicates that liquidity and equity of BBIs are more volatile due to misevaluation of assets 
and liabilities. The higher correlation between LIQMBI and AFCI on one hand and between 
LIQMBI and NEAI on the other, indicate that MBIs are more synchronized with financial 
and economic conditions relative to BBIs. This supports arguments by Adrian and Shin 
(2008) that LIQMBI is a good indicator of economic and financial conditions. Therefore, 
MBIs ought to be included as conduits of monetary policy transmission. Using GMM, 
TVAR and impulse response functions, I provide evidence that the structure of financial 
intermediaries matter in design and pursuit of a particular monetary policy. First, I find 
existence of both one and two thresholds (two and three regimes respectively) which define 
different liquidity regimes of both BBIs and MBIs. The identification of existence of these 
regimes is an indicator of uncertainty in monetary policy as postulated by Mankiw and 
Miron (1986). It is also a mechanism of allowing monetary policy stance to be time-varying 
since different regimes occur at different times. The threshold values of MBIs are higher 
than those of BBIs which have important implications for policy makers in design of 
monetary policy. BBIs do not respond to changes in base money growth while the reaction to 
FFDEV is rapid and magnified, perhaps due to conservative nature of BBIs or the need to 
meet regulatory capital and liquidity of overreaction to monetary policy changes. MBIs 
differently react to both FFDEV and BMG monetary stances. They experience higher 
expansion of liquidity or leverage under FFDEV during expansionary regime than in 
contractionary regime. MBIs liquidity (LIQMBI) respond more to BMG than BBIs. This is 
because BMG is implemented through sale and purchase of Treasury bills. MBIs use 
Treasury bills (and other tradable securities) as collateral while borrowing (repos) and accept 
the same as collateral while lending (reverse repos).It is safe to conclude that monetary 
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aggregate policy should be implemented through MBIs instead of BBIs while interest rate 
targeting by Fed should be aimed at BBIs. This is because BBIs and MBIs react 
asymmetrically to monetary policy shocks as they expect diverse scenario. It is thus credible 
to evaluate differently the response of LIQBBI and LIQMBI to contractionary and 
expansionary monetary policies. 
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